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:BIE:,IOGR.Al?HY 
CHAP'I'ER I 
I:NTRODUCTION 
1. 8tatem~ of the Problem 
The pr oblem of this dissert2tion i s to determine the 
adequacy of the concepts of some current p sycholo gi ~ s for 
their relevance and implications for understanding reli gion. 
Special at t enti on is paid to personalistic psychology. It 
is concerned mainly v':i th evalua ting the relationships of the 
concepts of some recent psycholo gies to problems of religious 
experience. The problem r aises at least three main ques-
tions. (1) What are the manifesta.tions of religion? (2) 
I n what ca tegories of psychology do the manifesta tions lie? 
(3) Are the conce:9ts in these various ca tegories of ~1sycholo­
gies sufficiently relevant c..nd adeouate for i nterpr eting re-
ligious phenomena? 
i. Im·oortance_ Qf the Problem. In r ec ent years most 
:;>sychologists have t ended to steer clear of any subject thc.t 
may be related f avor ably to religion or philosophy. Psy-
chology, whose business it is to study the mind and behavior 
of man, has tended to become the study of carefully selected 
areas of the mind; or it ha s renounced mind Emd focused its 
energies solely on behavior. This h as been for t he purpose 
of 1-\:e G.') i ng i t self r es ;"' ecta.ble as a 11 sci ence 11 • Thi s tr end 
h a s been ver y def i nite, i t seem~ sin ce th e arrival of be-
h a v i orism '::i t h its cla i m of being the n scien tific messiah" 
2 
of , sycholo gy. Ho~ever, the?e are some p sychologists ~ho 
vi ew the ~roblems of reli gion a s important from a p sychol o gi-
c e. l standl)oin t. 
Several differin g ''schools" of psychology exist. 
Each tends to cla im tha t it alon e gives an adequate inter n re-
t a t i on an d understandi n g of human behavior e.nd ex:_Jeri ence. 
One school of psychology, cl a iming tha t it covers all the 
h uman phenomena worth exl)l a i n ing, i gn ores the r eligiou s ph e -
n omena of p erson s. This is des oite the f' act tha t t he v a st 
ma jority of people in t h e v. orld possess and exhibit 2. reli gion 
of on e sort or another. Another school of psychology i t.J. t er-
"9 r e ts reli gious exp erien ce, but does so from its ov .. 11 ··J rticu-
l a r f-r 2.11e of reference. Thus, bece.u s e there a r e d i f fer ent 
p sychologie s , e a ch v.i t h c oncepts desi gned t o expl a in human 
behavior, and bec a use the se p sy cholo gies di f fer i n t h eir con-
Cc):otua l expl anation of psych ological problems of reli gion, 
there is a need for exami n ing the concep ts of curren t p sy cholo-
gies for t heir adequacy an d relevan ce in understa ndi ng r eli-
gious experience an d behavior. 
ii. Related Studies. Th ere h 2.v e b ee'.1 several p sy cho-
lo gica l studies of reli gion from t h e point of view of particu-
l c_ r schools of p sychology , i. e., a.pp l ying t h e concep ts of a 
3 
:9articular psychology to religious experience and beha,rior 
in order to understand them. Of the current schools, per-
hap s Sigmund Freud's application of the concepts of Freudian 
usychoanalysis to religion was one of the first. 
ing his concepts to reli gion, it is understood as an illusion 
~nd a form of obsessional neurosis.l Freud appar ently V!a s 
not avvare that by applying these same concepts to the atheist 
(", 
the results were the same.t:- Nevertheless, he made signifi-
cant contributions for understanding religion. 
J. H. Leuba3studied religion by applying mainly be-
havioristic concepts for its understanding. His conclusions 
''-'ere simi~ar to those of Freud's cmd his main contribution 
seems to be the disposal of the idea that fear is the ba sic 
emotion in religious experience. 
Alfred Adler4c.pplied the concepts of individual psy-
chology to religion and sees religion rooted in the nature of 
persons and their psychical structure because of the inevitabl.e 
comparison of huma.ni ty as it is with the ideals of perfection. 
Inferiority feeling s 11 '1 th subsequent striving for perfection 
1 S. Freud, The ~~r= 
(London:Hogarth Press, 
2 See P. E. Johnson, npsychoanalyzing the Atheisttt. 
Christian CenturY, 53 (Fee .. , 1936). 
3 J. H. Leuba, A Psychglogical Stud~ Q! Religion. 
(N ev~- York: MacMillan Co., 1912}. 
4 Alfred Adler u. Ernst Jahn, Religion ~ Individual-
usychologie. (Leipzig:Verlag Rolf Pa sser, 1933}. 
4 
and completion as ) resented by religion i s the resul t. 
Carl Jung applies the concepts of his analytical p sy-
chology to religion and this is treated later in the disser-
r::: 
t a tion . 0 The above men tioned psychologists have specifical-
ly appl ied their concepts to religion. There are others 
vvho have written from these point s of view on subjects having 
a bearing on religion. But the above are the main recent 
9sychologists who have appl ied their concepts to religion in 
order to understand it. Seward Hiltner has reviewed many 
of' the psychological vmrks tha t are relevE:nt to a psychologi-
cal understanding of religion. 6 He points out s i gnificantly 
t hat many a theologian f c.ces the temptation of accepting a 
·9sychology because the psychologist has avowedly Christian 
a ssumptions, or does not deny Christi an assumptions, " vd thout 
any apparatus for judging the psychology itself vhich is pro-
fessedly based on t hese assurnptions".7 It is at this point 
tha t this dissertation is related to these previous studies 
by providing a 111 ethod by ,_._·hich the various psychologies may 
be evaluated as ·to their relevance and adequacy for interpreting 
religion. 
5 see p.79 f. below. 
6 Seward Hiltner, "The Psychological Understanding of 
Religion", Cro zer Quarter1y, 24 (Jan., 1947), p. 3f . 
7 I bid., p. 16. 
5 
2. General pe:rinition Qf Personalistic Psychology 
Pe~sonalistic psychology is the science of selves or 
per sons. A person (or self') is defined as the exy erien cer, 
unifier, and regulator of conscious sta tes and processes. Al -
t hough personalistic 1Jsychologists differ in details about the 
cha r acteristics of t he person , they appear to be in agreement 
on the above de:fi:nition or the person. 8 Personalistic psvchol.-
.. =-
ogy is ba sed on the :fact that every con sciou sness ex-peri ences 
i ts el.:f as belonging together and a s <x:>ntmu<?Ue ·: with past and 
:future exp eriences i n a unique way . 
Personalistic psychology is a philosophical psychology 
in that it r elies upon human reason to supplement empirical 
da t a . Per sonalistic psychology has been nurtured by person-
alistic philosophy and ha s in turn garnered much or t h e evi-
dence which personalistic philosophy interpr e ts. It often -
attempts to t ackle t he philosophic al problems or psychology 
which other schools avoid. 
i. ~istinctions From Other Psychologies. Per so~ali s tic 
psychology declares tha t nothing less th8.n the v\rhole person 
i s the basic da tum of' p sychology. It is concerned with r e-
l a t ing the vv-hole of men t al life to the person who is its car-
rier and ori ginator. It is distinguished from t ypological 
8 See v;:. Stern 's General psvchologx, Tr. H. Spoerl 
(Neve York::Macmilla n Co., 1938) and E. s. Brightman's Intro-
duction to Philosophy (New York: Holt Co., 1925) f or t vvo super-
ficially different but basically similar definitions. 
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p sychologies in its emphasis on the V·.-hole :p erson r2.ther than 
a dominant physical, mental, or social characteristic. It 
has a grea t deal i n common 'v1:·i th Gestalt psychology vd th its 
emphasis on v.:holes and patterns of mental life. It differs 
from Gestalt psychologies mainly i n its interest i n the prob-
lems of lasting structure r a ther than the moment2,ry patterns 
of behavior. · Funct i onal . ::_ ptiychology. -~~ empnaeizeiJ the ends 
toward which consciousness strives and does not concern itself 
a great deal about that wh :ich is strivil1g for ends, or adjust-
ments. Thus it differs from personalistic psychology in that 
the latter is interested in both the means and ends and t h EL t 
v.:hi ch i s using means and striving for ends . A behavioristic 
psycholo gy denies or ignores the impor t ance of consciousness, 
it has very little i n common v.~i th a psychology v:hich makes 
consciousness a basal fact. Personalistic psychology agrees 
v;i th hormic psychology in its stress on goals of per sonality, 
but many contemporary persona~ists do not agree on the causes 
of goal seeking, especially of the instinctive t;>tpe. . Fer- _ -
sonaTistic psychology reali zes the importance of uncon scious 
motiva tion vvhich the dept1. psychologies hold as par amount :for 
the understanding of hume.n being s. Hovcev er , persona listic 
psychology stresses the conscious selectivity and relative au-
tonomy of t he person in contrast to the relative enslavement 
of the uerson by his unconscious drives, fears, etc. 
A distinction may be made between ) ersonalistic psy-
7 
clTJlo gy a.nd sci entific psycholo gy i n gener&l. Sci entifi c 
~sycholo gy i s i nt erested i n the f ects of ment al life fo r 
I t is s ometi mes refer r ed t o as "p sycho logy 
~ithout a soul" . Put since sci entific sychology hc.s its 
-o rincipal value i n the ar ea of ex;"J l 2,nation of c ausal r ela-
tion s , mental acts ce.nnot be easily expl 8i ned ap&.rt fr oc. t he 
'Jsrson v-h::· has t hem . Personalis t ic p sychology gr epple s ~ ith 
the ·pr obl em of t he ba sis or substr c:.tu..m of ac ts and i s th8re-
fore many t imes desi gna t ed as a philosophical p syc 1olo gy. 
ii. Personalistic Philoso.n.P4 and Personal i s t ic Ps~.rcholo-
.ID:· Personalistic philosophy vi ews reality E-S teleological 
&s ouuosed t o me chanistic pri nciples. I t r elies on coherence 
a.s the criterion of truth and is epi stemol ogically dualistic. 
It holds t hat personal i ty (person or s elf) i s the ~ey t o reali-
ty and the most c:.dequate philosophic al principle. Stc-1 ted 
briefly , i t i s th f) me t aphysical vi ev.· v·-hich holds tha t all ex-
istence is ex]erience and all experience i s ~ersonal. Every-
t h ing tha t exis ts is a s elf or an aspect of s elf, or a society 
of s elves . 9 t.s a philosophy , its t c; sk i s t o i ''.. t er pr et e:x:per-
i ence as a \''hole c:md v:ill of necessity i n clude ~;sycholo gy , 
history , sociology, and the other s c i ences for its da t a . Per-
sonalis t ic psychology , i t f i nds , provides a more ade~ua t ~ 
be s is for inter~r e ting ex~ eri ence than the other school of 
9 Bri gh t nc..n , "A Per sone.listic \Tiev-;- of Human Natur e", 
Reli gi q_n £-.D:-.1 Life, 4 (May , 1 947), p . 35. 
psychology. As personalistic psychology finds speculative 
... - . - .... 
support for its findings in the realm of final causality in 
personalistic philosophy, the two share mutual interpenetra-
tion. Personalistic philosophy depends upon personalistic 
psychology for its psychological data. 
3. Nature .Q.!: the Data 
As the first part of this study will be a brief survey 
-
of some contemporary schools of psychology in their implica-
. . . 
tiona for understanding religion, they have been grouped under 
four main headings: typological, behavioristic, Gestalt, and 
- .. 
depth psychologies. The selection of these four divisions of 
psychological study is to guide somewhat devel~pment~lly the 
study of religious intimations in concepts of current psychology. 
In order to do as much justice as possible to each school in 
such a brief survey, the psychologists who have exerted a 
great deal of historical influence _ in their fi.el~ and who, 
as well, have treated some of the topics that may be related 
' - . -
to a better understanding of religion are those selected 
for study. 
Eduard Spranger, whose Le\fens:f'ormen (Types o:f' Men} is 
o:f'ten cited is generally considered to be a promi-
nent representative of typological. psychology. His typology 
- . ~ . . . . .. 
· is based upon values rather than physiology. Most current 
... - -
typologies are based on physiological characteristics of per-
sons. Since r eligion i s pr imarily a value experience, . 
Spranger's typolo gy for the pur 9ose of t his dissertation 
1vell represents typologie c..! psychology. 
The late Kurt Lewin more them the other prominent 
Gestaltists concentrated his studies on the whole person in 
9 
his relationships with his environment. Kohler and Koffka , 
the other t wo prominent GestaTtists, were more or less pioneers 
in the movement and appeared to be more interested in percep-
tion and animal psychology. However, both have contributed 
to problems of experience and personality. Nevertheless, 
it should be worth while to compare the dyna.mic tbeory of per-
sonality of Lewin's to those of the personalistic psycholo-
gists. 
Orthodox behaviorism is represented by J. B. Watson. 
However, many contemporary behaviorists are far removed from 
V!atsont s original tenets. A leading behaviorist, E. C. Tol-
man, repres ents the typical modern behaviorism. Th e basic 
tenets are the same, but a view more consistent 1.\' i th a widened 
scope of problems makes his vi ews more repres entative of con-
temporary behaviorism. His writings on personality comprise 
one view of motor ~sycholo g ies . 
Depth psychology s_in.c-e Freud ha s been divided i n to 
several ;Jrotestant groups against orthodox Freudianism. The 
implications for understanding reLigion may be seen from one 
of thes e representa tives of depth usychology. The original 
10 
poin t of view· of Freud, the founder, t akes an anti-reli gious 
view. Carl Jung, who is widely acclaimed by religionists 
is studied because he represents a somewhat neutral or impar-
tial point of view. Fritz Kunkel for his open advocacy of 
religion represents the pro-religious view. Allred Adler's 
i ndividual psychology obviously has many implic ations for re-
ligion. However, both are omitted arbitrarily for conven-
ience. The impartial view of Jung seems fairer to depth psy-
chology in representing its concepts related to religion. 
Since the main problem of this dissertation is to de-
termine the suggestions for understanding religion and reli-
gious persons, the personalistic psychologists are treated in 
dete.il. This division of the data requires a more explicit 
understanding and background. 
There a r e many psychologists who share the personalis-
tic ways of thinking up to a certain point. Some of these 
may be called personalists in a limited way. For example, 
V.'undt, Ti tchener, and J 2.mes defined psychology as the study 
of experience as dependent upon some personal subject.lO But, 
having made the definition, all three proceeded as if unav,·are 
of the latter part of their definition. Since the works of 
such writers do not follOi~~ up the personalistic trend of 
thought, they will not be considered data for th i s study. 
W .Allport, Personality (New York:Holt, 1937), p . 549. 
• "a • 
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The da ta for this study are the writings of those 
authors v:ho have contributed directly to the matn stream of 
:9ersonalistic thinking. Another criterion for the data is 
that the author's influence has been instrumental in the dis-
seminati on and defense of personalistic psychology. In other 
i'rords, the. da ta consists of the writings of unmistakable per -
sonalists. Those writers whos e interests were i n the -p erson 
secondarily to other emphases in psychology are not considered 
a.s . ch e data of this study. Borden Parker Bo~ne : , Mary Vniton 
Calkins, William Stern, and Gordon Willard Allport seem to be 
the main representa tives of personalistic psychology. 
Borden Parker BoV~rne (1847-1910), l a te professor of phi-
losophy in Boston University, is considered to be the systema-
tizer of personalism.Ll Bowne ·was born a t Leonardville, New 
Jersey on January 14, l847.I~vas graduated from New York Uni-
versity in 18'71 and studied from 1873 to 1875 at the Universi-
ties of Gottingen, Paris, and Halle. He was especially in-
fluenced by the philosophers Lotze and Ulrici. He became ~Jro-
fessor of philosoyhy in Bo ston University in 1876 and held 
this post until his death despite ma~y more attractive offers 
from such universities as Yale , Ch...icago, a nd Johns Hoykins.l2 
Bov'TI.e' s gr eates t interest was in philoso ~1hy as was the 
ll Knudson, .Thg Ph:j_losouhx .Qf Personalism (Nev,• York: 
Abingdon, 1927), p. 433. 
1" r~ Ibid., P• 19. 
12 
cas e V\'ith mo s t of such vYriters a t the time. Only one of 
more than a dozen published v~'orks was specifically on ~Jsy-
chology. Even among his many articles in various journ2ls 
only a few dwell specifically on psychology. But in his 
Introduction to Psychologic al Theory13 are to be found some 
of the fo1..mdations of personalistic psychology that will be 
discovered again B.nd again by l a ter psychologists in the .fu-
ture. For Bowne, personality was as ultimate a principle 
psychologically as it was philosophically. He wa s one of the 
first to use the .term "personalism'' in the English language. 14 
His influence is felt now more than v':'hen he lived because of 
the number and quality of students he influenced. It is with 
the psychological data of Bo\~e that this study begins. 
The vvri ttngs of Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930) covered 
a wide range of psychological and philosophical subjects. 
They were in the main a development of Josiah Royce's monistic 
and personalistic idealism. Born in Hartford, Connecticut 
on March 30, 1863, :Miss Calkins attended Smith and Radcliffe 
Colleges. She studied as a guest of Harvard University and 
also studied at the University of Leipzig. She began t .;;~ach-
ing at Wellesley Col.lege in 1887 and continued there until 
her death on February 26, 1930. 
The great ma jority of her almost one hundred published 
!3 Published in 1886 by Harper Brothers in Ne~ York. 
~4 Knudson, Dhilosonhy Q! Personalism, p. 17. 
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articles and books were for the advocacy and defense of the 
·oersonalistic trend of thought. She is probably the most 
-rddely quoted author on self-psychology. Her writings con-
stitute the second phase of the development of personalistic 
9sychology. 
In 1906 a young German psychologist published the first 
volume of a philosophical work called Person und Sache in 
which he set forth the found at:iom of a system that he call.ed 
"Critical Personalism". This young psychologist was William 
Stern v- ho was born April 29 , 1871 in Berlin. He did his 
col.lege and graduate work at the University of Berlin. His 
views were affected by Ebbinghaus, Vi!undt, and Dil they in the 
field of psychology. His philosophy was i nfluenced by the 
vmrks of Aristotle, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Stern taught for 
nineteen years at the University of Breslau before going to 
the newly created University of Hamburg. There he remained 
until coming to P~erica after being expelled by the Nazis in 
1935. He taught at Duke University until his death t wo 
yee.rs later. 
Stern made significant contributions in a hail dozen 
:fields of psychology, notably in differential and child psy-
chology. He arrived at his system of personalism using the 
knowledge and experience he had gained from many years of 
v.rorl-c in psychology. The undivided totality of the person is 
the poi nt of departure throughout. He regarded his psycholo-
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gy as a branch of a more generalized science of Personal.is-
..:li.£.§. which is outlined with its bearings on metaphysics, 
epistemology, and axiology in the three volumes of Person 
und Sache. However, his Psychologie auf Personalimus 
Grundpunkt was not -~Jublished until 1937. His most viidely 
!_cnown student in .America is Gordon w. Allport. 
Gordon "Willard Allport (1897-}, although avrare of 
philosophical problems, is the only personalistic psycholo-
gist in the study v;_,ho has not developed a philosophical sys-
tem. His writings have been mainly on the psychological 
level. Allport was born in Montezuma, Indiana, on November 
11, 1897. He received his college and graduate degrees from 
Harvard University. He studied also at the Universities of 
Hamburg, Berlin, and Cambridge. He taught at Robert College, 
Istanbul, Turkey, and Dartmouth College before coming- to Har-
vard to teach. He has remained at Harvard until the present 
time. 
Although he was influenced a great deal by William 
Stern, Allport has nevertheless developed his ovm personalis-
tic psychology. His contributions have been mainly in the 
field of personality. He has been very influential in help-
ing to remove the study of personality from the borderline 
of the sciences and putting it on an empirical basis. His 
emphasis on the expansion of the bounds of psychology to in-
clude the person has been well placed. Because he represents 
. ·, 
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9ne of the contemporary peaks in the devel.opment -of personal.i a-
tic psychology his writings constitute the final data of this 
study. 
4. Method. 
The data for this study are gathered from l i brary re-
sources. Such data c~nsist_ of the principa~ psychological 
wri tinge of the four main representati vee of P.ersonali s~i? 
psychology. With this are included such secondary sources as 
have a direct bearing on the respective representa tives and 
. .. 
issues of this thesis. 
The main writings of the representatives of the other 
current psychologies selected for study are data for this 
study for the purpose of comparison and contrast. 
The data are treated as developed in historical se-
quence except that personalist.ic _ psycholo_gy is treat_ed la_st~ 
But· its representatives are treated as they developed in his-
torical sequence. 
The current psychologies other than personalistic psy-
chology are treated with respect to their _ gener~ po.si tion 
toward religion as well as the ph11osophica1 position which 
. . . 
helps to determine their attitude, whether such phil.osophical 
position is expressed or implied. An attempt is made to_ d~_s­
cern just what their conception of the origin and motive of 
- - - ~ 
religion is. Does religion serve any purpose or have any 
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value in personality? If so, what is it, and if not, why? 
The attempt is to determine the emphases of each psychology 
and its effects f or a psychological understanding of religion. 
5 • .Il§.!initions 
Religion is defined as cooperation and communic a tion 
vli th the Creator and Sustainer of values .15 The cooperation 
and commrn1fcation are expressed in attitudes, feelings, de-
sires, intentions, and behavior by means of an organi zed uni-
ty of sensing, feeling, thinking, wanting, 1."TTmYing , ougi::ting, 
and willing. Coopera tion and communication with the Creator 
and Sustainer of values may be i iJ. i ti a ted vd thin the person 
by trauma (a highly intensified experience of God), search, 
or 1 earning. It is affected by intellectual, physical, 
temperamental, and emotional needs. As cooperation and com-
munication become organized by the person, religion assumes 
a driving power tha t coalesces with other needs or becomes 
more or less differentiated from them. It seems best 
characteri zed as a sentiment. However, it is a sentiment 
tha t is embracing in scope, relatively enduring, and striv-
ing tm·•-ard go al.s. 
This definition of religion makes a distinction be-
t ween personal and i ns titutional religion. The latter is 
15 p. E. Johnson, Psychology of Re~igion (Ne·w York: 
Abingdon-Col.cesbury, 1945), p. 30f. 
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a stimulator for personal religion, a mediator (so to speak) 
between the person and God, and a preserver of religi:Jus in-
strumentalities. 
Religious experience .is defined as the consciousness 
of communicating and cooperating with God. It involves 
awareness, search, recognition, and purposeful activity. Re-
ligious behavior refers to the acts i nvolved in cooperation 
and communication vd th the Creator and Sustainer of values. 
B.eligiosi ty refers to the arousal &.nd expression of the re-
ligious sentiment within the person. 
By religious implications is meant ·what the concepts 
of psychology reveal for a psychological understanding of re-
ligion. Religious implications of a psychology are deter-
mined by the relevance, s ignificance, and adequacy of its 
concepts for understanding religion. 
6. Procedur~ 
A fr ame of reference consisting of those areas of psy-
chology most conducive to a psychological understanding of 
religion by which the adequacy of psychologies may be deter-
mined is given in t he second chapter. Some represen tatives 
of current psychologies are examined from this point of view 
as to the adequacy of their concepts. This comprises the 
third chapter. It ·will serve as a background of contrast 
for personalistic psychology. 
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Bovme's psychology contains some germs of the later 
deve~opment of personalistic psychology. Because Bovvne 
seemed to have had introvert tendencies as regards his com-
temporaries, he did not gain the popularity commensurate wita 
his attainments. His Vi.Ti tings have been largely overlooked 
by historians. He seldom quoted others, and in t urn, was 
seldom quoted by others. His works, however, still furnish 
a solid foundation for a personalistic psychology. To indi-
cate this, his psychology is present ed in Chapter Three. 
Calkins represents another tributary flo wing into the 
main stream of personalism. Most of her ~Titings were in 
psychology. She has often been designated as one of the 
greatest defenders of personalism. Her contributions repre-
sent, in many respects, a development of suggestions outlined 
by Bovme and Ro~~ce. However, she far exceeded the psychologi-
ca~ contributicnsof Bovme. Some implications of her thought 
furnish the data for Chapter Five. 
Stern brings to personalism a varied background in 
many fields of psychological research unequalled in richness 
by other personalists. His psychology represents a recon-
struction of general psychology arol.llld the person. He 
creates new concepts and extends old dimensio ns in order to 
characterize the unique and individual person. His psycholo-
gy is examined in the sixth chapter. 
Following suggestions outlined by Stern, Jl~lport at-
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tempts to extend and reconstruct the bounds of psychology to-
include the individual person and the organi~ation of his ten-
dencies that characterize his unique adjustments. His con-
tributions toward an adequate understanding of religion are 
noted in the seventh chapter. 
The eighth chapter contains the summar.y and conclu-
eions. 
CHAPTER II 
RELIGION AND PSYCHOLOGY 
This chapter is intended as a background against which 
the merits as well as the demerits of personalistic psycholo-
gy may be seen for understanding religion. An analysis of 
religio'ti~ r_-, _:.,:; experience and religious behavior is given so 
that there may be clarity as to what psychological concepts 
attempt to explain. A frame of reference by .... ~.:hich the ade-
quacy of psychological concepts can be evaluated for an under-
standing of religi on is then given. 
L. Reli gious Experience. Religio us experience is the 
awareness of communication or cooperation with the Creator 
and Sustainer of values. This awareness may arise through 
the effect of stimuli symbolic of the Creator or of various 
aspects of communication and cooperation with Him. It may 
arise a s a result of a conscious search for the stimuli, a 
search for Him, or from a ttempts to cooperate with Him. 
There is an interpretation of the stimuli, a judgment or 
r eco gnition of His presence or communica tion vfith Him.l 
I P. E. Johnson, Psychol.ogy: pf Religion (New York: 
Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1942), pp. 34f. 
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. - Religious experience may also come about through 
a learning process ( suggestion, imitation, ins i ght, etc.) a s 
vrell as by direct communication. It inevitably i nvolves con-
scious processes a s well as unconsci 8us processes. There is 
organization of "! . . experience, a selectivity, guidance, and 
r egulating v1Thich is orien ted toward the future. It af.fects 
behavior tendencies. Because it is an exp erience of communi-
cation and cooperation, it is essentially an i n terpersonal 
ex-oerience. 
This definition of reli gious ex9erience thus r eveals 
tha t there is an organi zed unity of thinking, feeling, ,~ow-
ing, wantiiig, sensing , and willing. Regardless of ho~ the 
experience is ultima tely generated, it is a con scious experi-
ence and must be dealt v~ri th on tha t level. The n·whyn of 
such experience i nvolves the problem of motivation. The 
experience is tha t of interacting persons. These aspects 
o.f · . religious experience thus constitute a fr ame of refer-
ence by which the adequacy and usefulness of the concepts of 
a psychology may be judged for understanding the religious 
experience. 
Reli g ious experience does not sta.nd isola ted from be-
havior. The importance of religious experience such a s 
prayer, meditation, etc., i s thc t it affects behavior. How-
ever, what may be judged as religious behavior from the 
standpoint of the observer, may not be so judged by the in-
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di vidual himself a,nd vice versa. 
ii. Reltgjous Behavior. Religious behavior nay be de-
fi ned a. s the acts of the i ndividual in a tt emp ting to communi-
c a te or coopera t e "-.i th God. Such behavior may be con scious, 
delibera te, and intended or it may be uncon scious and automatic. 
As conscio ~s action, it is mar ked by i t s direction to~ard God 
or toward the fulfillment or promotion of His Will. V'fu en 
such behavior is unconscio usly performed, its direction is 
the same, but such behavior h<:~ s become ordered under some sys-
tem which the i ndividual develops to f acilitate such adjust-
ment. Thus religious behavior is understood by a ~mm·:ledge 
of the personal orga.nization of' systems of' tendencies to ac-
tion as well as by a ,m owledge of t he significance of exper-
ience for such behavior. 
includes personality. 
The fr ame of reference therefore 
Under r elig i ous behavior are those aspects of personal 
religion as the loyal testing of religious beliefs, obedience 
to the divine will , and acting on religious principles r a t h er 
than convention.2 Worship and other forms of group partici-
pation for communica tion and cooperation with God ar e 2.lso 
s ignificant c:. spects of reli gious behavior. 
2 P. E. Johnson, Psycholggx of Religion, Ch. 7. 
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2. frame o! Reference 
There are a t least five religious problems tha t psy-
chology can i nves tigate: relig ious ex:l)erience, its orgB.niza-
tion, motivation, the de!elcpment -~ of enduring systems or be-
havior tendencies, and its interpersonal character. These 
:factors are directly related to religion and are vital for 
its understanding. The adequacy of the concepts of a psy-
chology for interpreting religious experience and behavior 
may be evaluated from such a frame of reference. However, 
there are tv.'O other fa.ctors that may be considered. They 
are the postula tes and presuppositions of a psychology. These 
are dealt with first. 
i. Postulat.e.s Q! Psychology . Psychology c annot escape 
the determinants set by its premises. The postula tes of a 
psychology determine its metaphysical baeii.& 'I.S well as its 
attitude and usefulness to religious understandt ng , z.l though 
psychology has no effect upon the truth or validity of r el.i-
'7. gious experience. 0 Psychologists postula te at least four 
propositions in at tempting to make psychology a!} independent 
science.4 Because psychology is i n terested i n the ~orld in 
so :far .. a s it may become an object of knowledge, "the Existence 
........--·-----:3 :r. S. Moore, The Found_atio n12, f2!.. ,£sychology (Princeton: 
Princeton U. Press, 1921), p. 122. . 
4 Condensed fr om Moore and Gurnee, FoundatioM Q!. £.mc-
chol.ogy (Princeton :Princeton u. Press, 1933), pp . 134 f. 
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of the Material World"5must be postulated. Given the ma. ter-
ial v.: orld., psychology is interested in the processes by which 
v:--e come to know this reality. The nature of the materia:t 
world is left to metaphysics, physics, geology, etc. 
The second postulate is "the Existence of Consciousnessrr.6 
This postulate is essentiEl for psychology in that conscious-
ness is the subject matter 6f psychology. Consciousness is 
presupposed by the science of psychology, behaviorism to the 
contrary .. no t wi ths tanding. The argument of behaviorism, how-
ever, is not that consciousness does not exist, but that the 
subject matter of psychology is human responses to stimuli.7 
The behaviorist simply has no need for consciousness as the 
subject matter of psychology, because objective behavior meets 
his needs. He contends that consciousness is not only non-
objective, but confusing as well. Nevertheless, no behavior-
ist can rationally state that his discernment of the meaning 
of a response is the product of his viscera and g~ands, etc. 
t!Qrgc;.nismic behavior" is meaningless unless there is a con-
scious mind to interpret it. The main fallacy in behavior-
ism is that the behaviorist uses the most important e.spect of 
5 Ibid., p. 159. 
6 Ibi~., p. 16. 
7 W. s. Hunter, "Psychology and lmthroponomyn, ch. 7 in 
C. :Murchison (ed.), Psychplogies of 1925 (Worcester::Clark U. 
Press, 1925), pp. 896:f. 
himself, his co~1. sciousne ss, f or 1..mderstanding others, but 
overlooks t he consciousness of others. 
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The "Interrelation of Consciousness and the Material 
World" is a very complex postula te.s It involves t wo subor-
dinate postula tes, nam ely, (1) "tha t consciousness can be 
studied only so f ar a s it is connected with some definite hu-
mc:m or ganism", a.nd (2) "that the i n terrelation be b '1 een con-
sciousness and the world beyond the~ (italics i n t h e 
originai) is al ways through the medium of the i n.dividual body 
--- especially t he nervous system ••••••• '1 Moore calls the 
l a tter a "psycho-physical" and t he former a "psycho-physiologi-
cal" i nterrela tion. 
He holds tha t t he i nterrela t ion betvveen conscio usness 
and external objects (beyond the body) is of t wo types. The 
first type is the nerceutual relation and the second, the 
conative relation. Thus psychology mus t postula te a. true 
knovJledge of t he materiE.l worl.d by the mind and an effective 
power of the mind to make changes in the rna teri a.l ,_,:orld. As 
this i n terrela tion is indirect and evidence points to behavior 
c aused by consciousn es s t h ere arises the phys iologic al inter-
"t" e l.e.t ion b e t ween c on sciousness and its orga nism. This p ostu-
l a te also i nvolves t wo subordinate ones. The f ir s t is that 
all mental processes have physiological conditions and t he 
8 J. S. Moore, Founda tions of Psychology, p . 160. 
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second is tha t all mental processes tend to express themselves 
yhysiologically. This is the principle of IlSychocerebral 
parallelism. It is opposed to the principle of ~Jsychophysi-
cal interactionism. It is postulated by those who desire to 
do so because of some evidence and because it fits into their 
scheme of thinking. It is unacceptable because it may be a 
uart of the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth. 
The ~ la~r t ruth seems to lie in the fourth postulate. 
It is that concerning the prinq:,~ple of independent psychical 
causation or i n teractionism. Psychological science postu-
lates the "Uniformity of Mental Life". More complex than 
the pos tulc:,tes of uniformity of other sciences, the 9 sycholo-
gist yet has to postulate a degree of uniformity of mental 
life along vd th natural science postulating the uniformity of 
the ~orld of objects of consciousness. This fourth postu-
late is not widely held by psychologists, especially the result-
ing pri.nciple of independent psychical causation. 
This postulate is usuallY - (J l:~ held by personalists. 
The basic considerations for this view are the purposiveness 
of human beings, compr .ehension, memory, and expectation, and 
the synthesizing poV~:er of the mind. 9 This 9ostula te i s to 
the effect tha t the mind and the body are distinct and they 
interact v,i th each other. Thus the mind is not a product of 
---g 
See C. E. M. Joo.d, How the Mind v,~orks (New York: 
?hilosophical Library, 1947) ., ch. 2. 
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the body, neither does it merely reflect the body; the mind 
is capable of i:ni tiating thought and actions of v,-hich the 
body is the registering accompaniment. Likewise, bodily 
conditions may affect the mind. 
Parallelism errs i n overlooking the fact that there 
is a difference between ·bodily and mental activities and the 
facts that there is no one-to-one correspondence and i nter-
dependence bebreen them. Mental processes are non-spatial 
v~here&.s bodily processes .:;.re successive or side by side. 
Consci01_1s striving, furthermore, is unknown outside of the 
mind. If one accepts the principle of psychophysical paral-
lelism, then one understands religion as the psychological 
accompaniment of bodily processes . In that case, the reli-
gious quest is doomed before it is started because the aware-
ness, search , .:md recognition of God is but a vsychological 
manifestation of physiological processes. It leads to a 
dead end. The principle of psychophysical interaction is 
more pregnant with possibilities. As such, it is more rele-
va.nt to 2. :!_)Sychological understo.nding of religion because it 
gives a more coherent basis for physiologic al reactions as 
a result of psycholo gical causes such as -reli gious belief, 
prayer, etc. 
The acceptance of psychophysical interactionism leads 
to a_n understanding of religion in terms of conscious striv-
ing, intention, and expectation, which may be affected by 
conditions of the body, but not necessarily determined by· 
t hem. 
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ii. Presuuuo sitions. There are philosophic al pr e sup-
positions tha t mark psycholo gi es and help t o determine their 
value f or understanding religion. Psychologies whose v:orld 
view presupposes the> t the y,orld is a machine and tha t men t al 
phenomena are mechanically determined, see no purpo se in the 
"'Iorld. All is determined by mechanical anteceden ts.lO There 
is no r~om for independent psychical causation. This presup-
position stems from the isomorphic, epi phenomenc.l, and paral.-
lelistic postulates. Such a presupposition precludes the 
essenti E. l purpose of religion. The vrorld not being designed 
by an Intelligep.ce, all is left to mere chance. Many philos-
ouhies and all religions t estify to the i nadequ acy of such a 
view. 
The postula te of interactionism lea.ds to a presupposi-
tion that the '·"·orld is c;, resul t of intelligence and tha t there 
is a pl an which man discovers (natural la1.vs). It i ndica tes 
tha t religion may h ave a sound basis. At least, it does not 
prejudice one i n advance either way. 
A psychology may be char acterized by an anti-rationa1is-
tic bias. By this is meant tha t the psychologist a ttempts 
to resort to sensory experimental verification ~lone f or 
10 E. s. Brightman, Introduction to Philosouhy, pp . 25lf. 
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truth. He abhors rational psychol.ogy as na ture c..bhors a. 
vacuum. Thc;.t much of the da ta of psychol.ogy cannot be sub-
jected to universal experimental verification is a fact be-
cause each individual exhibits manifestations tha t are unique 
and l awful only to the individual and general conclusions 
must be based upon reason. Witness experimental verifica-
tion of an experience of love, f or example, if one c an. 
Such a bias stems, in part a t least, from rejecting the meth-
od of introspection. It so happens that religious experi enc e 
cannot always be subjected to many experimental t ests. As 
a result of a lc.ck of r ational interpreta tions of i n trospec-
tion in a -psychology, t here exists very l .i ttle helpfulne ss 
f or understanding religion because re~igious exp erience is 
mostly private and has to be studied i n trospectively. 
iii. The Self. As a result of mechani stic and deter-
ministic emphases there is little need for a director and 
governor of responses i n some psychologies and no possibility 
of the person having any freedom or choice of responses. As 
an objection to such antipathy _to - experience, concepts of self, 
person, ego, and the lil(e, account for the "unity cind multi-
plicity, continuity, and change, identity and di f ference with-
in human experience!' .11 
11 SeeP. A. Bertocci ,'~ersonality", in P. Harriman (ed.) 
:Rncycl ouedia of P sychol.ogy (Ne1-v York :Philosophical Library, 
1.946), p . 456 . 
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Psychologically, the person-concept seeks to ex9l ain 
r eli gi on i n terms of the organized whole of mu1titudinou s 
re s -Jonses . It seeks to escape microsco -;Jic vievrs of explana-
tion in terms of a toms and elements of beha,rior such as the 
reflex arc, stimulus-response, and unconscious mechanism.l2 
While these parts of the vYhole h ave an import2.nt f unction, 
they are of necessity to be viewed only as parts. The self 
concept seeks to give objective per§pecti'\le ;to the ll'!hole of 
ex-o erience and to its parts. such a concept seems indis-
r)ensible for a -p sycholo gic e:~l u..nderstanding of religion a s 
'1,:ell as nersonali ty. Hov: else could the u..ni ty, identity, 
and multi:?lici ty of experience be exp1ained than by such a 
concept?l3 The self gives a unifier c_nd identifier of the 
many conscious actions. It unites past and future vd th the 
present and gives order to what otherwise would be chaos. 
Psychologies that overlook such a regulatory principle miss 
an imnortant as~ect of the meaning of reli gion to the person. 
They fail to state vYhether the body is the experiencer, or 
just ~hat ex- eriences. 
i v. Exnerience. The fragmentary life of consciousness 
is the life of ex~erience. Johnson has outlined a t least 
12 SeeP. E. John son, Psychologv of Religion, p. 3f . 
1~ ( 
.___, See '\Fm. James, l? svcholof..y, val. I New York:.Hol t Co., 
18~0) , pp . 529f. AlsoP. A. ~?rtocci, )hilg~o9hy Q! nerson-
allty (unpub. syll. , Boston Un1v., 1 948 , p. 5. 
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four steps in the proc ess of becoming conscious.14 These 
steps are selec t ive a ttention, a process of s earch , a judg-
ment of r ecognition, 2nd purposeful activity . Experi enc e 
and the process of becomi ng a'Nare are overlook ed by behavior-
ists. i.r.;'a tson m1ce defined personality a s "but t he end prod-
uct of our habit systems".l5 
Because r eligi on is a conscious ~n·ocess it c an be dealt 
v:ith most ad equa tely by a psychology of consciousness . Un-
consciousness, ~echanisms , habits, and gl ands may affect the 
pr ocess of consciousness , but religion is neverthel ess f irst 
and for emo s t & conscious exp erience. The lli!conscious and 
super-conscious ·phases are supplements to eJ~_·-~laining the con-
scious religi ous experience. 
There seems to be a tendency nmv to 
view psychology as a study of human dynamics. Such a vi ew 
is no t new. It continues the vie~.rp oint of the older psychol-
ogi sts ~ho con sidered the a i m of psychology as "the 
worJ.dngs of the mind" .16 As psychology has become divided 
..... ..,... 
I 4- See~ E. Johnson, PsycholQ&Y of Religion, pp . 34f • 
l 5 J. B. r~a tson, p sycll.o l.ogy_ From the Standooin t o f 11 
Behavi ori s t (Phil adelphia:Lippi ncott Co., 1919), p . 220 . Al so 
M. & I. Shermc-.n , The Process of. .Be:Qa.vior (Nev: York: Norton Co., 
1 929), ? · 174. 
16 R. S. vYoodY'or t h , "Dynamic Psychologytt , Chapter V 
i n Psychologies of 1925, p . 111. 
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into more and more fields of specialization there have resulted 
differ ent i deas concerning i ts subject matter. To-day the 
depth, hormic, and functi onal psycholog i es have reinstated 
the dynami c trend. Pr actically all subjects tha t psychology 
i nvestigates are be~ng studied fr om the point of view of caus-
a.l relations-. Religion is no exceution. 
Religion is being· subjected to scrutiny as to the dy-
namics v:i thin the -o erson tha t motivate the process of becom-
ing religious and the religious experience itself. There 
can be no adequate understanding of religion r.'i thout an un-
derstanding of the dynamics of the person because a knovvledge 
of \'.;hat prompts ex:perie~Clce and behavior may give a clue to 
i t s nature. 
There has been a considerable degree of uncertai nty 
a s to the nature of human dynamics. The question is still 
far from being permanently settled. Instincts, drives, urges, 
and psychoanalytic mechanisms, and a host of other concepts 
h ave been advanced as explanations.l7 A test of dyn2.rnic 
concepts has been sta ted by G. w. Al.lpor t.l3 Allport sta tes 
tha t the units of motivational structure should measure up 
to the r equirements o.f being dymamic, unique , persona~, and 
I7 Fo;-;-revievi of modern co·c'lcer)t .s of motiva tion, see 
~/[. Sherman , Mental Conflict s and Personality (Nev: York: Long-
mans Green, 1938), :pp . 3f. AlsoP . T. Young, Motive.tion in 
Behavior (New York: Wiley Co., 1938). 
18 G. n. Allport, "Motivation il1 Personality", Psycho-
logical Revi ew, 47 (Nov., 1940), p . 509. 
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ultimate. 
Measured by such criteri a , it is obvious tha t many 
concepts will f all by the wayside . In exami ning t he r eli-
gious implications of the personalistic school of psychology, 
close scrutiny is attempted i n order to evaluate the rele.tive 
usefulness of the dynamic concepts set fort~ by t h e :,:> sycholo-
gi sts • Usefulness in explaining the religiosity of man de-
. i · 
mands cly-n c:~mic concepts in c. psychology for a more adequate un-
derstanding of religion bec ause religion is not s tatic. Each 
experience is differ ent for each person a t different t imes. 
Its effects var y both -,,:· i thin the person and from person to 
person. 
vi. Personality. The central features of hume>.n behav-
ior a re those structuring activities of the person . By this 
is meant those enduriDg systems organi zed uniquely a.nd which 
hel11 determine the i ndividuals characteristic adjustment to 
his environment. Psychologies tha t t ake r s. ts, machines, in-
fants, and mentally -sick persons for their models appear to 
be less adequ& te :for dealing ·V~: i th the complex psychophysical. 
systems of the majority of society than the psychologi es 
v.hich malce the study of human personality their ma.in aim. 
'Pri thout question, the former aims are legitima te and usefu.l 
when results are sta ted in terms of the behavior of r a ts, 
machines, etc. Were it not possible to study personality, 
• 
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the analogy betvveen the behavior of animals and adul t s "i'.'Ould, 
a~ a matter of course, be accepted as the best ··Jos sible in-
formation as to the ~ental life of human beings. However, 
there are psychologists who are demons trating their efficacy 
in the f ield of personality.l9 
There is very little in the behavior of mechanisms 
a.nd r a ts, that could correspond to reli gious phenomena . .Al-
though ment ally sick persons may experience phenomena of re-
ligion in their personal lives, all too often the delus ions 
c;n1.d illusions as vvell as f al se (unsupported) analogies are 
t aken t o be the experien ce of all people, healthy and sick. 
William James' distinction be t't.reen t he "hec.l thy-minded and 
morbid-minded" religion apparently f ails to impress such psy-
c hologists. 20 Psychology must account for the consistent be-
havior of person s toward religious ideas and objects i n terms 
of both degree and manner. There must be some a ccount of 
why such behavior is sjmilar or dissimilar to the person 's 
behavior to other i deas and objects. It is mai nly in this 
sphere thc:.t t he f ield of personality is relev.:~nt t o under s tand-
ing religion. 
vii. I n terper sonal Rela tions. For a better and mor e 
19 The fore.mo s t i n Am eric a are G. All:9ort and G. Murphy, 
and P . E. vernon in Engl a.nd. 
20 James, Vs.ri eties of Reli ;2:i 01112. Exnerience (Nev.' York:-
Longmans Green , 1902), pp. 78f. 
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rna ture understand ing of r eligious phenomena L1 human be-
h Bvior and experience the f ield of personality seems to ex-
t end the h ::mndaries of modern :p sycholo'gy. "Religion devel-
ops in persons 11 (ital.ics i n t he original) a.nd religion cannot 
be uncl erstood apart fr om the devel.oping ':)ersons. 21 Indeed, 
it cannot be understood apart from the development of the 
-:Jersons and the environment (other persons, too) i n T.hich he 
develops. The study of :9ersonali ty aids the tmderstanding 
of reli gion, but it is not the 1ivhole story. There would 
hardly be any personality if there were no objective environ-
ment. As "man is e. creature tha t responds to other men in 
a s full a sen se e.s he responds t o oxygen and gr avity", the 
psychology of i nterpersonal relations must be i ncluded. Be-
c ause religi.on is h i ghly soci ali zed, there mus t be some under-
standing of its social character. A psychology thus ha s to 
pres ent a sound basis f or social psychology f or understanding 
his aspect of religion. 
Ordinarily soci al psychology alone tends to emphas i ze 
the group v;i thout adequately trea ting developmenta.l processes 
of interpersonal adjustments. Such an empha.sis has led F. H. 
J'.~ .lport to reject vrh a t he c alls the "group f' alla cyn e.nd to 
substitute i ndividual psychology as t he subject-ma tter of 
Sl P. E. Johnson, Psychology Qf Rpligion, p . 63 . 
22 G. Mur phy, Personality (NevJ York:Harper Bros., 1.947), 
1J. 6. 
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social psychology. 23 However, J. K. Folsom synthesi zes t h e 
contra. stin.g vi ews of the subject-ma tter of social psychology 
as being, on t h e one h and, t h e group as an org anic \•.-hole, and 
on t h e other, t he group as an aggrega te of i ndividuals. 24 
The group as a whole does not behave, but acts according to 
a pa ttern of intera.ction of its components i n i ndi vi duals. 
"This inter actionology deals v.;ith t h e inter-relations of a tti-
t ude s and ~ishes within t h e group, as distinguish ed from the 
ma.teri al culture activiti es and bonds of social organi za tion n. 25 
Thus soci al p sychology means the science of the i n t eraction 
of persons. 
The church as a social ins titution seeks to propagate 
and stimule.te religious idea s and actions. As a social in-
s t itution it provides t h e mean s for the inter action of per-
sons to promote and guide religious development. Thus reli-
gion i s better understood in the lmowledge of i n terpersonal 
relations f or the attitudes and wishes expressed and s timu-
l a ted by other persons affect grea tly the religion of the 
i ndividual. 
23 F. H. Allp0rt, Soci al Psychology (New YorlcrHoughton-
Mifflin Co., 19~4), p . 4f. 
24 J. K. Folsom, Soci al E.sychology (Nev, York:- ~ .. il ey & 
Sons, 1935), pp . 296f. 
CHAPTER III 
SO~m CURHENT PSYCHOLOGI ES AND RELIGION 
The rna jor con tempor a ry ·9sycholo gica l v ie11v-s a re divi ded 
into f our cla s s ifica tions - structural , mo tor, de _9 th, e.nd 
oersona.listic. By consi dering the scientific models tha t 
these different views represent, the understanding of religion 
m2.y be discerned in the light of t h e emph a ses of t h e se four 
views. Each of the vievrs con siderably overlap s <:"..nd i nt er-
-oenetr a tes v~ i th the others. Neverthel.es s the cou cept s and 
ideas of the psycholo gists a.p"9ear to be con stant a s perta ins 
to t h e particula r ap ) ro e.ches. Some p sycholo gi sts , notably 
behavi orists and Fre1J.di ans, aLmost go to the point of do gma-
tism ~hen there is a question of the subject-matter and ap-
pro a ch of p sychology . 
In this section we shall present a criti que of the 
concepts of ry sychological views as they perta i n to r eligion. 
Under the structur al vie·ws a re con sidered t y-pologic al and 
Gestalt psychology. Th e motor appro a ch cons ists of a brief 
examina tion of behaviorism. Depth p sychologi es are rep re-
sented by the vi ews of Carl. Jung. Personalistic vi e"~N S are 
treated in the following chapters. 
Structur al p sychologies are i n teres ted in the pa. ttern 
or Gestalt of rela ted ment al contents. The structure of 
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personality and the pattern of i n ter-related ment al items is 
the central focus of attention . Such views contemporarily 
t ak e t wo forms: (a) ty')Ological and (b) Gestalt psychologies. 
The former stressing types of persons and the latter ·9a tterns 
of mental structure ·within the ;::> erson. 
l. Tynologic al Psychology 
Psychologies t h c:.t empha size different tr c. i ts or char ac-
teris t ics as differentiating enduring structure of personal-
i ty are called ty:)ological p sychologies. They are based upon 
the &ssumption tttha t personality is char acteri zed by a more 
or less endurin g structuren. 1 Typol o ."' ical psychology is 
char acterized by a variety of approaches to personality 
which include the appraaches from the points of view of ab-
normal psychology , co gnitive function, constitution, and 
values. Since religion is primarily concerned ~ith values, 
a value approach is examined. 
There are many criticisms agai ns t t ypologies. MacKin-
non s ay s that they are generally too crude, overl ap, are dif-
ficult to prove and disprove, and most have received very 
lit t le uositive ex9 er i menta l verific a tion. 2 Allport criti-
Hunt 
(New 
1 D. MacKinnon, "The Structure of Personality" in J. M. 
(ed.), Personalitv and~~ Behavior Disorders, vol . I 
York:Ronald Press, 1944), p. 24. 
2 Ib1· d -) '"''Zf 
•' l • f.-u • 
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ci ze s the biosocial r eference of types by the obs erva tion 
th a t nty:_Jes exist not in people or nat,_1re, but rather in the 
eye of the observer". He further states t hat a typology i s 
a means us ed by a psychologi st to glorify his speci&l i nter-
est at the expense of the total life of the person. Tyyolo-
gies are abstract, artificial ca tegories.3 They f ail to do 
justice to the richness and variety of personality and a.re 
t hus a mere half-way e.pproach to i ndividuality.4 T'nese caus-
tic cr iticisms serve to modify undue exuberance over this 
particular ap) ro ach. 
EdvYard Spranger describes the dominant types of mean-
ings the.t are exhibited in the total organi za tion of person-
ali ti es resulting from their interaction VJi th their cultural 
environment.5 His method is to ab~tract a psychic value 
tendency, ideali ze it and rel a t e it to the total cultural en-
viroruaent i ncluding other persons. 
Spranger's ~ nriori li st includes the theoretic, econom-
ic, esthetic, soci al, political, and r eli gi ous ty";} es. Th e 
r el i gi ous ty·oe is consider ed in grea t er detail by Spra.nger 
t han any of the other ty9e s. By devoting a full chap t er to 
u G. 1:' . Allport, 1? ersm1alitv (Ne·w Yorlc:·Holt Co ., 1937), 
pp. 895f. 
4 Ibid., pp. 1 3f. 
5 E. Spra.ng er . T~r1es o"!" T•fl: en, Tr. P. Pi gors (Hal.le:- .!\Tie-
meyers Verlag , 1928) . 
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the r el i gious type and numerous r ef erences of a factual r a ther 
t han :J re judiced (either for or ag c.. ins t) nature, Spr anger me:;.y 
be said to be general ly f avo r abl e to religion as compared to 
some psycholo gists. 
Spranger's typology i s char ac teri zed by a m2.r k ed uhilo-
sophical emphasis. I n distinguishing between scientific and 
philosophic al psychology, he states tha t "a pure psychology 
shou~d only i nvestigate differences v:hich can be ex:perienced 
regardless of ·whether or not there are ~Jhe~1omena on the physi-
c al side which could themselves be further analyzedtt.6 The 
emphasis is on experience a s an ex, erienced Rhole. The soul 
is an abbrevi a tion for the i nclusive concept of an i ndividual's 
action s, reactions, and experienc es. That the soul i s more than 
a t eleological aspect is i ndica ted i n his method, 7 in his 
concep t of the s elf , as well as i n r eli gi on . The Geistes-
wissenschaf t of ' -:hich his p sychology is a part is me.inly con-
cerned T:-. ith the super-individual men t al co nfi gur ations of 
VB.lue which have become detached fro m the experiencin g selves. 
Fa r from presupposing a mechanistic and determi nisti c concep-
tion of per sonality , Spr anger' s c entral thought i s on t h e 
value-striving or the i:!.1divi du al. In f a ct, his whole philo-
sophic al ba sis i n the first part of this bo ok con sist s of 
6 Ib~d., p . 8 . 
7 
.J.bid.' p . 1 3 • 
];X:lt:rting-:_ru~ the nec e ssary philosophical presuppositions for 1.-m-
derstanding p ersons. Thus Spr::mger ' s presuppositions create 
a f c_vorable a tmosphere for understanding religious persons. 
However , such presuppositions a re p eculia r to Spranger 
and the u l turvvissenschaft school. Mos t other typologi es, 
notably t hose ap·9 ro aches from the poi n ts of vier . ' of cognitive 
f unction and consti tution8 o.ppear to presuppose an environ-
mental and physic~ue determinism. 
i. The Self. Spranger holds tha t the relating of a 
s ingle experience to the totc:;.l meaning of life i deally gives 
religious significance to the mental act.9 "The me ani ng of 
religious experience is this value relation which is neces-
s arily a to t al experien cen.lO I n con sidering this relation 
of a single experierJ.ce to total meaning, the que s tion arises, 
"In whom is this t aki ng plc;.c e? n M. y.· . Calk ins used a simi-
lar question to arouse her contemporaries to the need f or a 
stabilizing and guidi ng concept f or psychophysical E.ctivities. 
The answer that wa s usually given ha d its analogy in the 
physiologist not having need of c.sk i ng v,·hose muscle he vms 
8 See Sheldon's 'T'he Va.ri ell~ of Temperamen1 (Nev.: Yorlr: 
Harper Bros., 1940). 
9 E. Spranger, jy~ of Men, p . 37. 
10Ibid., p . 42 . 
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studyi ng.ll The error in such an answer may be s een by the 
po ssibl e answers t o t he que s tion put to the ~)hysiolo gi st 
tha t need not enter into th e realm of meta.physics. The 9hy-
siologist has alterna tives of asserting tha t the muscl e he 
i s studying exis t s only in itself and h e stud;Les it only i n 
r elB.tion to itsel f and not in rela tion to the. tissues, org c::ns, 
circulation, and t he physical body as a whole. Or he mc:.y 
a.nswer that it is a certa in organ's muscle or the physic al 
body's muscle, each of Rhich is a larger inter-rela ted whole. 
The l a tter answer is the more probable and sci entific. Such 
an an svler corresponds to the answer ths.t the psycholo gist 
should give to the question, whose psycho-physical activity? 
The ansvrer can only be in terms of a concept of a regula tor, 
c arrier, and adjustor of the individual activities. It 
corresponds to the i n t er-rela ted v:'11ole of the physical body 
in the psychical realm. Spranger gives such an answer. 
S~1r o.ng er' s psychology t akes in to account the f act tha t 
"the essence of mental acts is tha t they issue from a un itary 
il"ldividual consciousness, a self, an d are directed t o a not-
selfn. 12 He agress with K. Oesterreich tha t t h e self is 
the i n de9 enden t unita ry prius of' a ll acts, cont ents, functions, 
and condi t ions which are found in it. 
-n-J. N. _Curtis, "Concerning the Self" in Th e £12_ychologi-
c al Pul1etin, 12 (Jan., 1915), p . 70. 
12 Spr anger, Tvn es of Men, p . 84. 
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In a manner somevJhat reminiscent of V.'illiam J c;.mes, 
Spranger sees several levels of selfhood. 13 James' levels 
are based on the objectification of the s elf in its rela tions 
to its environment v:i th the spiritual self e_cting a s unifier. 
Spr<m.ger's levels of s elfhood are based on the positivistical-
l y i nter pre ted contents of the mind related to the acts in 
v;:hich r.n ob ject is grasped. Thus there are as many inter-
pr e t at ions or levels of self as there are objective regi ons 
of significance i nto ·which the individual process of acts 
and ex]eriences is interwoven. He accordingly sets up six 
levels of self i n accordance with six specific classes of 
value. The pure ego is thought of as the subject of the in-
stinct of self-preservation and of all physical urges and in-
stincts. (Curiously, a note of ambiguity creeps i n t o t his 
pure ego in the t it is also called the biological self' 2.nd 
the physical self.) Mental regula tors do not set in until 
later.l4 This conception of the pure ego utilizes only 
sense and motor organs bec ause of their biological importance. 
From this, Spranger goes on to de s i gnate the theoretic, aes-
thetic, economic, and the religious self. 
Sprc:.nger, lUre James, sees the reli gious self as the 
ultimc.te expansion of the soul. It "abolishes individuation 
1.3 1~'illiarn Jc..mes, EJ2YcholQU, Vol. I, Chap ter 10. 
14 E. Spranger, 'T'yues .Qf. Men, p. 89. 
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and le~.ds to the highest blessedness, to salvo.tion".U5 It 
is not only the focal point of value experience, but also of 
norm experiences. The religious self is the most incl1.1 sive 
that a human being can achi eve . 
Thus the self concept is given much attention in 
Spranger's typology . However, the pure self or ego is ob-
scure and it could be easily s aid that it amotmts to a basic 
concept of motivation such as the Elan Vital. The religious 
self 1Yhich acts as a coordinator of the other attitudes is 
developed out of the historico-cultural environment. 
Such a self appears to resemble closely the spiritual 
me of James' and performs the functions of similar concepts 
(without the reli gious aspect) in several other psychologies. 
Such a considerat i on of severB.l selves results in the weak-
ness generally inherent in typologies , namely, lack of con-
tinuity in the concrete individual . To have a separ ate s elf 
performing religiously, splits religiosity off from t he rest 
of life into a dissocic.ted personality. 
ii. E;x:nerience. One distinct advantage of Spranger's 
ty9ology is the emphasis on the' conscious experience of the 
i ndividual. v.n-:lile his typology is supposedly ba sed on cer-
ta.in attitudes, Spranger recognizes tha t attitudes are the 
results of conscious experience as well as unconscious exper-
15 . . . 
. Ibid., p . 9'?. 
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ience (the absorption of cultural norms and values). Each 
type is characteri zed by a philosophy of life in line vd th 
his a ttitude. As a re sult of the emphasis on conscious ex-
nerience he natur ally arrives at a personality type character-
ized by the religious attitude. Thos e typologies based upon 
physique a.nd abnormalities could hardly do this . 
iii. Viei"!S .Q.ll Relj,gion. Spr anger defines religiosity 
as t h e condition i n ~hich a single experience is either posi-
tively or negatively related to the total v alue of life. 
Here is seen more clearly the confusion wrought by consider-
ing a "religious self" along with other selves. Spr anger 
seems to confuse the "religious sel.f" vv i th the npure self" /'or 
'hure ego t~ . The l a tter has the over- all perspec t ive to re-
l .ate singl.e experiences to the total value of life. Reli-
gious objects ar e the objective con tex ts i n ~hich t hese deep-
est value experiences are created. Religion is tha t inclu-
sive concep t of objective-mental forms i n v,·hich these v2Tue 
relations are exnressed as dogmas or cults. He sta tes t ha t 
by his definition nothi ng is outside the realm of religion. 
Such a definition would lead to meaningl essness ·were it not 
for his explanation. Religious meaning is the relation to 
the value totality which C1Jlminates in the highest value, and 
God is tha t final being who is the meaning of the v:orld, or 
is crea.ted mentally as tha t vv·hich endows it v.i th meaning.l6 
1 6 Ibid., p. 211. 
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P sychologic ally, God is the objective principle v•hich is 
thought of as the object of the highest personc:l.l value exper-
ience. Thus Spranger indi.cc.~ tes tha. t human na ture is such 
that religion is basic to it and tha t human beings conceive 
a God because of a realization of hi gher personal value ex-
periences. Such a view is in line with personalistic thought. 
But an understanding of human nature by means of any typology, 
as has been indicated by the critics of typological psychology, 
is necessarily abstract. Vvi thout an adequate understanding 
of the whole person as he experiences religion only a snap-
shot of the person (in religiosity) is seen i n typologies. 
Religion performs a valuable function in the ) ersonal-
ity of the individual who experiences it according to Sprang-
er. Its roots may be instinctive or rational, but neverthe-
less its function is to give meaning to the world. The re-
ligious attitude serves to direct the whole mentE.l structure 
to the creation of the highest and absolutely satisfying value 
experience. Apparently Sprang er holds to the axiom tha t 
origin does not determine value and holds to the scientific 
method of descri-ption r a ther than drifting i nto meta~r)hysics 
by seeking ultimate causes of religion. It can be discerned 
tha t Spranger holds to the view tha t a ttitudes have the power 
to initiate and guide consistent forms of behavior. Atti-
tudes to Sprc.mger thus seem to be more i mportant aspects of 
1ersonc.lity than specific habits. His whole typology attests 
to his conviction. Such a considera tion also is i n line 
v. ith personalistic thought as will be seen in the s even th 
chapter. 
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Spranger's · broad definition of religion seems to les-
sen its u sefulness for understanding the true na ture of reli-
gion. He is adamant in his ste.tement that he wants to "em-
Dhasize not the specific direction of the mind, but the f ac t 
tha t in every attitude the en tire meaning of the world c .:m be 
gr asped'1 , ~7 and that a man thus becomes religio us when he 
a.ttempts to fathom the meaning of the world through his par-
ticular a.tti tude. In such a case religion is not a pa.rticu-
lar v.rorl.d view, but an end of any world view, even c:m a theis-
tic one because of the one-sided emphasis on seeking the 
meaning of reality v;i thou t any action toward cons erving and 
promoting value i :o. cooperr~tion v'lith the "Final Meaning". 
S9ranger sees the religious life as being of three 
types: the im.rnanent mystic, the transcendental mystic and 
the mixed type. The immanent mystic is life-affirming; the 
transcendental is life-negating. By mystic he means any 
point of viei'Y which "searches for the absolute unity of t he 
h ighest va1uesn.l8 Because of the abstractness of his 
definitions it is difficu~t to see the distinction between 
17 E. Spranger, Tynes of Men, pp . 214 and 215. 
18 Ibid., p . 213. 
48 
mysticism end religion. The word "mystic" seems to be a 
synonym for ttreligious person''. In both t yp es of mysticism 
nothing is valuable ·oer ~' everything is permea.ted vd th God 
and filled with a higher meaning. Everything finite is a 
mirror of the i nfinite. The religious person depends no t on 
knovd edge, but on the value attitude of faith or trust. This 
attitude is supported by the whole r <:.nge of ve"lues ex"9 erienced 
by the person and by the validity of tho se value s he exp er-
iences as highest. Thus religion is based on the experience 
of values r ather than a mere l~nowledge of values. 
iv. Theory of Motivation. The t heory of i n stincts was 
i n good standing at the time tha t Spranger wrote. 
recogni zes instincts as well as needs and impulses. 
speak s of ttinstinctive forms of self preserva tion". 
Spranger 
He 
ttThe 
rati onal guiding r1...1.les (of the mind) are not i n consciousness 
••• • • they are unconsciO'-lSly present i n the mind, a s it were, 
instinctiven . 19 A k i nd of l av.rfulness is spoken of tha t is 
a sort of iminanent driving force and is given the n ame of in-
s t i nctive r ationality. This ins tinctive r a tionality is a 
feeling of our ultimate mental destina tion or conscience. 20 
It appears th2. t S-pran ger sees i nstin cts as t he basic driving 
forces of persone . li ty. He gives no list other t han implying 
- 19 I bid., p . 65. 
20 I bid., p . 79. 
the s i x basic a t titudes . 
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The que s tion a t hand i s v,;heth er 
the theory of i nstincts alone, is sat i sfac tory to account for 
religiou s moti va tion . Are they uniQue, dynamic, personal, 
and ult ima te enough t o accoun t for the uni queness and varieti es 
of religious experience and behavior? 
The theory of i nstincts has not stood u:p well under ex-
periment and co gent questioning accor Qing t o current 9sycholo-
gists. There are o ther psycholo gis t s rvho vril~ be considered 
in t his study v·ho base their psychologies on an i ns t inct t he-
ory. So it is well to examine briefly the theory of i n -
sti n cts i n order to critici ze Spr enger . 
Some of the main cri ticisms aga i ns t i nsti ncts ar e tha t 
they ar e abstractions, t hey f ail to account for the diversity 
of hu.man purposes , they are mer e names fo r the pr oblem of mo-
tiva t i on Qnd not an exnl anat i on of the problem, they ar e not 
uni versal , and they cannot be exper i mentally verified. 2l 
Another mai n criticism i s tha t there has been no agree:r:n en t on 
hov-1 mc:my i n s tincts t here are and what t h ey a.re. The cla ssic 
i nstinctivist MacDoug 2.ll holds tha t the normal indi vi dual ha s 
i n common Tith other normal indi vi du.:i.lS c erta.i n :purposi v e 
f:' l These critic isms ar e t c.l\'.: en from J ohnson, Psychology 
of Religion, p . 40f., G. Allport, Personality, p . 112 , c:md 
K. Dunlap , Personal .A d ·justment (Ne•N York: McGr av.r-Hill, 1946), 
p . 409 . Also s ee G. Murphy , Historical Introduct on..:!& Psy-
chology (Lo•:ldon:Paul, Tr anch , Truber Co., 1938 , Ch . 20. 
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t endenci e s_ which constitute the underlying s ources of behavior. ~2 
Other t h i ngs being equal, each t endency renders t he i ndi vidual 
sensitive to stimuli of a certain class and leads to a cha:r ac-
teristic form of res ~onse. Th ey do not opera te mechanically, 
but are a more or less loose gearing of the means of res ponse 
(abilities) to the end to be achi eved~ They can be trained. 
They may be physiologic al or psychological. He accounts for 
uni que behavior by sentimen t-formation. 
Even with such a broad vie-..,; of ins tine t s t hey f ail to 
mea sure up to being dyn0mic. Yb a tever the pr edisposition is, 
it is fi xed. Modifica.tion by trai n ing seems to i ndic a te a 
con tr adiction or, a t lea s t , t h e possibility that t he tra ining 
r e ther than the instinct c a.use s humc:.n behavior a ttributed to 
i nstincts. VIi th a t h eory of instincts e:x:pl.s i ning human mo-
ti va tion, there is no uni que human behavior or go al. 1,11 
behavior is a mere expression of one or a combination of a 
list of instincts. Instincts are more univers al t han per-
sone.l. They oper ~ te more or less independently of their 
posses sor by de~)ending on the stimula ting object. Thus they 
are no t the potentialities for choice of action, but ari s e 
s p o n t s.neously i n th e p r e sence Q;f certa L 1 stimuli. Instin cts 
do appear to be ul time t e , but K...Di gh t Dunl ap ·doubts t ha t they 
are. He con sider s doctrines of ins tincts a s mere ex 9lana-
22 1!!m. MacDougall, 'T'he Ener gies of Men (Nevr York : 
Scrib!lers Son s, Co., 1932),p. 192f. 
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t . b . ~ ~ lOllS y namlng . ~. u The n ame s of i nstinct s are useful for 
cl a ssifying goc>.ls of human beings, but in themselve s they 
a r e vague in expla i.n i ng "'I,-h a t :Jroduces behavi or . 
It appears tha t Spranger 's typology is ba sed upon a 
theory of motiva tion i n humen na ture tha t is not o.cc ep t cbl e 
vii thout some other conc epts depicting uniqueness. The 
veakn ess in Sprang er's typolo gy seems t o lie mai nly i n the 
f act that he considered mainly i ns tincts as a source Tiithout 
an adequate con sideration of hoR high er drives or motive s are 
derived from ba sic i n stinc ts . Vbether in s t i ncts are accep-
table or not i s not the quest i on, bu t r ather, are the l evel s 
of hu..rnon m:J ti vati ~)n accounted for vd1ich ·~n·oduce r eli gi ous be-
havior . Th i s Spr c-.n ger' s ty~Jology mi sses . 
S]r~nger' s method of select-
ing and isola ting ideal. type s of persons by considering the 
values that seem to dominc:tt e each life i s hel pful i n under-
standing ty :Je s of 9er sons. But it is no t ez. sy t o discern 
the structure of the indivi du al person::lli ty except by the s i x 
z.t titud es that ar e postulated a s ideals. These a ttitude s 
a re arrived z. t by considering th s i YJ.dividua.l ment2.l acts, the 
elemental ment al laws, 8nd sub j ective s pheres of interest and 
objective levels, all of ~tich have a co rr e s)~ndenc e t o the 
six type s of a ttitudes. fmy one of the s i x may be do:11inc-.n t 
~ 3 Kni gh t Dunlap , Personal Adjus tment , p . 410 . 
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in a personality . ¥~ichever of thA Sl"x_ l"s mo t ~ · t 
- "·- s \..tOmln;:·n 
lec::.v 9s the struc ture of the -per son.s.li ty a subordinati on of 
l evel.s of t he reme ining f ive a ttitudes. But the a ttitudes 
ranr e s en t comolex levels of integr a tion of other f actors. 
Spr anger does not consider the i nt9rmedi a ry step s in t h e for-
1na tion of attitudes which mc:,_y h ave an influence on the ty-o e 
of ""J erson other than t h e f act tha t historic c;.l e.nd cultur al 
f actors enter into s uch a f orma tion. Neith er i s the pr oc e ss 
by "·h ich one a ttitude may be substituted fo r c..no t her a ttitude 
t a~c en u p . A con v ersi .-:m experi ence wh erein an economic a tti-
tude is f orsaken and a r el ig i ous one b ecomes do~inant is no t 
considered. P._s i n other typol ogi es , S_prenger' .s typology 
allov:rs domina.nt trc:d ts to appear det erministic, thc;. t i s , no 
allowance is made for t he volun b :;_ r y cho ices of the i n o.i v idual. 
1.:-.:hatever the structure of his 9ersonality i s , the i ·.~di vi dual 
i s more or l e ss a victim of his p ersonality r a the r than the 
personality structu r e be i ng an area of his environmen t v·-·hich 
the s elf creates and a c ts through , but is still cap able of 
change. 
vi. Interngrsonal Relations, It is in the a re a of in-
t er personal rela tionshi ry s tha t most typolo gi ~ s f a il to give 
ade CJ_u a te a ttention. Considering the i ndi v i du al a s 2.n isola ted , 
i ndependent •,;hole does no t make fo r understanding the genesis 
of the \fhole . The f actors of l ear ning, language, c:.nd condi-
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tioning , as weLl as many others, stem from :interpersonal rela-
tionship s. Their im?ort c:mce for ·personal goal s , a.ttitudes, 
and actions of rel igi on are as importc..nt as the i nner drives , 
s truc ture, and form ation of the person. Tha t Spr anger a t-
t emp ts to overcome this defic iency of trea t ment is indi c a ted 
by his sta tement, 
••• No sub j ect can be separated from its objective 
counter 9art , s i nce subj 9ct and obj ect can only be 
unders t ood i n terms of their mutuc;.l relati ons ••• 
This science i s occup i ed with transsubjective and 
collective crea tions wh ich concern i ndi viduc.ls in 
over-individual effectual r sl ation s. ~4 
Thus Spr anger a ttempts to indi ca t e t ha t man is a s much c:m end 
produc t of forces tha t envelo-p h im from without a s well a.s 
from Yd thin . Jmother indiC E'. ti on of Spre.nger ' s rec ognition 
and insi stence U 1)011 the importance of inter personal rela tion-
ships lies specifically in the area of religi on. He con tends 
t h a t i n the r eligi ous to t al eval ua tion, no sphere of life 
stc:.nds higher thr~n t he social. 25 The social emphasis in 
most religions is v:i th regard t o t he bond of l.ove t ha t unites 
suf fering huma.ni ty . The i ncrea.sing social cooper ativeness 
of religion makes such an emphasis nec essar y for its under-
standing not only of i tself, but for the understanding of the 
uart it pl ays i n the formati on of a personality wi th a cardinal 
r eligi ous trait. 
24 Spre.nger, Types of Men, p . 6. 
25 I bid., -y. 231. 
54 
Typological psychology as repres ented 
by Eduard Spr2nger's writings on the subject is not adverse 
to religion nor to religious persons. The attempt to under-
stc:md specifically the religious person a s well as persons 
with other dominant interests and attitudes makes it prefera-
ble to some other typologies. Nevertheless, the understand-
ing that one gets is an abstract comprehension as in all typol-
ogies. Typological psychology seems to gain under standing 
o.f a frozen personality and thus misses th•3 dyn&.mic flm•' of 
energies in the changes and varieties of the living person 
i n social relations, and especially in religious experience 
c:~nd behavior. 
Typological psychology is helpful for understanding a 
selected characteris t ic of the person. It indica tes tha t 
one may have a strong religious sentiment. Even then, how-
ever, the selected characteristic is hardly ever app1icab1e 
to more than a few people in so f ar as its degree and manner 
of expression are concerned. Constellatio:1s of energies 
within and without the person :9 revent a stP.. tic portrayal of 
the workings of any specific attitude. What religious un-
derstanding psychologically gains from universality, it loses 
in specificity. No basis is presented for u.n.derstanding the 
particular individual. and his religious experience. Typolog-
ical. psychology presents starting points for understanding 
religion, but one gains no account of specific religious 
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motivation, how it 'Norks, and its result in the whole person. 
From our frame of reference, it is inadequate for understand-
ing religion. 
2. GESTALT PSYCHOLQGY 
The Gestalt school of psychology is a part of a wider 
protestant movement against elementarism i n psychology. Its 
,. 
influence has served also as a check against excessive behav-
iorism. However, most of the work in this school ha s been 
directed to the field of perception. Kurt Lewin has done 
much of his work in the field of motivation and personality 
structure. He has thus tended to broaden the scope of prob-
lems approached from the Ges ta1tist point of view. 
In the following brief examination of subjects of im-
portance for a psychological understanding of religion, the 
treatment is by no means adequate to do justice to Gestal.t 
psychology as a whole nor to religion as a whole. Lewin 
nor any of the other leading Gestal.tists give any con siderable 
a ttention to phenomena of religion. 
Kurt Lewin, whose views are examined here, is probably 
not what one would call an orthodox Gesta~tist. .A.I.though he 
still maintains the general traditions of emphasizing vrhole-
ness, patterns, and perceptions, he has branched ou t and de-
yeloneq what i~ called topological. and vector psychology. 
Topology is a branch of mathematics which deals only with 
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the most abstract or generalized properties of space, n a::nely, 
•,IJ'i th part-whole relations. 26 Vector psychology is a general.-
i~ed motivational psychology which studies the more complex 
aspects of activity. 
i. Presunpositions. Kurt Lewin's brcmch of Ge s t alt 
psychol.ogy is based on presuppositions similar to those of 
some of the older sciences. In psychology there has been 
much argument concerning laws. The tendency has been to 
base lawfulness on regularity and frequency, considering the 
individual ca se as a matter of chance. LevJ"in agrees 1'/i th 
the first two assumptions, but holds that the individual. case 
is likewise lawful.27 This is in direct opposition to the 
many psychol.ogists who hol.d the individual person to be of no 
significance in so far as he devi a tes from the great majority. 
The implications of such a claim ·are important for scientific 
results that establish the worth of the individual person. 
Lewin's second and very important postula te is that con-
cerning the teleology-mechanism antithesis. 28 The nature of 
an object does not wholly determine its direction. Antece-
dent factors are important causal determinants but do not com-
26 R. W. Leeper, Lewin's To:gologic.al a~d Vector .Ls,y:cho1-
g_gy (Eugene:University of Oregon Press, 1.940 , p. 217. 
27 Lewin, ]Jynamic .Theor_y: ot: Personality, Tr. D. Adams 
(Nev,r York:McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1.935), p. 26. 
28 Ibid., p. 29f. 
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prise the whole truth. And neither does the nature of an 
object wholly regulate its purposive function. The environ-
ment or s i tua.tion in which action takes place assumes as 
much importance ~s the object or person. In other words, the 
whole determines the function of the parts rather than the 
parts determining the function of the whole.29 Such a view 
is not necessarily antagonistic to religion, ~~d tends to be 
more in h armony with it than postula tes of some psychologies 
because it indica tes the the world is a product of intelli-
gence rather than depending u pon chance happenings to deter-
mine its destiny. 
ii. The ~g_o. In speal·dng of the dynamic homogen.ei ty 
of the mind, Lewin is aware that many psychologists consider 
the mind to be the very prototype of unity. Lev.ri:n, however, 
questions whether that which may be called the self or ego is 
the psychical totality or mind. The indication is that the 
self is merely one system or complex of systems, a functional 
part-region within this psychical tota1ity.30 Individuality 
or uniqueness might be present even if the psychical tot2.lity 
(mind) presented no firm unity. ~l It is important tha t in 
29 A more specific and vigorous exnosition of this view 
is found in w. K8hler's Gestalt Psychology (New York::Li-ver-
ight Co., 1947), p. 121.f. 
30 Le~in, Dynamic Theory Q! Eersonali~, p. 56. 
31 Ibid., p. 57. 
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referring to the self, Lewin cites William James' conception.32 
James' consideration of the se1f was the se~f as perceived, 
or the nmen, although he uses the spiritnal self to unify the 
others.33 Thus Lewin sees the self as only a functional 
part-region within the mil1d and hence the mind not necessarily 
needing firm u.ni ty. However, besides the fact tha t this view 
is contrary to common sense, the human mind would be in an 
awful predicament if there were no unifying agent to regulate 
and coalesce the different functional part-regions (selves). 
It is true that there would still be individuality and unique-
ness, but it would be to such an extent that the different 
part-regions could run rampant and experience and behavior 
would be meaningless chaos. Recent psychologists give a 
more refined conception of the self than that presented by 
James,34 to whom Lewin refers. 
Lewin is neverthe~ess aware of the importance of the 
self' as it is conceived by modern psychologists. It . seems 
to him that 
It would be natural from Gestalt theoretical 
considerations to understand the se1f in terms of 
the psychical totality perhaps as its structural. 
indi vidual.i ty •••••• Som.e such notion is basic to 
the concept of character, for the adequate concep-
3~ Ibid., see note p. 56. 
33 See his Princiules of Psychology, Vol. I, Chapter X. 
34 See Bertocci, "Psychological Self', Ego, and Person-
ality" in Psychological Review, 52 (March, 1945), p. 58. 
tion of -v hich on e must start •••• from the whole 
of the person. If •••• one comes to the problem 
of the psychical dynamic systems, the attempt 
will i n all probability be made to identify the 
self vd th the whole of the psychical totality. 35 
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Lewin holds that the facts drive one in the opposite direc-
tion to the view that a special region within the psychical 
totality must be defined as the self. These t wo main facts 
are (1) not every psychically existent system would belong to 
t his central self. "Not all the things, men, and environ-
mental regions which I know and which may be very important 
to me, belong to my sel.f.n (2) "Not every tense psychical 
system would stand in communication with this self." The 
tensions which have to do with the self would also have a 
special functional significance in the total psychical or-
ganism. 
Apparently the "me's" r a ther than a "self" performs 
the functions of knovving, wanting, sensing, and feeling which 
give the unity and continuity to the person as experienced 
and observed. If one follows Lewin, such a conception seems, 
however, to be a. contradiction in view of the fact that there 
may be several "me's", but only one "!" or self. Any con-
ception of' "me" may be a psychical. system developed by the 
self to facilitate adjustment, but it can hardly exist inde-
pendent of some unifying know~ng, remembering, and sensing 
self. 
35 Lewin, Dynamic Theo~ Q! PersonalitY, p. 61. 
60 
The second piece of evidence concerning the need .for a 
central self :seems to be more sound in view of the fact that 
unconscious psychical systems, for example, may be non-self-
consci::ms. But on closer examination, there is communica-
tion between the self and the psychical systems that seem to 
be out of communication with it. These tense psychical sys-
tems were formed in consciousness and repressed. The medium 
of constant communication seems to be that of the repressive 
i'orce exerted to keep the particular systems out of conscious-
ness. The repressive agent seems to be the self (or ego). 
Thus Lewin's conclusion that psychical tensions and energies 
belong to systems which are in themselves dynamic unities and 
which show a greater or less degree of abscission seems to be 
in danger of reverting to another form of elementarism, as 
William Stern has pointed out,36 because they would be i nde-
pendent of the whole person. The phenomena of effort and 
will which are so important for the formation of character 
and the understanding of religious persons are thus left with-
out an adequ&te construction which accounts for the unity, 
guidance, and regulation of these and other psychical energies. 
Cooperation with the Creator of value has its effects on the 
social, theoretical, political, and other phases of life by 
means of some unifying agent. If the religious ego is an 
independent entity, there is a mystery as to why its activi-
36 Stern, General Psychology, p. 114. 
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ties interweave with other aspect·s of life in the interest of 
cooperating with God. Some account must be given of a unify-
ing self if there is to be an understanding of the fact that 
the reli gious ego by some agent's effort is able to exert in-
fluence over other areas of ~if'e. 
iii. Con§cious Experience. Lewin's psychology is al-
most predominately occupied with the behavior of the i ndivid-
ual in "fields of force". The emphasis is on the behavior 
of the individual and least of all on his experience of forces 
leading to modes of behavior. The "1ife space" of the per-
son 1:rhich includes the psychological environment comes nearest 
to fulfilling the need for emphasizing the conscious experi-
ence of the person. This lack of emphasis on conscious ex-
perience, it should be pointed out, is peculiar to Levdn more 
so than to Gestalt psychologists whose work has been mainly 
in the field of perception. One might expect that the psy-
chol.ogical environment, dealing as it does with momentary 
fields of force, emphasizes conscious experience. It is 
distinguished from the person as a part of the lif e space by 
the fact that it is "everything in which, toward which, or 
away from which the person can perform locomotionsn.37 It 
can be seen from this tha t the psychological environment is 
37 Lewi~ Princinles of lQQQlogical Psychology, Tr. 
F. and G. Heider (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1.936 , p. 18. 
62 
not adequately distinguished from the objective environment. 
Hence, conscious exp erience suffers a great dea~ in comparison 
with t he emphasis placed on field forces or the objective en-
viron~ent. Religious ideals, virtues,and values, it seems, 
c an best be understood by conscious awareness of the individ-
ual as well as the environmental forces which lead to their 
formation. To neglect one at the expense of the other is to 
give a warped -view of the individual and his religion. This 
seems to be true because ideals and values are also "fields 
of force" in the sense that they are a part of the reference 
by which objects of the environment are judged to have valence. 
Environmental fields of force are important, but likewise is 
the conscious experience of internal fields of force impor-
t ant for m1derstanding religion. 
iv. _Theory Qf Motivation. Lewin's theory of motiva-
tion is based neither on tissue needs nor instinctive tensions. 
The uni queness of his views on motivation is based on the em-
pirical approach as a means of deciding how needs origina te 
and what needs or tension-systems may exist. In fact it 
could almost be said that he has no theory of innate motiva-
tion. With great emphasis on the empirical approach, he 
suggests that experimental vmrk on substitute-value and satia-
tion seems to uoint to the solution of the problem of origin 
and organization of needs or tension-systems vd thin the per-
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son. 38 His purpose is to t ake the problem of analyzing hu-
man motives out of the realm of highly personal impressions 
and to p~ace them in the realm of empirical determina tion. 
The evidence that some needs originate from i nternal 
physiological processes is accepted~ but the existence of 
many other needs other than the physiologically produced ones 
is still held to be tenable. Since the work on the latter 
has been so slight, Lewin uses the general concept tha t there 
are needs of both kinds and that they influence the valences 
of the lif'e space. 
Lewin has given little thought to the problem of what 
different motives or needs there are. He t akes for granted 
that motives or tension-systems exist and proceeds from there.39 
Since his work in motivation has been mainly limited to stud-
ies of the conditions of arousal of motives, his concepts are 
mainly valid in that sphere. And since he has been attempt-
ing to formulate problems of motivation in mathematical terms, 
he has been r a ther wary of' presenting a theory of motiva tion 
that cannot be verified in terms of mathematical concep ts. 
It is for thi s reason that Garr ett40 calls Lewin's terms 
38 See Leeper, Lewin's Touological anQ Vector Psycholo-
.f£1., pp. 56f. 
39 Ibid., p. 57. 
40 Garrett, ttLewin's Topological Psychologyn, Psycholog-
ical Rev!~, 46 (Nov., 1939), pp. 480f. 
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"pseudo-ma.thematical" and states that "the scope and unambig-
uousness of these rela tionshi ~ s •••• reside solely in the math-
ematical nature of the concepts themselves". 
The concepts of valence, need, force, tension, field of 
force, inner-personal region, 2.nd goa.l-region as motivational 
terms have a positive significan~e for interpreting some phe-
nomena of the re1igious life ns in the phenomena of conversion 
experiences. Their limitations as pointed out by Garrett, 
Leeper, and Allport,41 are their co n£inement to contemporane-
ous actions rather than more lasting or permanent responses 
of the i ndividual. The above na~ed concepts are helpful in 
understanding a part of the person's rel&tion to his momentary 
environment. Eecause the effects of religion are more often 
enduring, and there c:.re many consistent patterns of religious 
behavior, the concepts of valence, need, force, tension, etc., 
which mc:cy fulfill Levdn' s purpose of studying the i ndividual 
in his momentary setting, do not seem sufficient for under-
ste.nding the long range character of religious expecta tion and 
its consistent forms of religious behavior. 
v. PersonaJity Structurg. To Lewin, the t otal person-
ality may be conceived as a Gestalt. A Gestalt is a "system 
whose parts are dynamically connected i n such a way that a 
l!n 
change of one pa.rt results in a change of all other partsn. -=~ 
41 See Allport, Personal it~, p . ~16 and p . 364. 
42 Lewin, Princi-oles of l'.Ql::lolo2:ical Psychology, p. 218. 
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The person is viewed as a differentia ted region separ a ted by 
a permeable boundary from his external environment. Certain 
perceptual-motor systems engaged i n sensing and i n acting 
adaptively are i n direct con t act with the environment. Th ese 
perceptual-motor systems interact and respond a s a ·whole. 
Inward from these lie the external regions of the inner per-
sonality ·wh i ch are more enduring and more segregated from one 
another than ar e the motor-perceptual regions. They may act 
i n dependently or as parts of l arger systems. Further inward 
are the central regions representing the deeper motives, in-
terests, and mor e l asting sentiments. At the heart of the 
inner-persone.l region lies the "core". It is this center 
that is aroused in sta tes of self-consciousness a.nd is in-
volved in aspiration and i n ph<mtCJ.sy. This core giv~, c:.p-
pa.rently, stability to the whole structure of personality. 
Lewi n 's treatment of personality is unique in its abil.i-
ty to depict the i ndividual case and most of the systems and 
f actors importcmt for understanding the individual. The 
omission of a temporal region appear s to be a handicap v:hich 
the appear ance of the irreality level makes prominent. But, 
on -the whole, except for the l ack of' a. unifyi ng agent , L.e~'in' s 
conception of the structure of personality in terms of rela-
tively stable and unified systems appears to be a good start, 
but only a start, f or understanding personality. Religious 
traits and interests can thereby be described in terms of 
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their nearness or remoteness to the core of the person. The 
core of the personality tha t Lewin speaks of appears to cor-
respond to the self i n many respects. It gives stabil.i ty to 
the actions of the individual. Hovrever, Lewin seems to see 
t he forma tion of personality resulting mainly from environ-
mental f orces of a temporary na ture. The part tha t the nin-
ner core" and the "central regionsfl which represent the deeper 
motives, interests, end more l as t ing sentimen ts of the person, 
play is minimi zed by Lewi n in considering the formation of 
motives. RGligious experience motivated by only temporary 
environmental f orces is a momentary exp erience and one f ails 
to understand why there is consistency in such experiences 
and behavior vthen the environment differs. Lewin limits the 
understanding of the religious person by underestimati ng the 
importance of the deeper structure of personality in motiva-
tion and experience. 
vi. Interpersonal Rela tions. Topological psychology 
attempts to treat psychologic<d phenomen a. i n relation to their 
total setting. This is supposed to be in rela t ion t o the 
f orei gn hull of the l ife space a s well as the inner structure 
of the personal i ty. The greater emphasis is placed on the 
foreign hull or t he momentary environmental conditions. Such 
a conception appears to be in line with a biosoci al approach 
to personality, i. e., personality is a joint product of en-
-,-
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vironmental conditions e.nd i nner structure of the person. 
Lev'!in attempts to study the i n.dividual from the point of view 
of his life situation. 
A distinction may be made between Lewin's emphasis on 
environmental f actors and most other psychological vie~ s on 
the subject. Lev.~in's concern is not so much viith objective 
environment as with the subjective environment or the envir-
onJnent as conceived. 'Such a distinction seems to make an 
enormous difference in determing the force environmental fac-
tors play in personality forma tion because, for example, a 
group of known thieves may be conceived by the r~ious person 
a s brothers needing proper help and guidance r a ther than as 
objects of threa t and fear. Instead of the thieves distort-
ing his personality, they may act as stimuJ.ants to greater 
improvement. 
Another empha sis providing utility i n i n terpreting re-
l i gi ous experience is tha t of the s ocial f acts exerting in-
fluence upon the f ormation of the indiYid.ual personality. 
Lewin states tha t "social f acts, as essential constituents of 
the nsychobiolo gical environment, very early acquire dominant 
significance". Furthermo r e , "so cial :facts such as f"riend-
ship 1:;- ith another chi l d, dependence upon an adul t, e tc., must 
also be regarded •••• as no less real than physical f ac t sn. 43 
43 . Lew1n, DYngmic Theory Qf Personality, p . 75. 
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Many of the f acts of religion seem to reside i n t his sphere 
of social relations. Friendship vd thin a social group as 
well as friendship with an unseen companion with a feeling of 
dependence seem to be characteristic marks of Christianity as 
well as many other religions. His studies in democra tic and 
dictatorial tendencies in children illustra te what ma.y be 
c.alled inherent goodness of persons. 44 
vii. Summar~. The understanding of the religious per-
son thRt one gains from Lewin's point of view might proceed 
somewhat like this: The i ndividuc.l finds himself in an envir-
oP..ment (the environment would more than likely be a. church 
since Lewi n deals v!i th only momentary fields of force) which 
ha s valence for the person's religious needs (how he came to 
have religious needs is not clear). The tension thus devel-
oped between personal need and environmen t al valence causes 
the person ~o react to the environment as he conceives it, 
perhaps by singing, praying, or some other form of r eligious 
participation. This is an oversimulified account, cut serves 
to indicate that Gestalt psychology, as represented by Lewin, 
is relevant to particular situations where religion is con-
cerned. However, there seems to be lack of emphasis on con-
cepts designed to understand the more consistent cooperation 
44 Lewin, "Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psy-
chology", American Journal of Sociology, 44 (May, 1939) and 
Lev;in "Social Reconstruction", Journgl .Q.f. ~ial Psycholo~, 
38 (April, 1943}, pp. 868f. and pp. 166f. respecti vely. 
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and communication of the i ndividual with his God. Whereas 
typol.o gica.l psychology studies the ideal type of person, Ges-
t alt studies the l iving person, but only i n particular situa-
tions. There seems to be a lack of emphasis on the inner 
core or self and its central r egions or personal ity, which 
al.so have valence for the person. These are the areas \'ihich 
throw light on why the i ndividual who leaves the particular 
situation may show effects of his religious experience in new 
situations. Thus Gestalt psychology provides a good founda-
tion for understanding religion, but does not provide con-
cepts adequately ho1istic for understanding the religious per-
son as he shows permeations of his religiosity i n every day 
affairs. 
3. Behaviorism 
It might seem that behaviorism v;-i th its · emphasis on the 
conduct and action of human beings as the subject-matter of 
psychology might be the i deal type of psychol ogy for gaining 
i n sight i n to the religious life of man. "By their fruits 
ye shall know them"45 seems axioma tic for human understanding . 
But t h is is to overlook the f a ct t ha t " as a man t hinke th, so 
is he". 46 There may be a great deel of good in behaviorism 
45 Matthew 7:16. 
46 Proverbs 23:17. 
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for a psychological understanding of religion, but it may not 
be the whole good. For a psychological. understanding of re-
ligion there are other factors to be considered besides the 
behavior of individuals. 
The writings of E. C. Tolman furnish the data for a 
brief review of behaviorism on those topics conducive to reli-
gious understanding. As a modern behaviorist, his emphasis 
on purposive behavior lends a more favorable light from the 
behavioristic standpoint to the topics discussed. 
i. Pers-oect;tve. Tolman like other behaviorists as-
sumes, it seems, that the human being is patterned after a 
machine, or at least, a rat. Although he does not hol.d to 
Watson's idea that the person is but a battery of trigger-re-
1.ease mechanisms, the principle that the behavior of the in-
dividual is determined wholly by physical. stimuli is main-
tained. Such a presupposition leaves little room for an 
understanding of goodness, truth, and be~uty v;hich are pre-
dominant in the religious life. This is because goodness, 
truth, and beauty , for example, are ideals looked forward to 
and intended and serve themselves as stimuli toward their 
attainment. Thus because physical stimuli do not possess a 
long range, future-oriented property, the idea tha t behavior 
is determined by only physical stimuli leads to ex9laining 
away all the qualitative features of the religious life. 
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Tolman's behaviorism assumes the validity and supremacy 
of the method of element analysis. Expl anation consists in 
eX-hibiting the parts out of which a whole is composed; a whol.e 
is nothing but an aggregation of parts. This seems to be 
the old aUmdsti.c mode of descrip tion v,hich the majority of modern 
psychologists have renounced in f avor of more dynamic and hoi.-
istic methods. As Pepper47 points out, behaviorism of the 
purposive type has a curio us i nheritance of mechanism. Re-
ligion lik e other cultural aspects of l ife can be unders t ood 
best by more synoptic methods. 
A third presupposition of behaviorism tha t seems ques-
tionable is the validity of the rat model for understanding 
human beings. Assuming a simple behavior-physiological par-
allel.ism, "not the old psycho-physical paral.lel ism", 48 Tolman 
holds tha t rats exhibit basic lavvs and principles ';,:hich un-
derlie and therefore expl ai n man's culturi zed i n telligence, 
motiva tion, and instability ----- the three foci of behavior.49 
P~though Tolman admits tha t r a ts have no culture, 50 it seems 
tha t his zeal for means to his scientific quest overshadows 
4'7 s. Pepper, "Conceptual Fr amework of Tolman 's Purposive 
Behaviorism". Psycholo ~ical Review, 41 (March, 1934), p . 1.08f. 
48 Tolman, "Determiners of Behavior at a Choice Poin tn, 
Psychological Review, 45 (Jan., 1938), p. li'. 
49 Tolman, f_urp osj,ve Behavior .in .Mgn and An;Lmals (New 
York :Century Co., 1932), Ch. I. 
50 Tolman, "A Stimulus-Expectancy. Need-Cathexis Psychol-
ogy". Science, · l.Ol (Jan., 1945), p. 160f. 
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and excludes the end for ¥.hich he seeks, namely, to expl ain 
human behavior. Rodhom expresses amazement at ToL~an's and 
other rat-psychologi s ts' prest:iillgit:rtion f cul tures, r a ts and 
men. 51 One might well question many of Tolman's conclusions 
about persons because the i ntelligence, motivation, and in-
stability of men is at such a great va.rience with t ho s e same 
factors i n r a ts. 
ii. ~onsgiousness. The keystone to Tolman's purpo sive 
behaviorism lies i n the concept of "sign-Ges t a.l t expectancyn. 
It is this princi?le along with a doctrine of instincts tha t 
mar k s his psychology as purposive. This seems to be a vir-
tual admission of mental entities. But Tolman regards the 
problem of the l.ocus of 'JI.rh a t is call.ed the content of con-
I;<) 
sciousness as a metaphysical question.""(;., 
In an early articl e i n the Psychologj,cal Review5 3 Tolman 
gives a behaviori s t's definition of consciousness. It stems 
from the concepf of behavior-adjustment. Behavior- adjustment 
is reg arded a s a func t ional surrogate for actual behavior 
which somehow serves to bring into the present the stimulus-
results to be expected from the corresponding actual behavior. 
51 C. Rodhom, "Cul tures, Rats, and Men". Affierica..n ..J:run:-
nal of Psychology, 58 (April, 1945), p. 262f. 
52 See K. Williams, "Five Behaviorisms". American Jour-
nal of Psychology, 43 (July , 1931), p. 357. 
53 Tolman, "A Behaviorist's Definition of Consciousness". 
psycholo gical Revie·;, 34 (May, 1931), p. 434f. 
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Behavior-adjustments produce or become consciousness. More 
clearly, he states, 
Whenever 2~ organism at a given moment of stim-
ulation shifts then and there from being ready to 
respond in some relatively less differentiated way 
to being ready to respond i n some relativ-ell more 
differentiated way, there is consciousness • .. A 
His definition is illustrated by the "lookings back and forth" 
of r a ts at a choice point. Later he writes and repudiates 
this idea. Speaking about the illustration of r e ts at a 
choice point, he states that he had unfortunately suggested 
this as a behavioristic definition of consciousness. But, 
nthis Wa$, no doubt, a silly idea. I woul d hardly dare pro-
pose it nown.55 Thus the subject of consciousness is dis-
missed &nd conscious religious values cannot be treated. 
Lest one assume from the concept of ex::> ectE,ncy that 
consciousness is required, Tolman emphatically ·sta:tes, 
. 
"Let me emphasize again and ag&.in that an 'expectation' does 
not require words nor consciousness --- that it is just a 'set' 
for a certain environmentc:d object-sequence". 56 
As a result of overlooking the importance of the self 
or some similar concept as consciousness, it seems tha t be-
haviorism has its signifi~ance in the realm of those peripher-
54 Ibid., p. 435. 
55 See Tolman, nneterminers of Behavior", Psychological 
Review, 45 (Jan., 1938), p. 27. 
56 See Tolman, '1 Reply to Professor Guthrie", ~hologi­
cal Review, 45 (March, 1.938), p. 163. 
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al, stimulus-oriented, and genetic features of the person. 
The deeper features of life with which religion is mostly 
concerned are left untouched because they i nvolve conscious 
desire, intention, and future oriented thought and action. 
These features behav1orism explains away. 
iii. Theory Qf Motivation. Although Tolman denies 
that he has left the watsonian tradition of disreg&.rding 
feelings and qualities, he has left the Watsonian tradition 
in the field of motivation. Whereas Watson saw human moti-
vation in terms of trigger-mechanisms, Tolman sees it through 
and through as purposive. Conscious i n tent is not involved 
in the meaning of the term purposive. Purposive is defined 
as the r eadiness to break ou.t in tri al and error a.."l.d to se-
l.ect gradually or suddenly, the more efficient of such trials 
and errors with respect to getting to an end.57 Such a defi-
nition gai n s clarity when one remembers that Tolman adheres 
to a doctrine of instincts. 
An act may be discerned from a molecular or from a· molar 
behavioristic poin t of view. It is contended tho.t only the 
latter is the psychologist's concern. Molar behavior is not 
reducible to molecular physiological reaction. A molar act 
has distinctions all its O 'Jii11 th 2c t can be identified and de-
scribed irrespective of whatever muscular, glandular, or neu-
----s7 See Tolman, "Glossary" in· Purposive Behavior i n Ani-
ma.l s and Men. 
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ral processes underlie them. The identifying properties of 
such an act are: 58 (1) initiating causes and (2) behavior de-
terminants. There are t v;o sorts of i nitiating causes: (a) 
environment al stimuli and (b) initiating physiological sta tes. 
There ar e three kinds of behavior determinants, and this is 
wh ere instinctivism co'nes in, (a} purposive and cognitive im-
manent determinants, (b) purposive and cognitive capacities, 
and (c) behavior adjus tments. 
Tolman draws up a li s t of appetites and aversions from 
the behavior determinants that clos ely resembles McDougall's 
list. 59 As ha s been pointed out before, i n stinctivism alone 
as a theory of motivation fails to measure up to the t e st of 
unique, personal, dynamic, and ultiillate causation. Instincts 
are mysterious and sta.tic. They f ail to account adequately 
for the unique psychical phenomena characteristic of religion. 
Religious mo tivation on such a theory can be explained only 
by reductionism. Ins tincts may be adequate for explaining 
the behavior of r a ts, but human behavior seems to present a 
much more complex activity guided by understanding of values 
a s seems prevalen t in religion. Besides, if religious be-
h a vior were only i n itiated by physiological sta t-9s, environ-
59 See Tolm2n, furuosive Behavior in Man And Animals, 
Ch. I. 
59 McDougall, Energies of Men, Ch. 10, and Tolman, 
"Drive-Conver sion Diagram", psychologi,Ql!.l Review, 50 (Sept., 
1943), :p. 504f., and. Tolman, nDemands and Conflicts", Psycho-
logical Review, 44 (Jan., 1937), p. 158f. 
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menta.l stimuli, and instincts, hmv would religious behavior 
in different situations be acconnted for? 
.And more important, 
hovv '"muld the changes or modifications that take 9l2.ce in re-
ligious behavior be accolli!ted for? Tolman has an answer for 
the first question. The concept of conditioning is used to 
explain the fact that the range of stimuli tha. t may excite a 
given religious response may be extended. Thus by condition-
ing., religious behavior i n different situations seems to be 
accounted for. But is it accom~ted for fully? Desire, in-
t ent, and vdlling make a difference as to whether the r ange 
of stimuli is ef fective. Conditioning is thus a partial ex-
planation. 
There is no satisfactory explanation for the modifica-
tions in religious behavior in Tolman's psychology. Changes 
and modifications in religious behavior can best be explained 
by concepts such as intention and ~:t.e:est. Since both of these 
imply consciousness, they are not considered by Tolman. Nei-
ther is the concept of the unconscious considered iD behavior-
istic psychology. 
iv. Interpersonal Relations. Tolman has been greatly 
inf1uenced by topological and dynamic concepts of Lewin.60 
Indeed, his psychology seems to be an attempt to synthesize 
purposive, Gestalt and behavioristic psychologies. It is 
60 T;lrnan, "Determiners of Behavior at a Choice Point", 
Psychological Review, 45 (Jan., 1938), p. 23. 
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Lev,"in' s i nfluence that has led to his emphasis on the total 
environment as affecting the behavior of the individual. The 
Gestalt emphasis on wholeness is tak en to mean emphasis on 
the behavior of the whole organism rather than concentrating 
on muscles, glands, or the viscera. 
This Gestalt influence shows itself again in his empha-
sis on the environmental factors affecting behavior. In his 
words, it is ''the environrnento-behavior relation which psy-
chologists take as subject mattern. 61 The subscription to 
the ":field theory" is shoVItn again in that 
•••• it appears that the psycho~ogist 1 s independent 
variables are not in any final sense independent 
and absolute. They are a"'."'')'Pys immersed j_n a 'field' 
constituted by the 'culture pattern' of the whole 
group. They cannot6~e mc:mipulated wholly independ-ently of this field ; · 
He concludes that the behavior of hum2n beings as society 
forming creatures cannot be studied save within larger socio-
logical wholes. 
Tolman lists interpersonal factors affecting the behav-
ior of persons as economic, technological, and political 
along "d th the geographical, historical, and racial factors. 
It is Tolman's belief that these factors underlie and condi-
tion individuals and their conduct. They are the ultimate 
6'I Tolman, "Demands and Conflicts", E.§ychoJ&gical Re-
view, 44 (Jan., 1937), p. 158 . 
62 Tolman, "Physiology, Psychology, and Sociology", 
. ~sycholog~cal Review, 45 (May, l938), p. 235. 
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determiners of the group and its particular conduct. It is 
not 'l"dthout significance that the behaviorist omits religion 
as a factor affecting the behavior of individuals. In his 
article, Physiology, Psychology: and .:Qociology, 63 ToLman uses 
a church wedding scene i n w·hich he attempts to analyze the 
behavior of the participants according to the various sciences 
mentioned in the title of the article. According to his de-
scription, the fact that it was a church wedding was apparent-
ly a mere accident. The religious factor was not even men-
tioned. 
. 
The interpersonal character of behaviorism is that of 
group stimulus to which the behavior of the individual. is the 
response. By overlooking the factor of conscious experience, 
wherein the stimulus is co nsidered as conceived by the person, 
behaviorism leaves out a necessary and important step for 
studying the "whole organism". In the social environment it 
is the person's awareness or conception of stimuli that af-
fects his behavior rather than the purely objective environ-
ment alone. Obviously Tolman did not drink very deeply from 
the well of Gestalt psychology. 
v. Summary. Behaviorism has merit in giving valuable 
}mowledge of reactions of the body to physical stimuli. Its 
experiments in animal learning have proved beneficial for in-
63 Ibid., p. 233f. 
• ' 
79 
terpreting some aspects of human learning. Its desire to 
make psychology an objective science is well t aken. However, 
for a psychological understanding of religio~ it seems tha t 
its presuppositions, concepts, and scone of problems ~) r ove too 
. 
narrow. 
4. Depth Psychology 
Among t he more penetrating methods evol.ved for under-
standing psychical phenomena are those discovered by dep th 
psychologists. Because of the practical and clinical na ture 
of their work, the ideas and findings of this group reach 
probably a wider public than those of any other psychology. 
Because of t h e scope and i n tensity of their methods, it is 
generally believed tha.t the contributio ns of depth psycholo-
gists have opened up new vistas for understanding t he dync:tm-
ics of the person. 
There are several important school.s or approaches in 
dep t h psychology. The Freudian, Adlerian, and Jungian are 
the oldest. Yet t here are other schools which are proving 
as sig~ificant and useful. To neglect any on e of these ap-
proaches would be to do an injustice to p sycho1 ogy an d reli-
gion. But since the whole of dep th psycholo gy is not the 
primary concern of this thesis, for the purpose of illustra-
tion, Jung ts psychology is briefly exami n ed for t h e light it 
may throw on religion. Comments on other depth psychologies 
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are made as t h e occasion demands. 
Jungrs psychology stands i n marked contrast to those 
of other depth psychologists. Whereas r eligion is overlool-red 
or seen as having negative value by the majority, Jung, along 
vYi th some other contemporary depth psychologists, 64 ha s taken 
the opposite view. Jung ha s attempted to broaden his psychol-
ogy in order that such fundamental experiences as t hose of the 
religious life can be explained. and used for furthering the 
therapeutic process. 
Despite the good (from the religionist's point of view) 
intentions of Jung to have depth psychology explain and use 
r eligious experiences, it seems tha t on. those topics most 
conducive to an understanding of religion he ha s shown one-
sided interest in a few topics to the detriment of other im-
portant topics. Indeed, t here appear to be some con tradic-
tions in depth psychology on these points. 
i. Persnec tive. In order to comp rehend the phenomena 
of religious :9 ersons the principle of teleogy must be recog-
nized. It is on such a presupposi tiori that Jung, as vv-el.l. 
as Adler, depart s from orthodox psychoanalysis. He stresses 
the teleology of psy:chic phenomena as opposed to a mechanis-
tic interpreta tion. The latter interpretation could hardly 
but lead to a misunderstanding of religion as in the case of 
s.q: Mainly Otto Rank and Fritz XunkeLin Will Therapy(New 
York:Knopf,1945),Ch.21 , and In Search gf MaturiiYTNew YorK: 
Scribner's Sons, 1943), p.85 respectively. · -
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Freud's views.65 
Jung assumes along vd th practically all other dep th psy-
chologists the existence of the unc on scious mi nd. The con-
scious portion of the mind i n i tsel.f 1.rould hardly present many 
difficulties were it not for the fact that t his m~conscious 
portion of the mind leads an i ndependen t exis tence. Moreover, 
this unconscious portion is an "autonomous power directed 
aga i nst •••• conscious personali tyt166 The unconsciou s posseses 
a continuity, i n telligence, and purposiveness all its ovm . 
According to Jung, t he u.Yl.conscious posse.sses religi ou s t enden-
cies springing from the collec t ive unconscious. 
It is this a ssumption tha t the m1consciou s exists inde-
pendently of conscious personality tha t leads Jung to r ender 
motivation in terms of almost exclusively uncon scious process-
es. Wha t the personal unconscious cannot explai n , t h e col-
l.ective u.Yl.conscious is postula ted to explain. The difficul-
ty tha t this seems to present for a psychological U.Ylderstand-
ing of religion is whether religious phenomena are to be ex-
pla ined and understood almost exclusively i n terms of uncon-
scious processes or conscious processes. Dep th psychology 
appears to lean too heavily on t h e un con scious processes. I£ 
65 See Freud, The Future. .Qf fill_Illusion, Tr. v.;. Robson-
Scott, (London:Hogarth Press, 1928). 
66 See Jung, Psy5hology and Rel.igion (New Haven:Yale 
University Press, 1938 , p. 17f. 
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the unconscious is wholly autonomous of the conscious mind 
then there exists an irreconcilable war of motives. There 
exists under the circumstances no governor or mediator of the 
t wo force.s. 67 
Jung, unlike some depth psychologists, seems to h ave an 
underlying philosophy closely approaching tha t of idealism. 
His concern for understanding the totality of the person and 
religious experiences of persons makes his basic philosophy 
harmonize with his aims. He rejects thorough-going na tural-
ism and leans toward i n teractionism. He postulates the 
psyche to be as real as any physical object. The real being 
interpreted i n terms of the rational and valuabl e in experience. 
I mmedia te experience is the starting point of any science. 
The principle of independent psychical causation is subscribed 
to. Such an idealistic position is more common to depth 9 SY-
chologists of the non-Freudian schools t han to the orthodox 
positions. The idealistic philosophical aesump tions of a 
psychology are more contributive to a psychological understand-
ing of religion than those of other philosophical positions. 
They lead to an apprecia tion of religiou s values f or personal-
i ty. 
67 See how Jung holds to t he primitive idea of soul as 
being something independent, capricious, and dangerous in 
Modern Man in Seardh of 1! Soul, Tr. W. Dell & C. Bayn es (Lon-
don:Paul, Trench , Truber Co., 1923), p. 211. To him, the 
soul sought is unity of outlook on life. 
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ii. The Bel.f. Jung distinguishes the ego from the self. 
The soul is also distinguished .from both the ego and the self. 
In his writings, ho·wever, t hese distinctions appear to be am-
biguous and vague. The ego68 is defined as a complex of 
representations which constitute the centrum of consciousness 
and which appears to possess a very high degree of continuity 
and identity. The ego is only the subject of consciousness. 
It is embraced by and included in the self. He gives sever-
a1 definitions of the self. In his definitions of the soul 
and psyche there appears an apparent lack of clarity to dis-
tinguish clearly between the soul, the psyche, and the sel..f. 
In one place he sta tes, 
The individual Self is a portion, or excerpt, 
or representation of something universally present 
i n all living creatures, and, therefore, a correspond-
i ngly graduated kind of psychological process, which 
is born anew in every creature.69 
Elsewhere it can be seen tha t "intellectually the self is 
nothing but a psychological concept. Since it transcends 
our powers of comprehension it might as well be called the 
god in usn.70 Again, the reciprocal functioning of the con-
scious and the uncon scious constitutes a totality, the self. 
68 Jung, Psychological TyQes, Tr. H. Baynes (London: 
Paul, Truber Co., 1933), p. 540. 
69 Ibid., p. 475. 
70 Jrmg, ~Q Essays .in Jl.nal.ytical Psychology, Tr. H. & 
C. Baynes (New York:Dodd, -Mead Co., 1928), p. 265. 
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"It includes not only the conscious, but a~so t he unconscious 
psyche, and is therefore a personalityn.71 By speaking of' 
an "individual self" Jung seems to imply that there is al.so 
a "collective self" in keeping with the individue,l and collect-
ive unconscious. Since he does not define the self in terms 
of its functions it seems little wonder that "it transcends 
our powers of comprehensionn. His ambiguity adds to the 
confusion. 
Jung stands opposed to the historic development of' the 
soul concept since his idea of the soul does not coincide with 
the totality of the psychic functions. He defines the soul 
as "the relation to the unconscious" and again as "a person-
ification of unconscious contents".72 In his chapter of 
definitions in Psychological Tyne~ it seems that the soul and 
the anima may be the same. Definition 48 is listed: Soul 
('Anima'). 73 Here he understands a definitely demarcated 
.function-complex tha t is best characterized as a personality, 
to be the soul.. Such definitions seem to lack precision and 
may ·well. lead to confusion. To add to the ambiguity the 
psyche is defined as "the totality of all the psychic process-
es, both conscious and unconsciousn.74 The selr and the 
71 Ib.d 
__L., p. 188. 
72 Jung, Psychological !YQes, p. 306. 
73 Ibid., p. 588. 
74 l£i~., p. 588. 
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·9syche and the animo. all ~ack clear definitions. They seem 
equivalent. The ego is given the function that personalists 
give the self in that it is the subject of one's totality. 
The common element in al.l of these concepts is awareness. 
Jung clearly recognizes the value of a self concept for 
understanding religious experience. It seems, however, that 
Jung would rely more on his nev.rly created concepts for such 
an understandin.g. His lack of clarity concerning the self, 
soul, psyche, and ego hardly leads to a better understanding 
of the function of the self in religious experience. His 
attitude toward such concepts seems to be more favorable, how-
ever, than ~hose of many of the contemporary psychologists. 
iii. Conscious Exnerience. Jung puts his greatest em-
11hasis on the unconscious. '\IYhat the ·oersonal unconscious 
~ . 
does not explain, the collective unconscious is posited to 
explain. Depth psychology is essentially a psychology of 
the uncon scious. It seems to recognize the value of conscious 
experi ence for "normal" persons in ordinary everyday affairs. 
But the orthodox depth psycholo gists at tempt to explain the 
plain, ordinary person predominEJ.tely by the u.rJ.conscious. 
Jung does not seem to be immune from this bias. The justifi-
cation of this overemphasis is tha t the unconscious is regard-
ed as a compensation to the one-sidedness of the general o.t ti-
tude produced by the function of consciousness. The reason-
ing indicates that 
The activity of the conscious is selecti~. 
Selection demand s dir ection. Eut the direction 
requires the exclusion of everything irrevelant. 
Therefore a certain one-sidedness of the conscious 
orientation is inevitable.75 
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Generally speaking, the depth psychologists go to the other 
extreme and conclude that the unconscious is the only portion 
of the mind worth studying. From it, ell tha t need be 
known about the person can be ga thered by the va.rious analyt-
ic methods. 
Depth psychology rightly contends that psychologice:•.l 
understanding cannot be complete without taking i n to con sid-
era tion the unconscious factors and processes. But t aken by 
itself, it gives only one side of the indi vidu ::. l because it 
is concerned more with uncon scious valuation or im:9ulses to 
the neglect of, or dismissal of, conscious values. Conscious-
ness, fragmentary and one-sided as it may be, is the basic 
datum fro m which all else mus t be of necessity i nferred. Jung 
rightly sta tes that the unconscious is a supplement of con-
sciousness. But he (a.s well as most depth psychologists) im-
plies tha t consciousness is but a refracting mirror of the un-
conscious :from ;rhich a.l.l. motivation and v2.l.ua tion arise. Thus 
it seems that the depth picture of experience becomes one-
sided. A psychology vYhich tak es i n to consideration both the 
conscious and uncon scious experience of the person , can do 
75 Jung," Psychological Tyn e~, p. 532. 
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more jus tice to understa.nding r eligious experience than on e 
thc.t neglects one phas e a t t h e expense of the other. The 
reco gnition of r eligious values arises when both uncon scious 
n eeds and conscious interests bec ome f oc al . in experi ence. 
Dep t h p sychology stresses the unconscious n eeds and t h e emo-
tional factors. The processes of search, judgment and pur-
poseful activity are neglected. 
iv. Mot1¥ation and £ersonalitx Structure. The p sycho-
analytic movement is noted for its dynamic theories of motiva-
tion. It is in the f ield of motiva tion tha t depth psychology 
ha s made one of its greatest con tributions to th e field of 
psychology. It substituted dynamic concepts of energy in 
pl ace of the sta tic concepts that were in use. 
A review of the dynamic concep ts of depth psychology re-
quires f ar more space than can be allowed in thi s t hesis. 
Hence, only the general and basic concepts of Jung's psycholo-
gy are considered. Jung sees the basic source of energizing 
forces i n the libido. He uses the term synonymously vri th 
nsy~hic energy. Psychic energy is the intensity of the psy-
chic process--- its psycholo gical determining power.76 
Jung holds the Freudian sexual conception of the libido to be 
narrow. Jling sees it as an all- embracing n ame for everythi ng 
'To Jung,-Psychologic a.l Tynes, p . 571.. Also Chapters 1, 
2 , and 3 of Part II in Psychology Qf the Unconsciou~, Tr. B. 
Hinkle (New York:Dodd, Mead Co., 1916~ 
having to do ~o:ith affects and drives. The libido is not 
only in the individual, but in hum~n civilization as well. 
Jung holds tha t a spiritual force vd thin the individual 
s truggled again-st the original sexuality of the libido so 
that there are now a sexual and an anti-sexual tendency in 
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the human psyche. This accounts for innate morality. 
ality is considered a gift as is intelligence.77 
Mor-
The transformation of motives is accounted for in that 
the energy of certain psychic phenomena can be transformed 
into other dynamisms through suitable means. The suitable 
means are symbols which make it possible for human beings to 
assume a counterposition to primitive drives. 
fm1ction of religion to create such symbols. 
It is the 
Another important aspect of Jung's theory of motivation 
is tha.t concerning instincts. The mind is governed by in-
stincts. Mind is the inevitable form t h a t the power of in-
stincts assumes. This does not mean that mind is a deriva-
tive of some instinct. By instinct Jung means "an impulsion 
toward certain activities". All those psychic processes 
over ·whose energies the conscious has no disposal come vvi thin 
the concept of instinct.78 According to Jung, not only the 
individual's manner of acting, but his whole way of life de-
pends upon a definite pattern of inborn tendencies. It is 
77 Jung, Psychology and Religion, p. 93. 
78 see Jung, Psychological Tyues, p. 475f. and p. 565. 
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upon this consideration tha t he develops his theory of mental 
types for which he is noted. Instinct control is a normative 
pr·ocess whose -power origina tes from inherited channels of the 
ancestral line. Thus are rel.igious symbols developed early 
in history to assist the con trol. I n other 1mrds, sentiments 
are formed toward certain objects and are therefore expres-
s ions of the unique adjustment of general i ns tincts to specific 
problems. This seems to be the implication of Jung's view. 
He is therefore somewhat in the hormic tradition, close to 
MacDougall . Some basic objections to i nstincts center around 
the mysterious way i n which they operate. Jung sees symbols 
~as· ·: t h e objects of instinctive energy. MacDougall calls 
this clustering of emotion toward certain ideas and objects 
sentiments. A part of the mys tery is thus cleared. Senti-
ments and symbols represent the adjustment of general in-
stincts to specific problems. However, hormic psychologists 
generally limit propensities to objects and there is no ac-
count of the fact tha t religious person s are generally reli-
gious in situations where the environmenal factors (objects) 
are different. Jung i s correct i n saying tha t rel igious 
s y:nbol.s assist i n controll;ing impulses, . but the statemen t 
doesn 't cover the phenomena of religiosity without objective 
symbols. This difficulty has recently been overcome by a 
90 
hormic-personalistic view of motivation.79 
The structure of personality is conceived somewhat dif-
feren tly than . in orthodox dep th psychology . The structure 
of personality is viewed as consisting of the self, the ego, 
consciousness, personal unconscious, emotions, and the col-
lective unconscious. The psychoanalytic terms, id and su-
per-ego, are rarely if ever men tioned in .Tung's works. The 
collective unconscious which contains the spiritual inheri-
tance of human development accounts for morality i n stead of 
the ego erecting a protective inner monitor, or super-ego, as 
an unconscious barrier to repress the forbidden libidinal 
cra."~iings. The super-ego in the Freudian view represents the 
coercive ideals of the group v'lhich account for moral.i ty. .Tung 
seems to hold that the moral imperative is an irreducible 
function of the psyche.80 The moral imperative is not an ex-
peri ence of want, or compulsion. Neither is it a result o:f 
fear. It is an expression of the inherited ideals of the 
race (collective unconscious) and the ideals incorporGted in-
to the individual from contemporary culture. Since on e's 
79see P. A. Bertocci, PhilosO"Qfcr of Personality (Urlpub. 
Sy ll., Boston University, 1948). Bertocci sees i n s t i n cts a.s 
only one level of personality integration. Other levels are 
acco~~ted for by the formation of sentiments, attitudes, traits, 
and eges. Such a view is more adequa te than those of simple 
ins tincts or drives, etc., '~Nithout any other concepts. 
80 For a criticism of the Freudian view and a personal-
istic interpretation of morality see Bertocci, "Reinterpreta-
tion of Moral Obligation" in £hilosophy and Phenomenological 
Resea~, 6 (March, 1945), pp. 273-280. 
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s -o_. iritual inheritance may· vary from that of other ~erson's 
1-' ' 
morality is considered a gift. 
For Jung, the concepts of instincts and symbols explain 
the fact that human beings seek common objectives and satis-
f action of similar needs. Symbols express the unique ad-
justment of instinctive t endencies to certc:-.. in probl ems of 
humanity. For example, just as dream symbols repres ent de-
sires, conflicts, and fears, so religious symbols repres ent 
adjustments to common problems faced by humanity. Jung' s 
EsycholQEY and Eeligion attempts to show, among other things, 
that religious symbols like dream symbols represent attempts 
of the i ndiv-idual to come to terms Vfi th his environment. At-
titudes are generally inborn, but can be changed by the trans-
formation of instinctive psychical energy. 
v. Views Qll Beligion. Generally Jung has relied a 
great deal uuon reli gious ideas, beliefs, and symbols to 
demonstrate his concepts of the collective unconscious, arche-
types and the anima. He is distinctive because of his in-
terpretation of these f actors in r eligion. Jung accepts 
and attempts to understand the values of religious experience. 
He gives them positive value. 
Religion is defined by Jung as the term that designates 
the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been a1-
tered by the experi ence of t he numinosum.81 He means the 
at Jung, PsychologY and R9l.igion, p. 1.0. 
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experience of divine force or potency ascribed to objects or 
beings regarded with awe in the ma.nner of Rudolph Otto. 82 
Jung emphasizes its..§: priori character as does Otto. It is 
considered a relationship to the highest or strongest value, . 
be it positive or negative. The relationship may be volun-
tary or involuntary.83 It is a spontaneous expression of a 
certain predominant psychical condition. This condition 
arises from the experience of the perception of reality by 
means of awe-inspiring objects or persons. It is somewhat 
of a mystical state. 
Noting the influence of Christianity on the world for 
.the past t wo thousand years, Jung points out that Christianity 
is essentially a psychological attitude, a definite form and 
~ 
manner of adaptation to inner and outer experience, which 
molds a definite form of civilization.84 He cites one of 
the great benefits of religion as strengthening the individua1 
against his all too great weakness and insecurity in real 
life.85 In· a somewhat different attitude and again emphasiz-
ing mysticism, he vie'i!\' s the benefits of religion as 
The benefits of parentc:d hands; its protection 
and its neace are the results of narental care unon 
.. - k 
82 Rudolph Otto. The Idea of the Hol~, Tr. J. V'l . Harvey 
(London:Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 76. 
83 Jung, Psychology and Religion, p. 98. 
84 Jung, Ps~chological Types, p. 230. 
85 Jung, Psycholo c;;r £f. ~ Unconsciou~, p. 98:f. 
the child; its mystic feeling s are the unconscious 
emotions of the first childhood.86 
This sta tement is important because it indic a tes i n brief 
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Jung's view of re~igion. Jung probably means by benefits of 
parental hands t he benefits derived from the ma ternal a ttitude 
the Church t akes i n his native Switzerland, which is very 
Catholic. 8'7 He doesn't amplify or clarify his statement. 
This would hardly be applicabl e to Protestantism ~hich stress-
es individual freedom, initiative, and responsibility. This 
s ame i n terpreta tion might be applied to the second statement 
concerning peace and 9rotection being the resul t of paren t al 
care. But, more than likely, both sta tements mean actual 
paren t al care and he thus sees religion being directly affected 
by the childhood parental care and childhood a ttitudes. The 
pr esent religious feelings are understood by finding t h e re-
pr essed emotions f elt in childhood. Although the emotions 
of ear l ier childhood may be somewhat similar to some felt in 
the religious experience, there is much room for doubt as to 
wheth er they are the same and whether they c an be understood 
as childhood emotions. Since the i nf ant lacks ~ong memory 
and his capacity for expectc. ti on is very short, he is mostly 
present-oriented. His fee l ings t herefore lack t~o of the 
86 Ibid., p . 99. 
8'7 See a specific example of t his attitude i n H. Murray 
c;_nd C. :Morgan, nA Clinical Study of Sentiments 11 , Genetic Psy-
cholo gical Monogr anh, 32 (1945}, p . 192. 
.. 
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most vital points of reference of mature religious emotions. 
As Johnson sta.tes, BB religious emotions are "dynamic responses 
to a Sustainer of values believed to have creative answers 
to human needs, or to any value associated by memory or hope 
with our destiny". The three vital criteria of conscious 
belief, memory, and hope are very limited in early childhood 
and religious feelings are beyond the unconscious emotions of 
childhood. 
A point can also be raised as to whether Jung is correct 
about the mystical feelings i n a narrow sense. Emotions of 
childhood are engendered by local and visible reality, where-
as the mystical emotions are engendered by an unseen reality. 
They cannot be the same because the person ha s changed, the 
feelings are different i n so f ar as they can be compared, and 
the exciting source is different. 
Concerning the origin of religion, Jung states that 
nthe part of the libido which erects religious structures is 
in the last analysis fixed i n the mothern.89 It is inherited 
as a part of the collective uncon scious. Jus t why it is 
fixed in the mother and not in both parent s is not expl a i n ed. 
I:f it :follows the laws o:f genetics, certa.inly the psychologi-
cal "religious gene" of the f ather would have a con tribution 
88 P. E. Johnson, ''Emotional Factors in Motiva tion". 
Religious 'Rducation, 42 (Sept . -Oct., 1947), p. 262 . 
89 Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious, p . 474. 
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to make. 
Jung explains the universality of religion by pointing 
out tha t it has been learned tha t the religious functio n be-
longs simply to the con stitution of t he psyche, and it is con-
stantly and everywhere present, however undifferentiated it 
may be. 90 He does not seem to mean tha t there is a rel i gi ous 
~ Drior1 which is a distinct and irreducible f aculty as Otto 
and Knudson would hold.91 Jung do es hold that the abi l ity 
to become religious is inna te and that the need for r eligion 
is transmitted to the indiYidual as a part of his i nheritance 
of the collective unconscious. 
V;'hen a problem is acce:9 t ed as religious, Jung hol.ds, it 
gains a psychological signif ic ance of immense importance. A 
value is i nvolved which relates to the whole of man. In 
his experience, none of his pa tients over thirty-five had a 
pro blem which was not in the l ast analysis a problem of re-
gai n i ng religious outlook. 92 
For a psychological understanding of re-
ligion it mi ght be said t ha t Jung's psychology is dynamic, 
but like many psychologies, his fr ame of r eference is very 
90 See Knudson, "Religiou s Apriorism", Studies in Phil-
osouh and ,Theolo,g:y, ed. E. 1Ji ilm (New· York:Abingdon Press, 
1 9 3R , p. 93f. Also Knudson, Yal .idity Q!. Reli_gious Exp erience 
(Ne1.tr York : Abingdon-Coke s burg Press, 1937). 
91 Jung, psycholQgic al Types, p . 237. 
92 Jung, Modern Man in Search of ~ Soul, p. 264. 
96 
narrovr. Muller-Frienfels notes tha t Jung 1 s great concern Yiith 
mythological matters ha s led to a mythical vagueness in his 
psychology. 9 3 Jung has resorted. to myths and primitiv3 cul-
tures to bolster his vie'.i'iS. It is for this same reason that 
G. Murphy sta tes, i n effect, that he has broadened psychoanal-
ysis past the bounds of natural science i n to the re alm of meta-
physics, a transition from the r a tional to the irra tional. 94 
His concept of the collective unconscious with its constructive 
and creative ability is helpful as an ad june t to the vi·e'N of 
the unconscious generally advoc ated because it i ndica tes psy-
cholo gical continuity with th~species as well as a physiolog-
ical one. Because many of his conce)ts are culled from the 
annals of mytholo gy r a ther than present experience and obser-
vation, they are of doubtful value for a psychological under-
standing of r eligion. His view on r eligious experience is 
tha t of a pragmatist as the final page of his Psvchology .illld 
Religion clearly shows. 95 
His overemphasis on the unco~nscious I.i:eeys his nsycholo-
gy in a speciali zed s egment of personality. He largely ig-
93 Mul.ler-P.rienfels, Evolutio n of Modern Psychology;, Tr. 
if'' . -rolfe (Ne';'' Haven:Yale University Press, 1.934), p . 307. 
· 
94~~~c~!.Argro aches t o Personality (Nev~ York:Cow-
ard-McCann Inc., 1962 , p. 76. 
95 Jung holds thetas long a s religion is helpf ul it is 
v aluable. J. c. Flugel makes a similar observa tion concerning 
Jung in Man~ .Moral...s., and Society (New York::InternB.tional U. 
Press, 1945], p. 266. 
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nores the interpersonal f actors enteri~g into psychology. It 
seems tha t A. Adler with his emphasis on the social factors 
is a supplement to Jung's psychology. 
It may be seen, in summarizing, tha t typolo gical psy-
chology as represented by E. Spranger is conducive to a psy-
chologic a.l understanding of religion by its norms of ideal 
value attitudes in persons. Its limitations are that it is 
too abstract for an understanding of the concrete individual 
as he experiences religion. Gestalt psychology a ttempts to 
embrace the whole individual. It negl.ects the guiding and 
directing aspect of the )erson, namely, the self. Without 
an understanding of the self, Ge s t aTt psychology can but deal 
':ri th the i ndividual in his momentary relationships. It can 
throw a great deal of light upon religious behavior, however, 
because of its emphasis on the total environment of the per-
son. Behaviorism of the purposive type seems fitted for 
descrintion of religious conduct. Because it neglects the 
conscious and unconscious, it seems too superficial for an 
exulanatio:n or understa:u¢lin_g of the religious behavior it 
might describe. Depth psychology plunges down into the lower 
stra ta of human experience and comes up with pear~s of i n sight 
heretofore unfound. It throws a great deal of light on the 
undercurrents of hu~an behavior and experiences, but appears 
to neglect the effects of the conscious strivings \·\_'hich also 
pl ay a part in religiou s experience. 
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In each of these psychologies the i ndividual is a more 
or l€ss helpless victim of his heredity, l:lis momentary en-
vironment, his instincts or his unconscious. It is well 
that personalistic psychology be examined to see i f there is 
an eclectic perspective which might account for most of t h ese 
f actors and still declare justifiably the relative crea tivity 
an.d autonomy of the whole person. More l .ight may be thrown 
on religious experiences which may lead to a more profound 
understanding. 
CHAPTER IV 
BORDEN PARKER BOWNE'S THF..ORETICi\L FOUNDATIONS OF PERSO N14LISTIC 
PSYCHOLOGY 
In this chapter Bo V~ne's conception of personalistic psy-
chology i s examined for the light it throws on a psychologi-
. cal understandi ng of r eligion. A preliminary considera tion 
of his historical setting shows that his method, alth~ugh 
somewha t one-sided in emphasis, is a legitima te on e for a 
grasp of some of the essential problems of psychology and re-
ligion which are overlooked by con temporary psycholo gists. 
His emphasis on con scious experience and f actors essential to 
human action are then noted. The purpose of this chapter is 
to point out some of the beginnings of personalistic psychol-
ogy for a better understanding of the later developmen ts in 
this area of thought. The emphasis at this point is merely 
to show the roots of this school of thinking in psychology. 
1. Bowne's Historical Bettin~ 
Religion as an experience of strivi ng and actin g f or 
soci al relationships and higher v alues is a phenomena peculiar 
to hu.man beings. An explana tion and understanding of it pro-
ceeds from a knovTledge of the dynamics of those v..-ho experience 
it. Those refractory patterns of experience that persons 
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compare and agree are religious experience suggest tha.t there 
is something there. The concept religion attempts to define 
these perceptions. Psychology i n attempting to explain the 
causes and functions of these experiences . has had difficulty 
because of the traditional limits of natural science. At 
on e time, psychologists looked only 1Ni thin themselves for ex-
planations. Once all the elements of a process were enumer-
a ted the process was considered explained. Reaction set in 
against the introspective method and to-day very few psychol-
ogists rely upon it exclusively f or psycho1ogical data. The 
pendulum has swung to the opposite extr eme of relying mos tly 
upon observa tion of stimu.li and responses of the i ndividual . 
Bowne wrote at a time when the method of introspection 
wasconsidered the method of psychological investiga tion. Al-
t hough he studied in Europe, he, as well as most American psy-
chologists at tha t time, still had not been too favora bly im-
pressed v.•i th the influence of Wund t' s psychological labor a tory. 
As f ar as psychological method is concerned, Bo~me was a pro-
duct of his times. 
In other resuects it mi ght be s a id tha t Bowne represented 
- -
a stream of' thinking that was to be synthesized by Vi!il.liam 
James into a setting dovm of the bas ic principles of psycho!.-
ogy for many years to come. Bowne's European influences ·were 
not as extensive as those of James and neither was his back-
grou.."ld of education as varied as tha t of J ames. As a prede-
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cessor of J ame s , the influences upon them and their mo de o:f 
thinking ·were similar .1 
Writing in t he l a te ei ghties of the nineteenth century 
Bov:ne' s historical setting was that of the period of sensa-
tional.ism or elementarism. As with J ames, Bo~ne was a pro-
tester against the ideas and aims of his contemporaries. 
i • .Ell Defj,nitio.u of fsychology. As a philosophic al 
psychologist, Bovme' s me.in i n teres t was i n theorizing concern-
ing th e origin and causes of mental f acts and processes. 
Bowne holds tha t a simple de scription and cl.assifying of men-
t al f acts and processes is the duty of scientific psychology. 
With this as a starting poin t, philosophical psychology pro-
ceeds to theori ze concerning the causes and origins of the 
processes involved. One mi ght i nfer here tha t philosophers 
were not giving up psychol.ogy 1vi thou t a fi ght. Psychology 
was gr anted a sta tus as a collector and cl.assifier of f acts, 
but the f i nal interpreta tion and theori zing mus t he left to phil-
osophy. The psychologist was not deemed capabl e of t heoriz-
ing concerning the ultima te origin and cause of mental pro-
cesses he studied. One sees a distinction here between early 
p sychology and modern psychology. Modern psychologists de-
clare their comp etence and right to theori ze concerning t heir 
-- - --r See James' sta t emEmt of general agreemen t vd th Bowne 
and his regret tha t their paths did not cross more of t en in 
R. B. Perry, The Thought and Character of William J ames , Vol. 
2 (Boston:Li ttle Brown, 1.935}, p. 330. . 
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data to the extent tha t they do not exceed the bounds of 
science. They grant philosophy its claim to theorize con-
cerning these f acts in cosmic perspedtive. The modern psy-
chologist holds tha t he is going to theori ze, but will stick 
to empirical evidence concerning origins and causes of his 
da.t a . To t his, modern personalists agree. The great in-
terest in the problems of motivation a ttests to this f act. 
Philosophical and scientific psychology to-day have somewhat_ 
(") 
di r ferent methods. ~ 
Bovme is in agreement with modern personalists in his 
em~hasis on menta~ facts and processes, but omits exp erimenta~ 
work on conduct and action as it relates to personality due to 
the stage of growth tha t psychology was in at tha t time. 
However, where religion is concerned, Bowne3 stressed action 
and conduct deve~oping into character. This is with respect 
to a p~rticular emphasis he placed upon i n ten tio n and action 
r a ther than mysticism in religion. 
ii. _The Introsnective MethoQ,. Bowne's conception of 
the da t a of psychology led him to a considera tion of i n tro-
~ See VI. s. Nietman, A Ph losonh i al Princinle :for In-
t ernr eting Psychological Data Unpub. Ph.D. disserta tion, 
Boston University, 1943), p. 3f. 
3 See Bovme, "Obedience the Test of Discipleship", 
?ion's Herald, 81 (Jan. 7, 1903)-t p. 10 and "Childhood Piety", 
Zion's Herald, 81 (Feb. 14, 1903}, p . 138f. . 
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spection as the chief legitimate method of psychological study. 
He considers psychology subjective as contrasted to the objec-
tive sciences. The difference to him is that the f acts of 
the objective sciences are discovered outside of the s elf. 
The f acts of psychology are chiefly revealed only in conscious-
ness. He admits that mind c an be studied to some extent in 
history, institutionsand literature. It is because in these 
mind manifests its nature and utters its spontaneous convic-
tions. In l anguage, literature, etc., there can be an objec-
tive study of mind.4 But this does not mean that mind is 
pres ented to the senses; but only tha t "the nature of mind 
c an be studied in its uroductsn.5 This means that a 9sycho-
logical understanding of religion can, in part, be gained 
from a study of history of religions, religious institutions, 
and their products.s 
Bo~me insists that all knowledge of mind objectively de-
rived must come back to consciousness for either its m€aning 
or its verification. There must be agreement between the ob-
jectively derived facts and the experience of these facts in 
4 See G. w. Allport's statement that personality is so 
complex tha t every ligitimate method must be emp1oyed in its 
study. Personalit~, p. 369. 
5 Bovme, Introduction to Psychologic9]. Theory, p. 3. 
6 Knight Dunlap is a strong supporter of this view in 
'Psychology of Reli gion", Encyclopedia of Psychology. P. Harri-
man, ed. (Nevr York: Philosophical I.i brary, 1947), p. 568f. and 
Religion, Its Function in Life (New York:Holt, 1947). Also 
Bovme, "The Logic of Religious Belief". Methodist . Quarter!~ 
Eetiew, 66 (Oct., 1884), p. 665 . 
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consciousness. Disagreements arise concerning interpreta-
tions o~ facts presented in con sciousness. There can be no 
doubt about the f acts presented there. 
is the chief psychological method. 
Hence, introspection 
Although Bowne seems to have overstressed the importance 
of introspection as a psychological method, he recognizes the 
value of other methods of objectively studying the mind. It 
is in thi·s recognition of the validity of other methods that 
he points to an eclecticism that is t aken up lflter by other 
personalists. In his ovm words, "it is only the mentally 
one-eyed who insist that all facts shall be treated by the 
s ame method, regardless to differences of naturev.7 
2. The Self and Conscious Experienc§ 
i. The Reality.: of the Self. Being the foremost pioneer 
of personalism in America, Bowne furnishes outlines of argu-
ments for self psychology that are echoed later by psycholo-
gists and philosophers of the personalistic school. The basal 
fact in personalistic psychology is the self or person. It 
is this fact that Bowne uses as a starting point. This fact 
is also a sta rting point for understanding religiou s experi-
ence. 
Bo~~e holds that i n al1 mental experience the self ap-
pears as the subject and the sta te is referred to the sel.f as 
'7 Bovme, Introduction to Psychol.ogical. Theory, p. 5. 
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its subject. 1.~ri ting in an era of sensationalistic and fac-
ulty psychology, he had to "show cause", as have l a ter person-
alists, and ansvver the question: what is this sell? To the 
faculty psychologists the sta tement is directed that ttthought 
and feel.ings apart from something that thinks and feels are 
• 
unreal abstractions, like motion apart from something that 
moves".s The whole structure of thought and language implies 
a mental subject and, furthermore, the r ace has constructed 
names as mind, soul, spirit, etc. to indicate its reality. 
In ans·wer to objections to the self, Bovme defies anyone to 
account for the unity and continuity of conscious life with-
out it. Rather than mental data being composed of sta tes of 
consciousness, it is truer to say tha t it is a consciousness 
of sta tes. This is true because a rational life by its very 
ne.ture demands a unitary consciousness and a unitary subject. 
Furthermore, in order to think, one and the same conscious sub-
ject must grasp in the unity of a single act things compared, 
distinguished, or united. Moreover, memory presupposes a men-
tal subject having retentive po~er. 9 
8 Ibid., p. 10. 
9 See Bovme, Introduction JQ Psychological~~' 
p. 28. 
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There is no clear cut definition of the s elf.lO It 
is simpl y experienced. Self-experience is t he original and 
irr educible f actor of self-consciousness. The self ha s its 
vividness and reality in the life of feeling, desire, emotion, 
and interest.ll 
ii. Factors 1n Seli"-.Q_onscioJJ.snes§. Con sciousness is 
an essential prope r ty of mental processes. It is simply im-
mediate experience. It is the condition of acting, willing, 
feeli ng , etc.l2 It cannot be defined. Only its conditions 
can be studied. The general form under which it exists is 
tha t of antithesis of subject and object, i. e., the object 
of which v.re are conscious must be distinguished from s elf as 
its subject. 
Bowne points out t wo essential f actors of .self-conscious-
ness which turn out to be a moredetailed exposi tion of the 
general form under which consciousness exists, i. e., antithe-
sis of subject and object. These are (1) our con.cep tio:n of 
ourselves, and (2) our experience of our conce~tions as our 
io Ventura Franquiz points out some confusion in BoVIme' s 
conception of experiel'ice and consciousness, in Bowne's Treat-
ment of Change and Identity, (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 
Boston Uni versi.ty, 1.940 • Also see Bowne, ~r sonalism, p . 101 
and Bovme, r.heor_y Qf. Thought ang Knowledge 1,.New York :Harper 
Bros., 1897 , p. 345. 
1~ Bovme, Psychological Theory, p . 246. 
l2 Ibid • , p. 234 • 
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ovvn. The former is variable and is generally develoned so 
that its history can be traced. It is to this factor that 
modern psychologists refer when they speak of the ego. It 
is the kno·wledge of self. But this is not an original and 
consta.nt da tum. The second .factor Fhich has been pointed 
out by Bovme and to which modern yersonal.ists refer to as the 
self is self-experience • It is the original E.nd irreducible 
.factor of s elf-consciousness.l3 
Thus can be seen another foundation of' persona.listic 
psychology, empiricism, that is emphasized again by Calkins 
and Stern. 
iii. Rational Consciousness and ~he Self. In his dis-
cussions of the self and consciousness, Bowne lashed many at-
tacks u-pon the sensationalists and f aculty psychologists. He 
seemed to have clearly discerned the errors of both vie·ws. .A 
:9assage from the conclusion of one of his chapters illustrates 
this. He states concerning the factors of mental life, · 
Concerning them a double error is possible. On 
the one ha.nd, we have an attempt to reduce these fac-
tors to some common form; end on the other, we have 
a tendency to regard them as distinct entities. The 
former appea.rs in the sensationalist' s deductions, 
and the latter in the traditional doctrine of facul-
ties. Eoth errors ar e to be guarded against.l4. 
He concl.udes tha.t the transformations of sensationalism. are 
13 Ibid., p. 245f. 
14 Ibid., p. 250. 
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purely verbal and the faculties are always only abstractions 
from the many-sided mental life. This life is the reality 
in which the sensations <:md faculties have their existence. 
This precludes any idea of a religious faculty or any attempt 
to understand religion by reducing it to its lowest common 
denominator. 
With the decks thus cleared, the distinction or rela-
tionship betv,'een rational consciousness and the self c<m. be 
made. The experience of self is primc;.l. It is from this 
self that lrnowledge is built by the process of distinguishing, 
relating, or uniting non-self with self. It is this unique 
inherent ability of the self to build a rational. consciousness. 
iv. Interaction of Min~ and Bod~. Bowne means by in-
teraction that the mind and the body simply affect one another. 
The band that ties them together is their mutual influence. 
Questions as to the sea.t of the soul exist _ only on the sup-
position that space is real, ·which Bowne in his metaphysics 
finds reasons for doubting. However, Bowne finds psychologi-
cal reasons for clearing up su~h a question.15 In the first 
place, the mind. is not the brain. Secondly, changes in the 
brain mc;.y be accompanied by changes in the mind. It is not 
necessary to think of the t wo as being in contact. He points 
out that astronomy and physics find no difficulty in the as-
15 Ibid., p. ~98f. Also TTThe Interaction of Mind and 
Body", The Methodist Review, 66 (Oct., 1884), p. €42f. 
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sumption that one a tom can immediE1tely affect another across 
the whole diameter of a system, or that one atom may affect 
all others in a system a t the s ame time. He concludes that 
beyond the f act tha t physical and mental sta tes mc;_y mutually 
determine each other, the question is both idle and emp ty. 
The point tha t is stressed is tha t the body is simply 
recep tive and retentive while the mind origina tes and guides.l6 
He holds to the view that the body ini tia.tes the mind but that 
the mind perf ects the body because, "Left to itself' the soul 
v.-ould never learn to use the body, but the body left to itself 
would never come to any high developmentn.l7 It might be 
mentioned tha t this vie·w seems peculi ar to Bowne c.nd not to 
l a ter person.s.lists. It shoul .d be r emembered, however, tha t 
Bowne seems to r anl-r. f avorably li'd th J a.mes as a creative genius 
in breaking the thinking chains that bound them t o their con-
temporaries. Later personalis t s recognize the ~owers of re-
t ention, receptivity, initiative and guidance of both mind 
and body. On Bo·wne' s view the telic and i nvoluntar y move-
ments of t he body v..-oul d either be a con tradiction or s. result 
of mental influence. His idea that the body i nitia tes the 
mind suffices to show the i n ternal inconsistency of' the view. 
16 Ibid., p. 305. 
17 Ibid., p. 304. 
18 Cf. p . 18f. with p. 304f. i n Introduction jQ Psycho-
logical ·Theory. 
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Bo~ne rejects such a vie~ earlier in his book18 as he shows 
the untenability of materialism, but confusingly comes ba.ck 
to it. As Franquiz pointed out about consciousness, Bovine 
was sometimes inconsistent. Ho·wever, that still do es not 
t a1re away from his other good points. 
3 . Motivatiq,n 
In the last half of the nineteenth century the f ield of 
human motiva tion, in so far as psychology is concerned, was 
almost untouched. It was during this period tha t BoVi:ne 
V':rote. The major interests were in the fields of cognition 
and volition for philosophical and ethical reasons. However, 
Bm<~.ne a.ttempts to come to grips with the problem in his chap-
ters on the feelings and the will. ~nile he did not make 
any startling discoveries, it is well tha t the signific ant 
points he emphasized be pointed out for the understanding 
tha t it may throw on l a ter writers of this point of view. 
i. Emotions. Bo·wne identifies feeli ng as that state 
of consciousness which consists in some form of pleasure or 
pe.in, like or dislike, satisfaction or dis satisfaction. Like 
James, he holds that feeling is quite indescribable.19 For 
18 Cf. p. 18f. rdth p. 304f. in Introductio"Q to PsyQho-
logical .Theory. 
l9 James, PsLchology (Briefer Course), p. 373 .:md Bowne, 
.I_ntroduction to Psychological,. Theor_y, p. 183. 
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a definition, one can only say that feeling is feeling just 
as knowing is lmowing. He points out that it generally con-
sists in some form of desirable or undesirable consciousness, 
v,"hich either springs directly from our physical experience, 
or V\"hich attends our mental activities, or v.rhich arises from 
the contemplation of our objects and ideas. It cannot be 
deduced. It is this last stc.tement concerning the irreduci-
bili ty of feelings that has fotmd an enlarging importance in 
personalistic psychology. 
As if anticipating the James-Lange theory of emotions 
which sees emotions arising from a physical effect on the 
nerves, Bowne explains that the attempts to deduce feeling 
generally confound feeling with its conditions. It is ex-
plained that although feeling may result from the sta.te of the 
organism, this is only one conditiou. The state of the or-
ganism is not the feeling. Furthermore, 
as there is nothing in the conception of nervous 
action which implies that a sensation of light must 
result, so there is nothing in any physical concep-
tion which implie~ tha t it must be accompanied with 
pleasure or pain.NO 
It is further explained that if pain should result from a 
physical conception it can be only as there is a subject capa-
ble of feeling and in such relation to :the organism that the 
ste.tes of the latter furnish the conditions for the develop-
- - ----m:> Bowne, Introduction .:t,Q psvchologica.l Theory, p. 186. 
ment of feeling. It seems for this same reaso;:1 that Johnson 
points out that the half truth in the James-Lange theory is 
the f act that the mind and body interact. 21 
One more comparison of Bowne with James. It is sig-
nificant that James holds tha t every objec~ that excites an 
instinct excites an emotion. It is upon t his idea that W. 
McDougall holds that every i ns tinct has as a corollary a con-
comitant emotion, both of which depend on the appear ance of 
certain obje_gts for their arousal. Bowne's argument holds 
equally well here. Bowne stresses the person rather than 
objects. He seems to imply tha t all activity not of a voli-
tional nature is of a mechanical nature. Its general char-
acteristic is that it follo ws lmiformly from its antecedent. 
Such motiva tion is determined by the nervous system and the 
constitutional needs and impulses of the mind itself. Some 
are partially subject to volitional control. On the whole, 
they have a driving or impelling character which probably ac-
counts for modern :psychologists simply calling them drives 
after the German Trieb or Naturtrieb. Bov;ne's vi ew of per-
sonality, however, seems to preclude emphasis on drives of a 
mechanical n a ture in f a vor of the more religious viev; of f ree-
dom. He ascribes motiva.tion to the emotions and the will of 
the person. 
Another ground of · feeling toward objects lies in our 
~1 Johnson, ~hologi of Religion, p . 51. 
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conception of their significanc~ for our w·ell-being. He 
points out tha t as an abnormal sta te of nerve in the tooth 
may give rise to a toothache, so may the perception of such 
an abnormal sta te of the nerve. But neither constitutes the 
toothache. It is neither an abnormal sta te nor the percep-
tion o:f such; it is its owr1 wretched self. So while fee:ling 
a ttends physical and mental functions, and springs also from 
the contemplation of objects and relations, there is no vvay 
of deducing it from t hem. 
Feelings have t wo sources: the sta.te of the organism 
and the relations of our mental states and ideas. Those from 
the former source are physical feelings and from the latter, 
emotions. There are mc:my tha t have both physical and mental 
roots. Feelings of this class can only be understood from 
the co-working of the physical with the mental in the person. 
Physical feelings are roughly distinguished as constitutional 
and contingent. The former a ttend those -physical appetites 
and cravings which arise from the nature of the organism it-
self. The latter depend upon some contingent stB. te, either 
arising vii thin the organism or resul ting from external action 
u pon it. Physical feelings are telic i n character. They 
are almost entirely related to the use and well-being of the 
person, or to the arousing and directing of our activity. 
Thus Bo~ne seems to make allowance for the integr a tive and 
di sorganizing character of feelings according to the direction 
ll4 
of activity. 
Bovme attributes more importance to the feelings ·.-. hich 
have a mental source, i. e., the conception of an object. 
He attempts no classification but co rJf'ines himself to a few 
general points of view. He points out three general types 
of feelings or emotions. These are the ego feelings, socia~ 
feelings and the impersonal feelings. The latter consist 
of the aesthetic, ethical and the religious feelings. None 
of these occur in isolation. The ego feelings depend unon 
sel.f-consciousness. They exist through their relation to 
our self-esteem and desire for self-assertion. The ego is 
a.t once their subject and object. Bovme means by the term 
ego, the self as conceived or desired. The value of an ex-
perience in the mature person is chiefly determined by this 
relation to self, i. e., self esteem or self-assertion. Acts 
of the self are never estimated by the sensations attending 
them, but by the exaltation of self-feeling which results. 
The value of a.n experience to the individual lies in the 
amount of self-feeling •xhich he has put into it. Thus are 
the self-feelings constraints and potentialities of the indi-
vidual. This is another important emphasis of' personalistic 
psychology, ego-involvement. 
Human nature is provided with the social feelings as a 
counter-balance to the ego feelings. Here belong the social 
impulses and sentiments. "Man is na turally selfish, and 
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na turally social and syrrrpa thetic". 22 Man seeks man and de-
lights i n man f ar more than man war s upon man. The provi-
sion for social and unselfish existence is seen i n human love, 
sympa thy, and language as the medium of excha.nge in thought. 
It is in the social feelings that the importance of interper-
sonal relation~ is pointed out. The field of social rela-
tions is the field . of benevolent and malevol ent impulses and 
the field of ego feelings. "Indeed human life in general 
exists (in .general ) only in society. Of course there can be 
no society wi t hout the individual as its unit; but the indi-
vidual comes to himself only in society" 
dem2nd society for their development. 23 
The ego feeling s 
ii. Ethical Feelings. Ethical and religious feelings 
belong in that class of feelings that are called impersonal 
feelings. They are impersonal i n the sense that they are in-
dep endent of the personal reference previously referred to, 
and seem to depend upon an objective quality of the :ideas, ob-
jects, or actions themselves. Moral feelings agree with the 
aesthetic feelings in expressing a satisfaction or dissatis-
22 Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 196. 
Cf. This view vYi th that of Bertocci' s in his unpublished sylla-
bus, Philosouhy Qf Personality, p. 25. Also his syllabus, 
Reasonable Living, p. 6f. Bertocci holds tha t man is neither 
na turally selfish or unselfish, but capable of becoming either 
in the process of need satisfaction. 
23 Bovme, Introduction 1Q Psychological Theory, p. 197. 
For similar reasons, P. E. Johnson holds that interpersonal 
relations is the subject matter of psychology. 
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faction in the presence of certa.in conceptions. There is a 
sense of obligation vvhich is inherent in the morC?.l feelings 
and there is al.so a sense of merit or demerit -,·_·hich attends 
the resul tant action. The perception of the good carries 
obliga tion, or contains an implicit law for conduct. It is 
an impera tive of the will. 
Modern personalists also st~ess the f act tha t the uni-
versal ethical f act is the recognition of a distinction be-
t·ween right and wrong in conduct, and a resultant sense of ob-
ligation. 24 To the objection that feeling is not universal, 
.. 
but is too subjective to be a basis of ethics, Bor.ne replies 
that a f act is not made universal by calling it an utterance 
of the reason or of feeling. Its un'iversali ty depends upon 
its con tent and not upon its psychological cla.ssifica tion. 
Such an objection arises from holding feeling and rea son apart 
i n unreal separation. Although ethics gets its law from the 
ideal, it is forced to limit its actual requirements to the 
ability of the person. This view is well. illustra ted in the 
religious views of th&.t time. Grea t emphasis was placed on 
the emotions displayed as a test of religious character. All 
persons, children as ~ell, were ex9ected to have a sudden or 
striking exhibi tio ·:1 of what Bowne called "hothouse piety". 
24 Bov·me, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 206. 
This em-ohasis is seen in the writings of G. W. Allport .s.nd 
P. A. B~rtocci. It will be referred to again i n a l a ter chap-
ter. 
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"0ught'1 was consequently determined by feeling, &lmost a~on~. 
Bov:ne attempts to give a more adecua te place to reason in 
judging "ought". Ought is thus no t a feeling, nor cognition 
of value, but both interacting. He contends that feeling 
and reason cannot be artificially separated. 
The development of mor al sentiments and ideas is a s~ow 
and complica ted process. The mor al characteristic itself is 
originally given in human nature as a potentiality a.nd not as 
a completed and systematic insight. Our experience of con-
sequences, our knoYd .edge of tendencies, our underlying world-
vi€w all enter into the formation of our codes of conduct. 
More.l development is impossible wi t_hout assuming an original 
ethical germ, or predisposition, in the mind which contains 
an immanent l aw of moral development. 
The secondary mor al feelings are those which result 
from obedience or disobedience to mor al law. From a subjec-
tive standpoint, feelings of merit or demerit, 1mrthiness or 
baseness, remorse, shame, or guilt may result. Yihen the ac-
tion is c:.nother's, our feelings may vary from esteem and ap-
-probation to indigne.tio n and disgust, according to the circum-
stances. 
iii. Rel~ious Fee1ings. Bo¥me dwelt upon this area 
of the emotions as much as he did other areas. It seems tha t 
h e y:as very much disturbed by the emphe.sis on emotionalism in 
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reli gion. We confin e ours elves to pointing out t ho se ideas 
v·ith •bich contempor ary personali s ts seem to agree. It 
mi ght be noted tha t Bov.•ne \'ras tried f or heresy because of 
his view of the religious emotions, but was acqui tted. 
The religious and the ethical feelings are closely re-
l a ted. The main difference is tha t religious feelings are 
mainly concerned with some supernatural being or bein gs while 
the latter are not concerned v:i th such reference. V:hen the 
hlea of God is given, the moral law is almost inevitably 
thought as expressing His will. This does no t mean tha t the 
mor al nature reve als a Holy Person as the author of the moral 
imperative because differing codes contradict this. 25 
The origin of religious feelings is found a.s given in 
human na ture when the i dea of God is conceived. The human 
mi nd is such the. t a s the outcome of its totc.l experience it 
forms the conception of the supernatural, not solely as a 
result of conscious i nferentia.l processes, but as an expres-
sian of its own needs and nsture. This leads t o de sires and 
aversions. Desires are conditio ned by previous experiences 
and a knov.:ledge of causes of those experiences and their re-
lation to our interests. Desires have no me2.ning y,·hen sepa-
r a ted from those objects or mental functions i n v;hich they 
are realized. We c an repress or exalt feel ing and v;e can 
25 See Bovne, ~tudies in Christi anity (Boston:Houghton-
Mifflin, 1909), p. 200f. 
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dir ect desire. 
Experience first acquires living r'ea~i ty in feeling. 
Our feelings and i n teres t s are the deepest things in us. 
They furnish the grea t impulses t o action and they also out-
line its direction. 26 Bo~ne concludes tha t for t hese basal 
interests , the intellect is instrumental and the will execu-
tive. One note s here not only agreemen t Tr.d th modern person-
alists, but also a functiona.l view of the problem of mo tiva-
tion. 
iv. Further Yiew~ Qll Religion. Bo~n e sees the essenc e 
of religion in the i ndividual seeking (intending) to do the 
will of God. All else is seco ndary and of importance only 
a s it helps achieve this result. As G. W. Allport la.ter em-
phasi zes, 27 Bmm e. points out tha t the most characteristic as-
pect of religious experience is its conscious directedness. 
Mystical experiences and exhibitions he sees a s irrevelent in 
so f ar as religiosity is concerned • He sees them tending to-
. !ard the "misdirection of effort and aims". 28 Mysticism leads 
~6 Bov.ne, .Introduction to Psychologico.l Theo~ p . 217. 
Note a similar view in Johnson, "Emotional Factors in Motiva-
tion", in Beligious Education_,_ 4 2 ( Sept.-Oct., 1.947), p . 262. 
27 G. w. Allport, TYintent and Faith". Lecture 6 of The 
Indi vidual., and His Religion (Feb. -March, 1947), c..nd Bovme, 
!!Obedience the Test of Discipleship" in Zion 's Herald, 80 
(Jan., 1903), p. 10. · 
2 8 See Bovme, "The Supernatural i n Religion". Zion's 
Herald, 81 (Jan., 1903), p. 43. 
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to a divorce of ethi cal behavior fro m religion. He concludes 
t hat the te s t of religion is in conduct. 
Bo~me t akes a subjective view of reli gion i n tha t he 
feels that it is a personal. matter both in experience and 
life. Having rejected "unutterable exp eriences", he desig-
na tes the true religious emotions as based on religious i deas, 
objects, and activities. Religious emotions must not be mis-
t aken for religious experience. Rel.igious emotio ns are pro-
duced in reali zing faith in practice. 29 It is the conscious 
reali zing tha t con stitutes religious experience. 
tha t the emotions produced stimula te the realization of faith. 
Stressing action and conduct, he sees the test of religious 
emotion s in the type of char acter they cause. 
Bowne stresses the cognitive factor in conver s i on. He 
considers the mai n qu.e$tions about conversion a s being vvhether 
the individual knows 1Nhat he is doing and whether he has any 
sen s e of t he obli ga tions he is assuming in "turning toward 
God in thought and action", his definition of conversion. 30 
.A s evidence of his assertions about religio::.~. , Bovme 
cites cases co ,J.cerning childhood rel i gion. The religio n of 
ma turity is impossible to childhood. The deeper i nsight and 
emotions must come of themselves from cultiva tion. Person-
29 See Bmme, "Religious Exp erience" , l.h1..Q.., p. 74. 
30 Bov.ne, ·"Are They Converted?", Zion' s Herald, 80 
(March, 1903), p . 301. 
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ality ·must be ) repared for mature religion by the cultivation 
of religious habits of thought and action, an atmosphere of 
pi~ty, wise religious i n struction, and illustrations in liv-
int:t exarn·~Ies. 0 - reflective consciousness does come and 
the self decides its direction toward God, it has but t o rat-
ify its developing personality. Bowne is aware tha t the in-
dividual has to live withii1 the fr amework of his personality • 
.R eligious emotions and exy eriences tha. t are no t in corpor a ted 
into the personality are useless. It app .3ars from his view 
that religious traits are developed as a re~ul t of consci6us 
i n tention and introception of ideals. Without religious 
traits of action, emotions &.nd mystic experiences are wasted. 
Bo<Nne also seems to imply tha t once religious habits of action 
and thought are developed, they take on a drivi::.1g power of 
their ovm because, as he says, the self then has but to r a ti-
fy its developed character. 
v. The Relationshiu Qf Will to Motivation. In feeling 
and knowing we have the conditions of desire. In desire we 
have the concH tion of the will. The essential rela tionship 
is tha t sta ted above. The will is the executive ag ency of 
the person for effecting the desires. The de sires have emo-
tion s as their bases. Desires have no element of will in 
them. The intellect is t h e mediator between the desires and 
the 1••il.l. Thus Bmme lays a corner-stone of an anti-materi-
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alistic view allowing for the freedom and autonomy of the per-
son. 
vi. Will and Action. It seems necessary to report at 
this point tha t Bo~ne's view of the person is of a transcen-
dental nature as con tra sted to humanistic and naturalistic 
views of personality. He views man fro m above himself and 
in terms of something higher rather thm1 in terms of proper-
ties ·-_hich he shares vd th lower animals. His personalistic 
view flavors his psychology of the V7 ill. This viev.:· is char-
acteristic of most personalists. 
Bowne does not consider all activity vol.i tionE.l.. As 
wa s pointed out, he mak es allowance for mechanical impulses 
as a form of motivation. The volitiona.l activities are above 
and beyond these activities. He defines the will a s the power 
which the soul (self) has of controlling i tsel.f V.'i thin certain 
limits.31 Later personalists reject this definition because 
it cor1fuses the effector with its effects. P. A. Bertocci 
holds to the Jamesi an point of view that will is fiat. 32 He 
holds that t he power of the vdll is ~m inference from experi-
ence as to the ability to accomplish the end willed. Thus 
Bm;_ne' s definition corrected would be the will as the agency 
il Bovme, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 22f~f. 
32 Bertocci, PhilosoQhy of PerBonality, (Unpub. Syll., 
Boston University, 1947), p. 13. 1\Tso see James, Psychology 
(Briefer course), p. 422 . 
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the self has for controlling itself v,i thin certain limits. 
Its abi l ity t o control would be its pOF'er. 
Modern personalistic psychologi s ts agree with Bovme r s 
distinction s of volition from its psychological attendants. 
A volition is not a judgment because the former may contra-
dict the latter and the latter may exist without the former. 
A volition cannot be identified with desire although it may 
s pring from desire jus t as it may spring from judgment. This 
is so because a t hing may be strongly desired without being 
willed and hence a desire may not be attempt ed or brought to 
its fruition. Furthermore, the will often app ears as the 
ex·9ression of an energy directed toward resistance and con-
trol of the desires. 
Bovme sees three main characteristics of volition. Vo-
li tiona1 action is conditioned by consciousness. Unconscious 
action is r egarded as voli tione.l onl y by t ho se who v,-ar upon 
the conventions of language. Generally, volition impli es 
f oresight and intention. Vte shall have occasion to come 
back to t his characteristic in Chapter Six i n the ·9sychology 
of G. w. Al.lport. When foresight and intentio n .are- impossible, 
action is generally r eg arded as non-volitional. The third 
char acteristic, v:hich has been the subject of much controver-
sy, i s tha t volitional activity is always regarded as f ree. 
It involves the thought of a possible al ternative and no t un-
bendi ng necessity. Because the conception of t he will a s 
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free is often denied, Bm,ne t akes hi mself to great l .engths to 
show the untenability of arguments on such view. 
These a.rgwnents ag ainst free-will are boiled down to 
b "'O ma jor objectio ns. The denial of freedom rests f ir s t on 
the impossibility of comprehending free action, and secondly, 
on the supposed demands of the l aw of causation.33 Expl ana-
tion presupposes the existence of a set of f acts and laws 
vJh i ch furnish t he conditions of expl an a tion. Its very nature 
is a reference to f acts and processes outside itself 2s its 
founda tion. '!.fhen v.re can find i n freedom only an irreducible 
fact, recognition, an admission of t hi s fact is needed more 
than an explanation. Besides, "there is all the less reason 
for disturbance, lJithen we see that this freedom is a necessary 
implication of tha t r a tiona!. activity i n vvho se interests ex-
planatio n itself is undertakenn.34 
The second reason for the denial of freedom concerning 
the contradiction by the law of causation is doubtful. A 
free act has as much cause as any other act. Its c ause is 
the free spirit, says Bov.~e. And i f one should ask wha t caused 
it t o cause, what causes free spirit, t h en one is shut up t o 
an infinite regression. In other words, the law of c ausation 
from c. psychological point of view cannot be t alcen absolutely . 
Bov-me reminds us tha t the will is not an i ndependent agent 
:53 Bo;Nne, Introduction to Psychologic al. Theory, p . 278f. 
34 b d 9 LL·, p. 22 • 
separated from the person. Thus vYe see tha t "if anything is 
free, it is the soul (self), and not the will; for the ~ill 
is only an abstraction from the volitional activity of the 
soul". 35 
Bovme points out another fact v.hich is a founda tion of 
personalistic psychology. The freedom of the self is not ab-
solute. It is l .imi ted by our mental and physical consti tu-
tion and by the intensity of the desires and impulses it has 
to control. A similar consideration ha s led Brightman to 
declare tha t human nature is both limit and potentiality.36 
y:i thin the limits of human nature the person has his realm 
of freedom. 
In sum.rnary, Bov~!!le points out that while motives a s con-
ceptions are not dynamic, motives as s pringing from or express-
i ng impulses, do exercise an influence upon volition, and may 
even defy our attempts to control them. 
vii. Summary. This chapter has been an attempt to 
noint out some of the fundamental bases of personalistic psy-
chology as conceived by Jl_merica's first exponent of this 
school of thinking. It may be noted that the conception of 
the self is only partially developed. Consc i ous experience 
3!5 Ibid., p. r31. . 
36 "A Personalistic View of Human Nature", Journal of 
Religion, 14 (April, 1.946), p. ~:64f. 
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is the starting point from iihich other data are inferred. 
The dearth of considera tio n for personality structure is prob-
ably understandable vthen it is real ized tha.t Bo·wne was ~')rin-
cipally a protester a.gainst sensationalism. The environmen-
tal relations are also given scarce attention. 
It remains to be seen whether personalistic psychology 
ad equately .trea ts those other areas of personality deemed most 
important for a psycho~ogical understanding of r eligion. The 
follo v.'i '-1g chapter undertakes to give the further development 
of personal.istic psychol.ogy a s it moves forward in undertak-
ing to account for all phases of human activity. 
CHAPTER V 
MARY 't RITON CALKINS' EXPOSITIO N OF SELF ?SYCHOLOGY 
In this chapter it will be seen tha t personalistic psy-
chology has evolved frommdependent insights r ather than as 
a result of follm•ring an exalted master lf:ho has charted a 
course for adherents to follow. This does not mean that it 
has developed in a vacuum, but rather that it ha s been the 
result of new i n sights folloving from the synthesis of old 
facts,. Like Bowne, Callrin.s is a protestant aga.inst elemen-
t arism and sensationalism in psychology. How·ever, as v.-e 
shall see, Calkins is also a protester against other one-sided 
psychological approaches preval ent in her period. 
The chapter begins vd th a brief review of Calkins' his-
torical setting and its resul t ant influence upon her. The 
next section deals mainly with her exposition of self psychol-
ogy and some of its relationships to other problems in )SY-
chology. Religion is one of those problems. The following 
section deals with the problem of motivation. Some i nf l u-
ences are noted and comparisons made. The f inal section con-
t ai ns a summary and some comparisons vri th Bowne. The pur-
pose of this chapter is t o show how personalistic psychology 
ha s had its main issues clarif ied and refined and hov; its 
scone has broadened and been justified by other psychological 
- . 
influences. Its grov·ing adequacy for interpre ting religion 
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is also pointed out. 
1. Historical Setting 
Calkins is not f a r removed from Bo-v: ne in so far as 
birth da. tes are concerned, there being hardly more than a 
dozen years separating them. Bovme did not live t o see the 
great changes that v,-ere wrought by the corning of functional, 
Gestalt, depth, and behavioristic psychologies. Calkins 
lived through this era. In surviving t v:-o decades longer than 
Bov.ne, Miss Calldns v'!as much more able to extend the bounds 
of her thinking by the enrichment of newer points of view. 
Consequently, she devoted a great deal of her writing to the 
defense of self psychology aga inst the onslaughts of the new-
er points of view. Moreover, to the enrichment of the field 
of psychology, she attempted to reconcile these new psycholo-
gies with each other and -.~.---1 th p ersonalistic psychology. 
As a student of Willi am James, Hugo Munsterberg, a.nd 
Josiah Royce, she shows characteristics of the influence of 
all three. As she sta tes, 11My debt to these men •••• both 
academic and p ersonal, may be acknovdedged, but c an never be 
repaidn.I. Miss Calkins '"-as also a participcm t in exp erimen-
tal psychology i n the e arly days of thc; t field in Jl..rnerica. un-
der the gu idance of Munsterberg. Unlik e Bovme, v-ho wa s an 
I -S e~ the chapter, "Mary ·whi ton Calkins" in C. Murchi-
son's ( ed.) History .9! Psycb.o,l,9__gy in Autobiograppy, (Worces-
ter:.Clark Press, 1930), p. 35. 
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in1mediate predecessor a.nd contemporary of J ame s r, Miss Cal-
kins Wf!S a direct -oroduct of J ames' influence. 
It should be remembered tha t a.t the beginning of Cal-
ki ns' span of psychological productivity (beginning in 1892 
and ending in 1930) f aculty psychology had been buried and 
J ames had ~- i , ' sn the~ cl.'e tat to sensationali s tic p sy cholo-
gy. :E\lnc:t±:ona]_ and exp erimental psychology v ere becomi ng the 
f ad in .America . The analysis of mental structures was giv-
r, i ng way to the study of processes or functions. ""' As Moore 
a.nd Gurnee have pointed out, in a very general sense, ~J revious 
to the close of the l as t century, oll psycholo gists vvere self 
psychologists. 3 It has been since tha t time tha t the posi-
tion of personali s tic psychology has been mos t clearly formu-
l a ted and que s tioned. 
1. Miss Calkins' ~.finition of Psychol.Q.La.· I n one o-r 
her earliest writings, Miss Calkins makes the staterr.ent tha t 
"a presupposi tio:n of the f act of association i s th r~t of the 
identity of the subject. The s ame "I" must exist if there 
i s to be consciousness 'in the s a.me way' or 'of the same ob-
; PC t' f! 4 u~ • Ag ain she writes that na continuous self se.ems to 
G G. Murphy, Historical 
QZX_, (Nev' Yorlc:Harcourt-Brace, 
3 Moore and Gurnee, Foundatio n Q~ PsychoJ~, p . 79. 
4 Calkins, "A Suggested Classifica tion of Cases of As-
sociation", Phil. Review, 1 (Nov., 1892), p. 392 . Also Cal-
kins, "Association", Psychology fieviE)vi, 2 (Jan., 1896), p. 4f. 
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the ,;,ri ter to be an inevitable presupposition of psychic phe-
I=' 
nomena of every kind".~ It vm s from her experiments in as-
sociation that the realization of the importance of the self 
for psychology was impressed upon Calkins as i ndicated in the 
statements above from her articles on experimental projects. 
The influence of James and Royce probably had a large part to 
do vii th this realization also. 
It was upon this basal. fact that Calkins conceived the 
definition of psychology. Psychology defined as the science 
of consciousness did not seem to go far enough for her because 
consciousness does not occur impersonally.6 Similarly, psy-
chology a.s the study of mental processes was unsatisfactory 
to her. Such a psychology studies the ~ er cept, for example, 
r ather than the self as perceiving. It fails to ans11ler the 
inevitable question: V~hose percept? Furthermore, such a 
psychology cannot adequately describe the different forms of 
hu."'Ilan experience because "perception and recognition c:.nd 
thought, <md, more obviously, emotion, vdll, c:md f aith, a.re 
incoopletely described when analyzed into merely structural 
elements and referred to bodily condi tions 1:. 7 Calkins con-
eludes that the de:fini tion of' psychology e.s scien ce of mental 
functions without referring the functions to the functioning 
5 Calkin~, Firs.t Book in PsychQlogy (New York: MacMillan, 
1921), p . l. 
6 CaTkins, .E1.!:J;t ;eook j.n Psychol.m, p. 1. 
7 Ibid., p. £74. 
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self is an entirely artificial proceeding. 
The developm en t of Calkins' definition of psychology 
v.rill not be considered in detail because such ·would exceed 
the scope and boundaries of t his thesis. The main f act is 
that, at first, she considered psychology as the science of 
the self. She refined this definition later. Thus she de-
fin es psychology as 11 the science of the self in relation to, 
or conscious of, its environment".8 Only by such a defini-
tion, she believed, could the manifold f actors and experiences 
of human life be studied adequately from a psychological point 
of vievv. Thus sensations, behaviorisms, mental f unctions, 
Gestalten, and mental disorders are given a bond of unity and 
O'Nnership. These creat ions are studied i n rela tion to their 
creator. Not religious experience, but the self as experi-
encing religion is a re sulting principle. 
ii. ~ IntrosPective Metho£. Calki ns holds tha t the 
me thod s of psychology are the same as those of other sciences. 
The first is descri ption (analysis and cl.c.ssification) and the 
second is tha t of explanation. Psychology has a method pecu-
liar to itself just as other sciences. The method of i n tro-
spection i s the method peculiar to psychology. This is be-
cause the f acts of psychology are the inner f acts, selves, and 
ideas. 
8 Ibid., p. 1. 
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The advantages of i n trospection she holds to be the 
absence of need of special conditions of time e.nd place, me-
chanical adjuncts, search for suitable material. The disad-
vanta.ges recognized are the need ·of training i. ... introspection, 
the changes that it makes in its own subject and the uncer-
tainties of memory.9 The verification of introspection is 
secured by the method of experiment. Because psychic facts 
can never be repea ted or exactly measured, experiment must 
concern itself with the physical stimulus of psychic facts 
and with the physical reactions to these stimuli. The method 
of experiment is held to be subsidiary to the method of intro-
spection. 
Thus we see personalistic psychology recogni zing the 
value and validity of experimental psychology, but still hold-
ing to the primacy of the introspective method. The recog-
nition of experimental psychology is a step forward in t he 
development of personalistic psychology for the productivity 
of nev.r ideas as 'Nell as for the verifica tion of hypotheses. 
IJI~e now proceed to examin e the personalistic psychology as es-
poused by Miss Calkins. 
2. Self Psychology and Its ,Belat_ion~ 
i. The Characteristics of the p~l!. 
the self is not merely inferred to exist. 
9 Ibid., pp. 7 and 8. 
To Miss Calkins, 
It is immediately 
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experienced as possessing a t least four characteristics. The 
self is relatively persistent, complex, unique, and related 
to (or conscious of) ~ersonal and impersonal objects. Some 
of the more fundamental relations of the self to its objects 
are those of rece~ tivity and activity, sympathy, a ttention, 
egoism, and altruism.IO I n her latest writings, Calkins 
shov\rs the influence of William Stern. In a different manner 
she states the characteristics of the self as being identical 
in varying experiences and through succeeding moments, chang-
ing, a tot&.li ty but "nonetheless, a whole of me.ny characters 
e.nd 2. ttitudes, a 'multiplex' selftt.ll She did not subscribe 
to the idea tha t the self is psychophysically neutral.. 
Miss Calkins holds that the self car~ot be defined. 
\\'hen asked to define it, she replies tha t "by self is me e.nt 
that, wha tever it is, Y'.'hich the plain man means when he says 
'I am ashamed of myself:' 'I am spurring myself on'; etc.!!l2 
This apparent i ndefinability of the self seems to be on e of 
the mai n causes of its rejection by many :psychologists. 
:Moore and Gurneel3 sta te that only the definable can be a .fit 
object of scientific study and vrhat c annot be defined cannot 
IO Ibid., :p. 3f. 
ll CaLkins, "Self-Psychology of the Psychoanalysts". 
Psychological Reyiew, 37 (Sept., 1930), p. 278. 
1 2 Ib" d C"'78 
__]:_., p . ~· • 
13 Moore and Gurnee, Foundatio.ll§ of Psychology, p. 91. 
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be described or expl ained in any systema tic or scientific man-
ner. Roback14 holds tha t the characteristics of the self au-
ply mo re aptly to con sciousness than to the self. As an an-
svcer to such criticisms, CaUdns points out tha t .mc:my exoeri-
ences are indescribable without some specific ref erence to 
the consciousness of selves. Consciousness ap art from tha t 
which is conscious is an abstraction. Besides, those v:ho 
a rgue against the self imply self in arguing. 15 
It seems tha t the substance of the objections to the 
in.definability of the self remain for William Stern to clarify 
and answer in a positive manner. As W. S. Hunt8r :9oints out 
i 11 a reviev.r of Calki ns' First ]oak i n Psychol_ogy, an an alysis 
of the self and the theories of its analysis vmuld fill a 
great gap in self psycholo gy . 16 It seems that CaL~ins' con-
ception of the self wa s not very satisfactory to t he domi nant 
structuralists and behaviorists. It wa s severely criticized. 
But none of her critics had a better or substitute concep t to 
offer. One notes tha t h e. rdly a s i ngle psychologist c c.me 
to Mis s Cal~dns' defens i."' c: though many embraced the same point 
of vie·w. 1 7 
14 A. A. . Robacl';: , Behaviorism and ?sychol og:z_ (Cambridge: 
University Bookstore Inc., 1923), p. 264f. 
15 HThe Self in Recent Psychologyn, Psych9logic al Bulle-
tin, 24 (Feb., 1927), p. 208 . 
16 Psychologica l B11_Iletin, 12 (April, 1915), p. 328. 
17 James V'.'a rd, C. I:l. Judd and William McDougall e.re psy-
chologists v,'ho have strongly advo cated the self conce1)t in 
psychology. 
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Lest one associate the 
psychological self v~i th the old metaphysical soul, Calkins 
is first to reject the l a tter and distinguish it from the 
f ormer. In the first place, psychology sturdily refuses to 
s t udy the nature of the soul, its permanence or i mmortality. 
"It simply analyzes the forms of s elf-consciousness, or stud-
ies people in their social rel ations~.l8 
The main distinction between t h e metaphysic al self or 
soul and the psychological self' is tha t the metaphysic al soul 
or incorporeal, simple, unchanging being is clearly unjusti-
fied by experience. It is "an empty abstraction excep t for 
the characters - - persistence cmd individua.li ty - -- · ¥rhich 
as truly belong to the selfn.l.9 The self has none of t he 
cha rc;.cteristics of the soul concept except for the t •,o men-
tioned above. Furthermore, the self is not an inference, 
but an experienced reality.20 The metaphysic al self is the 
:p ersonalistic psychol.ogist•s self supplemented by whatever 
characteristics 1Hhich the metaphysician infers as essential 
1 8 Calki ns, Introduction to Psychology . (New York:Mac-
milla.n, 1901), p. 5. 
19 Calkins, ncase of Self Against Soul" in Psychologi-
cal Revieli, 24 (May, 1917), p. 299. 
20 ''Mary Whiton Calkins" in Murchison (ed.}, History 
of Psychology in Autobiograuhy, Vol. I, p. 54. Also Calkins, 
Persist ent Problems .Qf. Philosophy (New York:Macmillan, 1925), 
p. 4 26f. 
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to the self )::1 These distinctions between the self of psy-
chology and the self of philosophy seem to be misunderstood 
even to-day despite Calkins' explanations and protests. At 
least, this seems to be a main rea son for the avoidance of 
the s elf in psychology. 
Per sonc:.lis t ic psychology does not seek an understanding 
of theme~ of the soul for a psycho~ogic al understanding 
of religion. Instead, it seeks to understand the dynamics 
of · the empirical, experiencing self in its relations to the 
Creator and -sustc.iner of Values. 
iii. Form.§ Q.[. ~ psychology. It may be ga thered from 
the characteristics of the self tha t it does not include the 
body. It is relat~d to the bo~ but is distinct from it. 
Calkins i s in agreement with Bowne on the fact th2.t the mind 
and body interact. However, some personalistic :9sycho~o gists 
hold tha t the s elf or person is no t entirely psychical, but 
is psychophysically neutral. 
i n ful l in the next chapter. 
This latter view will be treated 
The agreements betwe en these 
types of :9ersonalism are pointed ou t here. 
Both types of personalism are strongly opposed to every 
form of imuersonalistic psychology. Both treat psychology as 
the sci ence of the self or person. The distinction lies in 
the definition of the self or person. ~mereas Calkins holds 
21 Calkins, "Self Psychology of the Psychoanalysts" in 
Psycholo Eical Review, 37 (April, 1930), p. 280. 
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it to be strictly psychical,, Stern holds the person to be the 
whole con scious organism in response to its environment. It 
is psychophysically neutral. Both stress the totality, unity, 
multiplicity, uniqueness and continuity of the person. Both 
are concerned with the objects of the self and credit the 
self ~ith basic attitudes and dispositions toward the achieve-
ment of definite ends. In short, personalistic ) sychology 
in general attempts to describe the nature of the reactions 
of a consciou s being which is a unity of many charc-.c t ers, 
i ndividual, self-identical, and changing. These seem to be 
the main points of emphasis of personalistic psychology. 
iv. The Self and Its Belations. Self ysychology, as 
Miss CaDdns conceives it,. h as three basal conceptions: the. t 
of the self, tha t of the object, and that of the self's rela-
tion or attitude toward its object. The latter is primarily 
a social relation. By the self's relatio ns to objects is 
me.:mt its avrareness or consciousness of objects. Stimuli of 
which the self is .unaware are not con sidered object s of the 
self. Ob jects of the self may be personal, or impersonal, 
,_;hysical or psychological, public or pi'i va te. 
Very important for -:::>ersonalistic psychology are the re-
lations or at titudes of the s elf toward its objects. It 
seems in these attitudes of the self tov1ard its objects, that 
the autonomy and creativity of the person st~nd i n mark ed con-
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trast to the seeming enslavemen t of the person t o his environ-
ment , i nsti ncts , or u.ncon scious th2.t many psycholo gists stress. 
This is putting the matter crudely, but the generc:d i dea 
s t ands. Cal ki n s divides these a ttitudes in to several groups .22 
In the first group ar e thos e attitudes of receptivity , activ-
ity, and compul sion. Activity m2.y be in the form of de s ire 
or volition. Volition may be in the form of domination or 
ada-p t c..tion. 
The s econd group of personal a ttitudes consists of the 
egocentric and allocentric, i. e., altruistic, a ttitudes. 
The egocentric emphasis is on the self or its body. The al-
locentric a ttitude is the r elation of the self to thing s and 
other selves. An example of the latter may be hatred or rev-
erence. These a ttitudes a re no t mutually exc l usi ve bec ause 
they are experienced i n their compl exity and go t o make up 
the life of emotion. The thi rd group of relat ions of t he 
self to its objects are called the individual i zing a ttitudes 
and the generali zi ng a ttitudes. Th e fo rmer i s ex1?r essed 
mainly in emotions and the latter in classificati on and con-
ception. These basal attitudes of the self are descrip tions 
of experience r ather than i nfer ences from it. From these 
de scriptions it may be seen th a t the self is not merely pas-
sive or adap tive, but likewise assertive. Thus, environment, 
22 For a summary of these at titudes, see C. Murchison 
(ed.), Historv of Psychology in Au tobio gr aph_z, Vol. I, p. 48. 
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instincts, needs , etc., are not the only f orma tive influences 
u:9on the person because the self not only individuali zes 
these influences, but al so m2.y actively ass ert it self over and 
beyond them, and in spite of them. 
The significance of these relation s of the self for a 
psychological understanding of religion lies in the dyns_mics 
of the self they illustr c:lte. The self not only receive s 
stimuli, ';ut acts on them as v,-ell. Reli gious objects may 
be both stimulators to religious action and r aw ma t eri als for 
the self to act upon. The s elf receive s , but selects, to a 
certain degree, its stimuli. It acts upor,. t hem selectively, 
i. e., selfishly or altruistically. In acting, t he s elf and 
obj ect of the self may be brought sharply i n to focus a s is the 
ca se in experiencing em6tions or the s elf may rel a te one ob-
ject to another, or to a general class (generali zing). The 
person does not merely react to religious S:.imuli, h e reach es 
ou t, a s it \'!ere, and looks f or them also. 
It seems tha t one 
of Miss Calki ns' grea t con tributions to ;J sychology is her a t-
tempt to show tha t -pel"sonalistic psychology has a :9l ace for 
t he facts of behaviorism. In the case of behaviorism, the 
sc_me can h ardly be s aid bec ause many behaviorist s do n :) t con-
sider the fact of consciousness i n the domain of psychology. 
It is interesting to note tha t Roback classifi es Calki n s a s 
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a nominal egological behaviorist.23 Such a classifica tion 
seems to stretch behaviorism far beyond its admitted bounds. 
Personalistic :_)Sychology holds that the experience of the 
stimulus is a more deciding factor for res~)onse than tha t of 
simple :a1a tter in motion. As Calkins points out, the i ndivid-
ual's relation to environment is not exclusively identified 
with bodily reactions. I t consists, in part a t least, of 
consciousness. She points out further tha t "consciousness 
is a more fundamental relation with bodily res:oo:::1se and ::1ot 
a fu_YJ.ction strictly coordina te VTith itn. 24 
Self psychology is behavioristic only •Fhen it stresses 
the relations of self to environment. Keeping i n mind that 
the self is psychical rather than physical , behavior ism can 
hardly embrace personal.istic psychology. Nevertheless, there 
exist other e.greements between them. Both reject abstracted 
sta tes or nrocesses. Both are interested in the conception 
of the relation of the incU vidue.l to his environment. And 
both tre2.t primarily entiti es or orge:mic wholes. Both are 
activistic. However, the basal f act of personalistic psy-
chology c:.nd its subs equent scope of relations seem t o enable 
Calidns to assu\-ne right~y tha t personalistic psychol.ogy is 
--·-~--· 23 A. A. Roback, Behaviorism .s:nd Psycholo gz (Cambridge: 
University Bookstore, 1923). See the chart at the back of 
the book. 
24 See M. 'N. Calkins, "The Truly Psycholo gica.l Beha,Jior-
ismH in psychological Review, 28 (Jan., ~921), ,. 13. 
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the true ysychological behaviorism. 25 Behaviorism lacks many 
of the conce~ ts necessary for understandi ng r el i gion, wherea s 
D erso~alism embraces most of t he important concepts of behav-
iot" ;e nd has many others to ·throw light on the religious ex-
peri ence and reli gious behavior. It :not only deals v:i th phy-
sical respons es to )hysical s timuli, but with mental res -;)Qnses 
to both phys ical and mental s timuli as well. In f act, a know-
ledg e of the s·elf and its activities gives more understanding 
of t he physic al stimulus-re spons e equation than behavi orism 
gi ves (reflex actions excluded). Values, morals, and desires 
aff ect behavior a s much as other stimuli. 
vi. Depth Psvchology and personalistic Psycho.bQgy. As 
a further indic a tion of personalism's adequacy, Calk i n s poin ts 
out tha t self psychology is at the very core of every on e of 
the psychoanalytic systems. Jung's distinction be~reen ex-
t rovers ion and introversion, as positive and nega tive rela-
tions be t ween subject and object, presuppos es the existence 
of self and of object. Adler's contrast betvYeen the sense 
of power and the f eeling of i nferiority requires the exp eri-
ence of one' s self i n relation to other selves. The uncon-
scious, superego, and censor in Freud's writings can hard:ty 
be impersonally concei"l.red. The doctrines of depth psychology 
can be made more mea•:1ingful only as they a-re ol aced in a con-
25 I bid., p . ~5 . 
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tex t of self psychology. 26 Personalism avoids the "gremlin"-
like ch&racter tha t pervades depth ysychologyrs concepts, by 
affirming the whole person acting i n each experience. 
The method of depth psycholo gy seems for practical pur-
poses the same a s CaDdns'. Both seek lmovdedge of the in-
dividual through introspection. As Furtmull.er points out, 
psychoanalysis is nothing more thEm artificially guided intro-
snection. 27 
·' 
Thus Calkins points out the advantages in con-
creteness and meaningfulness that depth psychology can gain 
by personalistic interpretations. 
vii. Self Psychology and Reli gion. By describing the 
a ttitudes of the self to its objects, self psychology does 
not h ave difficulty explc:dning the religiosity of man. Hold-
ing th2.t all personal relationships may be the bB.sis of a psy-
chological study, M:iss Calldn s sees the rela t ionshi:9 bet1;!.'een 
a human self and a conceived divine self as another typical 
i nterpersonal relationship important and legi tim&.te for ~)sy­
cholo gic al study. 28 
It must be emphasized thc:.t personali s tic psycholo gy does 
26 See Cal kins, TTThe Self-Psychology of the Psychoanalysts" 
in Psvchologica1 Bevi~, 37 (April, 1930), p. 275. 
27 c. Furtmuller, "Die Psychologi.sch e Bedeutun ~:t der Psy-
choanalyse!!. Alfred Adler (ed.), Heilen und Bilden ~Munich: 
Reinhardt Verlag, 1 914), _p. 171. 
28 See Calkins, Eir st ]ook i n Psycholo gy, p. 260f. 
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not stress the psychological study of the isol2ted sel f nor 
of its isolated r elationships or adjustments. It stresses 
the self in its adjustments and relations. Thus religion 
beco:r:1es another activity in v;rhich the self expresses its basic 
attitudes toward a self conceived as divine. 
Although Miss Calkins reali zes the importance of the 
self and its relations for a psychological unders tanding of 
religion, she does not stress the fact tha t the self organi zes 
its a ttitudes and tendencies i nto a somewhat stable organi za-
tion. The inner structure of the organi zation of the self's 
relations is highly important for understanding religion. 
Since the development of personalistic psychology has no t 
reached the stage of emphasizing the structure of _;> ersonality, 
'tri thout which an understanding of religion would be incomplete, 
·-e confine this section to pointing out characteristics of 
the r,eligious consciousness given by Miss Calki ns, after -:· hich 
a brief examina tion of the mo tiva tion of the person i s brief-
ly examined in the follovdng section. 
Calkins defines religion as being the conscious relation 
of a human self to a divin e being, i. e., a. being regarded as 
grea ter than any human self and treated or conceived as per-
sonal. 29 The adequacy of this definition is shovm by the f ac;t 
ths t phenomena of nature and fetishes in appar entl y impersonal 
religions are ~·.'orshiped not for what they are, but bec ause they 
29 Ibid-:: p . 262f. 
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are looked upon as embodiments of conscious selves. This 
definition of religion distinguishes the religious experience 
from the moral experience. Whereas religious experience is 
fundamentally a consciousness of God or gods, morality is 
fundamentally a con sciousness of one's place and responsibil-
ity in the whole system of beings. It may or may not include 
God, but v,'hen it does it becomes a part of religion. There 
c an be religion, however degrading, without morality. But 
no morality, ho~ever sublime, can be religion, without the 
consciousness of God. 30 
As the consciousness of God is the first characteristic 
of religion, a second characteristic is its 2motional quality. 
As CaXk:ins sta tes, "At its lowest emotional terms, it i n cludes 
a t l east the feeling of t he dependence of the human on t he 
divinen. 31 The emotiona.l quality may be expressed in fear 
or reverence. Since the relationship to other selves may be 
ac t ive as well as passive, the active a ttitude of f aith or 
loyalty to the supreme Self is a characteristic phase of reli-
gious experience. It m.;_y be exhibited i n active submission 
or adoption of what one conceives as one's subsequent duty. 
It is here that religion and ethics see~ to be so closely re-
lated. The final characteristic pointed out by Calki n s is 
that of the conviction of God's reality---- belief. This 
30 Ib.d 2~7f 
__ l_.' p. >0 • 
31 Ibid., p. 266. 
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ph~se of religious experience forms the background of the re-
ligious consciousness. vVithout it, there can be no re~ation-
ship 1.~ci th God because one can hardly relate himself con scious-
ly to something he is convinced doesn't exist. 32 
The object of faith is a self or selves; the object of 
belief is impersonal.33 Both are altruistic, adaptive atti-
tudes. Both are assertive and include the consciousness of 
coherence. Both are social attitudes. 
3. Motivation 
CaUdns does not deal very much with the motivational 
structure of the self. Her concern wa s so much "d th reinsti-
tuting the self in psychol.ogy that it seems that the motiva-
tional structu're; of the self, comparatively speaking, vvas 
overlooked. The introspective method of description and an-
alysis of one's conscious processes does not seem to give much 
help in theorizing about the self's motivational structure. 
With the exception of the topics on emotions, the various as-
pects of motivation are scattered, r a ther than being systemat-
ically organized, t hrough her book on general psychology. We 
attempt to bring them together and brie£ly examine them. 
:32 Philosonhically, Calkins sees the i n.di vidual as a 
nat't of the "Absolute Self" (God). See her Persistent Prob-
lems of Philosophy, p. 472. 
33 Ibid., p. 244f. Note similar ideas in Jo~~son, Psy-
chology of RP.ligion, p. 190 and Strick~and, Psychology of Re-
ligious Experience (New York:Abingdon, 1924), p. 152. 
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Calkins sees the reactions of the body 
consisting of reflex and ideo-motor (after James) movements. 
The reflex movements are unconditioned by antecedent conscious-
ness. These innate or m1learned reactions are called in-
stincts.34 The instinctive consciousness is the natural or 
the temperamental p sychic attitudes. These reactions are 
hereditary and are useful in the perpetuatio n of the r ace. 
The instincts are classified as altruistic, ada:ptive, 
and egoistic. The greater number of them are primarily so-
cial, i. e., reactions to persons and not merely reaction s to 
an impersonal environment. Some are transitory and some per-
manent. Habit makes the transitory ones relatively permanent. 
Her views on instincts are archaic, as a r e the ones she names. 
ii • .Emotions. Emotions are first and foremost, intense-
ly i ndividualizing experiences. In an emotional sta te, one 
immediately realizes himself as a unique self. 
ualizes himself and the object of the emotion. 
One i ndivid-
They are re-
cep tive experiences, i. e., they include the awareness of be-
ing i nfluenced or a.ffected. The elemental experiences pecu-
liar to emotion are pleasantness and unple~santness. They 
a re characteri zed also by the organic sensations which they 
include. Bodily reactions may accompany and condition emo-
tional states. These reactions are instinctive. 
34 Calkins, First Book i n Psychology, pp . 90 c;_nd 92. 
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Cal~ins classified emotions according t o the varying 
relations of differ ent s elves to each other and on the ba sis 
of t he contras t betY'een pleasan tness and unpleasantness. 
Thus there are soci al &nd non-social emotions. And under each 
of the above, there are egoistic and altruistic emotion s. The 
plea s ant and lliJ.pleasant emotions are a matter of valua tion. 35 
The term feeling is used to i ndica te t h e emotional sta tes 
of plea santness and unplea s an t ness. 36 
Cal ki ns does not seem to see the relationship betv;een 
emotions and instincts advoc a ted by McDougall and adopted by 
some per sonali s ts. Like t emperament and instinct~ they are 
s imply innate a ttitudes and r eactions of the s elf to its ob-
jects. 
The f actors i n motiva tion are f ew as trea t ed by Cal kins. 
This is il1 direct contrast, a s we shall see, to William Stern's 
trea t men t of the problem. The mai n criticism tha t can be 
pl aced on personal istiC psychol ogy a t this stage, especially 
i n the light of present-day interests, is its inadequa te 
trea t ment of motiva tion. Instincts and emotions , important 
a s t hey may be, s eem f ar too simple t o account f or the v ariety 
o~ h uman motives. 
iii. ~umma;a. As Bovme stood on the firing line bat-
35•Ibid ., see Chapter II. 
36 I bid., p. 366. 
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tling against the forces of impersonalism in psychology in 
his era, we find Calkins t aking her place on tha t same line. 
The forces of impersonalism have grown more tremendous and 
Calk ins, a.lthough not retreating tries the strategy of recon-
ciliation. She shows that the sects in psychology can all 
find common ground and advantages to their special interests 
in a personalistic treatment of their subject. 
The self is separa ted emphatically from the old soul 
concept and is given a status commensurate wi th other scien-
tific concepts. In her conception of the self she is in 
agreement with Bo~~e. As personalists differ in some resnects 
concerning the self, we shall examine Stern's conception next 
where many of the deficits of Calkins are made up so that a 
more complete self psychology appears. 
Since our main interest is the personalistic interpreta-
tion of religious experience, we have some of Calkins' specific 
views on the subject. The overview of personalistic psychol-
ogy as a whole may give more information and furnish mor e cri-
teria for an evaluation of its adequacy for interpreting reli-
gious experience. We proceed novr to an examina tion of 
Stern's psychology. 
CHAPTER VI 
STERN'S PERSO NALISTIC GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 
The claim that a psychologist's underlying philosophy 
helps t o determine. his psychological views is cogently illus-
··· 
tra ted i n the perso.nalistic psycholo gy of Fill.i am Stern. 
His nsychology is treated as a branch of a more general science 
of lh'hich his "critical personalism" is the underlying philos-
ophy. vre shal~ be content v;i th pointing out basic similari-
ties to other personalists on those poin ts having a direct 
bearing on psychology of r eligion. The fact tha t his -ohil-
osophical speculations, like Calkins', lead him to a pan the-
istic reli gious view is not disturbing for the purpose of 
t hi s thesis because the All-Person or Abso1ute is r egarded 
a s personal .. Our main co ncern is whether the f acts about 
human nature as illustra ted in his psychologica~ concep ts are 
relevant and adequa te for understanding religion. The under-
lying philosophy of personalistic psychology is in most re-
spects much the s ame. 
~- Historical Setting 
A period of sixty-five years covers the four main repre-
senta tives of personalistic psychology. In such a short per-
iod it seemsnatural that both the lives and the influences of 
these renresenta tives woul d overlap. And to a certa in ex-
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tent they do. The influences affecting German bo rn and edu-
ca ted V'illi<:tm Stern con siderably affec ted the P..merica.n person-
2lists because of their studies in European, and especially 
German, uniirersities. 
However, the total cui tural and psychologic2.l situation 
of the German psychologists was quite different from the same 
s ituation in .America . There seem to be at least two main 
f actors a.ffecting Stern i n Germany v.'hich were somewhat differ-
ent from those affecting American psychologists of the same 
period, i. e., since the turn of the · century. The first 
factor is the trend of German psychology a.way from quantita-
tive asp ects toward a qualitative psychology.! It seems the.t 
German psychology at the time was becoming more concerned vd th 
l{inds of experience and qualitative analysis than trying to 
grasp the mind with number and measure. This is i n contrast 
to t he .American scene where t he present century has seen a gen-
eral interest in statistics and quantitative measurements. 
The s econd factor is t he close allicmce between psychol-
ogy and philosophy in Germany. As Kluver points out, nthe 
connection between philosophy and psychology has been and 
stil~ is a very close o:ne in Germany '1 .2 The connection 
seems to be a voluntary one. Practically all of the f amous 
psycholo gists on the continent have contributed v:ork to some 
---- --r H. Kluver, ''Contemporary German Psychologyn in G. 
:Mur phy's HistoriGal Introduction to Modern Psyc·hology, p . 417. 
C'· 
;:::, Ibid., p . 352f. 
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fi eld of philoso~hy. Th is seemed to have t een the c a s e a t 
one time i n Americ a , but i t is not so to-day to a l arg e ext ent. 
J.t any r a t e , it should ha r dly be surprising to find tha t Stern's 
psychology is rege . rded as a. branch of his metaphy sical person-
alism, i n view of the foreg oi ng f acts. 
In common v!i th other personalistic psychologies is t h e 
f eet tha t Stern was motiva ted by dissatisfaf t ion ~ith the 
mechanization and depersonali zation of psychology . Unlike 
the other personalists, he doesn't attempt to subjuga te mech-
anism to teleology, but attempts a r adic al synthesis between 
the tvm and, t hus, unity in psychology. It i s not unimpor-
t ant that Stern develops his conception of personalistic psy-
chology after he develops his philosophical system. However, 
it should be noted that many of the concep ts of personalistic 
philosophy c ame as a result of studies in various phases of 
psychology. 3 Stern, admit t i ng the influences i n hi s thinking, 
gives credit to the follo wing psycholo gists and philosophers 
f or the follo V>;ing influences: to Ebbinghaus for devotion to 
t he empirical, t o Wundt for the emphasis on activity, t o Fech-
ner fot' a heierarchal c: rr 2.ngement, to Hartmann for t eleology, 
and to Dilthey for the empha sis on the concreteness of p erson-
4 ality. 
3 See the article, "William Stern11 in C. Murchison (ed.), 
History of psychology in AutojJiogranhx, Vol.. I, p. 350. 
4 Ibid., p. 352f. 
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Purpo se and Me t hods. Stern's personal is t ic psychology 
aims at gi vi ng a nevr found a tion to the general psycholo gy of 
t he humo.n i ndividual. It aims a t being i nclusive, synop tic, 
and general. It oppo ses one-sided treatments of psy chology 
and is ba sed in pe..rt upon the personali s tic philosophy v:;hich 
he expounds. 
The subject-ma tter for p sychology is experience, or the 
essen tial na ture and activity of mind. And Stern defines psy-
chology as the science of the person having experi ence or cap-
bl ¥ h i . . 5 a e o~ av ng exper1ence. His method is therefore identi-
fying and i n terpreting experience in terms of the unitary, 
goal-directed person. His procedure is to interpre t ex~eri-
ence as the product of the per son-world relationship, s tc:,rt-
ing with the dependence of the person on the v:orld and going 
to those areas of experience where the person is relatively 
free and acts on the \ ~rld. 
\Fe nov~ proceed to an examination of the concepts Stern 
uses for interpreting exp erience, noting similarities ·with 
the idea s of other persone.lists as vmll as those distinctive 
of Stern. 
2. Experience 
i. '1'h e Psychonhysically Neutra~ Person. Stern holds 
5 111 • 1.1 i r S t G - 1. P b 1 E c :·. l . ctm ern, P..nera syc _o og~, Tr. .• upoerl 
(New York: Macmillan , 1938), p . vii. 
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that all men t al data have a substratum of mind by v., hich .they 
are substantia ted and from 1xhich they issue. Whereas Calkins 
and Bowne hold tha t this substratUJn is psychical, 8tern holds 
that it must be something that has existence prior t o the 
differentiation into the mental and the physical. Rejecting 
parallelism and interactionism, Stern sets up the hypothesis 
that the person must be psychophysically neutral. Stern is 
a ttempting to overcome the dichotomy of mind and body or~ir-
it and matter. He is monistic both in his conception of the 
universe and of individual beings. 
It should be pointed out that the wor·<i "person" is de-
fined as 
Ein solches Existierendes, das trotz der Vielheit 
der Teile eine rea.le eigenartige und eigemvertige 
Einhei t bildet u..11d als solche, trotz der Vielhei t 
der teilfun1{tionen, eine einhei tliche zielstrebige 
Selbsttatigkeit vollbringt.6 
The opposite of person is thing. A thing is the contradic-
tion of the characteristics of person. How·ever, "was von 
oben (als Ganzes) gesehen Person ist, ist von unten (.s.ls Summe 
von Teilen betrach tet) Sache".7 Stern's extension of the 
V'Ord person to cover such a variety of objects such as atoms, 
moJ.ecu.les and even such uni vers a ~s as races, f'a.mi~ies, etc. 
seems to rob the word of all its meaning. This Knudson has 
6 'Pilliam Stern, Die Menschliche Personlichk.ei t. (Leip-
zig:3. Barth, 1923), p. 4f. 
7 Ibid.., p. 9. 
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pointed out.8 
The humt1.n person is defined as "a living vrhole, indi vid-
ual, unique, striving toward goals , self-contained r.nd yet 
open to the world around him; he is capable of having ex9eri-
enceH.s He is 2, psychophysically neutral unitas muJ. t.i.l!l..ez 
and may be apprehended through qualities tha t are psychophysi-
cally neutral. It seems tha t psychophysical neutrality ap-
pli es . t o the mind and body as a vmrking 1rhole. The i ndivid-
ual, 1. e., totality of mind and body, is neither wholly :? SY-
chical nor physical, but capable of being either according 
to the suhere of life involved. ~D indication of this mcy 
be seen in a stc:.tement concerning the limits of the term "men-
tal'1 • Stern states, '' ••• the act of v:ill as a vthole ta:.~es its 
meaning from the purposive unity of mental experience cmd bodi-
ly actions; it is psychophysically neutral, a person£! actn. 
But Stern in the first pl ace, overlooks the f act t h c:1.t descrip-
tion demands mo-re specificity than the generali zing tern ";:> sy-
chophysically neutral." seems to give. In the second pl ace, 
to describe an act a s psychophysic ally neutral seems to be a 
contradiction to experience. It seems tha t an act can only 
be psychical, physical, or an interaction of both. Taking 
the act of 1p:ill as an example, the initiation of the 2.ct seems 
to be '£)sychical; its outcome seems to depend upon the preser-
8 Knudson, Ihe Philosonhy of Personalism, p. 29 . 
a 
v Stern, GAneral Psychology, p. 79. 
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Vc).tion of t he mental act and the instrur.aentality of the body. 
If the person be psychophysically neutral, i. e., neither psy-
chical nor physical, then it seems that the person is an ab-
straction that can neither be experienced nor observed. It 
seems that unity is gained at the expense of non-conformity 
to experience. 
Now despite the difference of opinion concerning the 
person, the similarities are much greater among personalists. 
Both the person and the self are uni que, persistent, many-
sided, related to their physical and social environment and 
are t he fundament al basis of all their experiences. Stern, 
Calkins, and Bovme agree on the characteristics of the person 
or self. So for all practical purposes the psychologic al 
self may be regarded as the person. 
ii. The Modalitie§ of Life. one of the fund2.mental 
theses of personalistic psychology according to Stern is that 
experience develops out of e.nd into life.10 Life for t he 
person appears in three modalities, each of vvhich constitutes 
a personal world to the person. The first modality is that 
of the biological 'rhich the person shares with other living 
organisms. This is the behaviorist's interest. The func-
tions of this modality are those of growth, maturation, re-
production, adaptation, and other vital functions for bring-
10 Stern, GAneral Psychology, p. 7 .... ~. 
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ing the person into conformity vd th his environment. This 
is called the biosphere. Contrasting ~ith this sphere is 
the vc'Orld of values. This is a purel.y humc:n sphere s ince it 
is not shared with the ~ower animals. The uerson rel a tes 
.• 
himsel.f to the objective significance of the v:·o rld e..nd incor-
porat es or introcepts these values into his o~n life . This 
is a spher e Fhere religion is a great concern. 
Introception denotes the activity tha t gives direction 
and form to human life. The end resul t of introcey tion is 
the formation of personality (character). This is the uni-
t ary and meaningfu~ pa ttern of life. Examples of i ncorporat-
ing objective values into one's ovvn life are loving , under-
standing, c.nd consecration. They ar e whol.ly i nconceivable 
in the absence of co nsciousness. Introception involves form-
ative tendencies and the enactment of intentions. 
The concep t introception is f ar su-o erior to behavior i s-
tic nconditioningn in understanding the meaningful adoption 
of values. Jung's analytic psychology has no concept to ac-
count fo r such an oueration other than by r a tionalization, a 
concept denoting the irrational. The typolo gists are not 
cone erned v.ri th hov.- , but mainly vd th what i s the i ndividual's 
values. 
Stern applies the concept of introception to religi on 
i n accordance with the introception of spiritual values . 
Therevd th does introception a ttc:dn a double stc.ndpoint. First, 
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that which i::rhol¥ tome 'ls more than me, determL1ing (bestimmend), 
repr esentative for me, a.nd is seen a s perfection. Secondly, 
this more-than-me is felt as somehow related to me.ll 
He sees different forms of i ntroception of the holy. 
First is the immedia te sanctifying of a person V:.'·ithout need-
ing a perceptual or sy:.mbolic medium as in Judaism and other 
religions. The second is the personification of an idea, as 
vrhen the idea s of freedom, equ ality, and brotherhood are re-
vered. The third form is the impulse to com1Jrehend the holy 
in persons , as in heroes or Christ. 
He compares religiosity with loving introception. It 
embraces the reality of persons, but limits itself t o the hu-
man s.nd anthropomorphic realities . The religious ma.n,as ,tl:e :1m-
:fr.~g man, determines his r el a tions , in intention and behavior, 
in r ecognition of and creation from his position to the intro-
12 cepted subject. 
Stern sees the spiri tuc..l position of man to God deter-
mi ned by t he four i ntroceptive trc:.i t s of loving, understc..nding, 
cons ecration, and awe. 13 These traits are exhibited i n t he 
following types of religiosity . The religiosity of childhood 
is colored by 1ove such as tha t towa rd the f a ther. The re-
~igiosi ty of the penitent humbl.es itself i n contrition before 
1.1 See Stern, )liiertnhilosophie (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1924), 
p . 389f . 
~2 Ib.d 
__ l_.' p . 
l 3 rb·d ~., p . 
393. 
400. 
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Godly mi ght . The mystic2l religiosity , v..rhich intends to see 
the Godly glory immediately , is different from the under-
standing religiosity 1.'.·hich comprehends its own imperfec t ion 
at the same time i n its nearness and its distance to Godly 
perfection. 14 The characteristic longing of all religions 
is absolute introception vvhich is complete absorption or in-
corpora tion of religious values into one's s elf, or Khere the 
i ndi vidual is as his ideals. And Stern sees these types of 
r eli giosity as applications of the c oncept to religion. 
The third sphere of life is tha t of experience. Ex-
perience occurs wherever the modality of vitality is sur~9assed, 
but complete introception is not attained. It is defin ed as 
life u..11der cleavage and tension.15 Cleavage and tension of 
the person-world r elationship being dynamic processes, they 
are constant but varied. To express this state of affairs, 
Stern uses t ?.ro more terms: salience and embeddedness. 
The more acute the tension between person and vv·orld the 
more conscious t he person becomes. Consciousness is salient, 
i. e., it stands out from t he diffuse baclcground of personal 
life, i n acute tension between the person and wo t'ld. Em bar-
rasment or acute awareness of some object brings about this 
s alience of consciousness. At other times when thet'e is less 
sharpness of consciousness or vagueness, consciousness is s aid 
14 Op. Cit., p . 400. 
15 Stern, General Psychology, p. 73. 
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to be embedded more deeply. Comple te embeddedness is uncon-
sciousness (repressed or otherwise). 
Personalistic psychology t hus far hasn't given much con-
sideration to the unconsc~ous, a concept by v.ohich many depth 
psychologists would attempt to understand all phases of reli-
gious experience and behavior. However, it should be noted 
that the unconscious consists of embedded ex-p erience e.nd so 
is not unaccounted for. What remains to be seen is how this 
exuerience works from a personali sti c point of view. At this 
point, this much can be s aid, the self chooses the experiences 
it represses or embeds. The self brings these experiences 
into salience when they are relevant for its adjustment . The 
unconscious is thus not non-conscious, but is non-self-con-
scious. Other adjustment mechanisms are discussed in the 
next chan ter. The main point here is that religion is not 
just a result of unconscious wishes or desires because there 
is a unifying thin1·d ng , wanting, willing self vrhich is i n 
command and selects its method of adjustment to a grea t degree. 
Experience being fragmentary, it is appropri a tely regu-
l a ted by selectivity and the nersonal. :rel§vance of objects. 
The unconscious is thus a necessary supplement to con scious-
ness. The person experiences the vmrld in such a way that 
the foreground a p9ears lErge, background small; importEnt 
items clear, incidental items blurred. He clso ex9eriences 
himself .§9. M to live .Qll the best nossible terms v;;ith himself. 
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Conscious experience leads the way to the introception of 
va.lues. 
The facts thus far -pres ented are similar to the person-
ali stic psycholo gies of Bovme and CaLlcins. Stern is i n agree-
ment r ith Bowne and Calkins tha t the significance of functions, 
adc.ptation~, and adjustments is understood only by reference 
to a coordinating concept such as the self. All three per-
sonc;.lists agree that the self and its relations t o it s objects 
(person-world) i s the main subject-matter of psychology. Cal-
kins and Stern agree th2.t t he unconscious is not a separ c... te 
entity, but is non-self-conscious experience. Bovrne · c:.nd Cal-
ldns are in agreement with Stern concerning the autonomy, cre-
ativity , c:md purposiveness of the person. These personalists 
2.gree i"'ith Spranger that t h e understanding of per sons must be 
on a higher level of concepts than the l c.s t distinguishable 
elements. But t hey i n sist that this understandi:.1g be ba sed 
on empirical evidence, rather than abstraction. These per-
sonalists agree with Lewin and the Gestalt psychologists on 
the importance of understanding the person in his total set-
ting. But Bovme, Calkins, and .Stern vmuld say tha t th·3 per-
son is relatively stabl e from setting to setting c.:nd tha.t the 
lasting structures of the person are as important as the en-
vironmentB.l setting. Personalists are in accord with the 
behavioris t ic emphasis on action, but see responses selected 
and regula ted by the person. Stern and Calldns recognize the 
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relevance of the uncon scious, but rega rd it as a supplement 
to co nsciousness and no t as an e.utonomous entity. 
iii. Interq,e-rsone.l RelatiQll~ --- Convergence. In p er-
sona1istic ~sychology t he per son is n o t viewed as merel y p a s-
sive, but as both recep tive B.nd active. Ca l kins po inted 
t h is out " hen she listed rece1 tivity and activity as t wo of 
the fw~damental r elations of the self to i ts objects. Stern 
g:L ve s these t wo relations a s omev,'ha t different formu lation. 
Both come under the concep t of co nvergence. 
seeking more than a. mere cla.ssification of ideas, feel-
in~~ s and a ction s, Stern hol.ds tha t the b ackground or th e ten-
d ency o.nd rea.diness to act must be sought. To signify the 
l a s t ing a ttitude and c apacity of the p erson to a ct i n definite 
ways, the concep ts of dispositions a re po stula t ed as funda-
men t ~ l categori es. Dispositions are not f aculties, but po s-
sibilities for action h aving a r ange of free play. Teleolog-
ically, they act as impl.ements and as directional d eterminants 
of functions .1.6 Th ey va ry a ccording to time, po t ency , c..nd 
Examples of dispositions a re temper ament and char-
acter traits. It remai n s for G. ~. Allpor t to distingui sh 
between these latter t -.:.-o more fully. 
Heredity does not play the role of determining behavio r 
a lone . F actors f rom the external '·'~orld a lso pl ay t hei r pa.rt. 
--- -rGStern, "The Personalistic .Shift i n Psychology" , The 
Personalist, 1 8 (Oct., 1937), p. 237f. 
162 
Heredity and environment are convergent mates in. t he adjust-
ment of the person. External f actors converge iYi th the in-
ner dispositions of the person. The environment has effect 
on the person only because the -o erson is susceptible t o its 
effect by means of dispositions. Thus convergence designa tes 
the reciprocal action between t he yerson and world. It means 
that only i n the cooperation of the inner and the outer f ac-
tors does the personal life arise. This doctrine of conver-
gence i ndicates that the person is not merely passive to en-
vironmen t al stimuli. It thus differs from behavioristic con-
ce:p tion s of environmental factors i n tha t the individual's 
values and tendencies are considered as coinciding Y'i th exter-
nal factors to produce behavior. Convergence thus ex~;lains 
I 
v-:hy there may be cm1sistent behavior regardless of s i tuE.tions. 
It depends urJon the convergence of the environment "!:' i th the 
i ndividual's inner values e.nd tendencies. For example, whether 
a reli gious person placed in a criminal dive as an environment 
will act like a criminal depends to a certa in extent on whether 
there is conflu2nce 1Ni th his values and environment a t the time. 
Stern points out tho.t there is an other f actor i 'J.volved. 
It is the personal goal-striving of the ~erson. Only tho se 
acts nbei v1elcher der Jmteil der personlichen Zeils trebigkei t 
ein Hochstmass erreicht, bezeichnen vrir als frei'T .17 In such 
acts the Derson is free from external forces and f ree from 
17 Stern, .ill.§. Menchliche Personlichkeit, p. 15~. 
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inner tension s. In free acts, "die Aus senwelt nicht der 
bes timmende Faktor, sondern da s Material ist, an dem sich die 
Disposition i n yrirl: s amkei t vervvandel t" .1.8 It is bec ause o:f 
the freedom of the person tha t introcep tion is possible. 
Othervdse, there could be no meaningful L1t c.king of objective 
value into s elfhood. Thus t h e person is free v:rithin the lim-
its of innate ability ami the external factors he has to vmrk 
V.'i th. But since consciousness does not reflect the objective 
world clearly, external factors have a doubl ·e standpoint. 
The ~)erson reacts to the stimuli of the vmrld as he conceives 
it and the objective r·orld acts as a check on his conception 
and a.ctions. Thus convergence expresses these relations con-
cisely. 
This i ndica tes tha t t h e person has a capacity f or many 
acts, religiosity included. The double standpoi nt of exter-
nal factors appears to preclude any idea of G. universal drive 
in oersons toward religiosity as will be seen later. The 
main point here is tha t human nature is capable of r eligiosity 
by the introception of religious values. Whether such values 
are objective or not, the -person reacts to them a s he conceives 
them. I~ they are too much out of line with the objective 
world, it has appropriate checks for him. As the person ac-
cu.rnulates experience and evalua tes the Viorth of his desires, 
he forms a hierarchy of values. I:f religious values are es-
18 Ibid., p. l53. 
teemed, then t h ey are introcep ted. 
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The extent and complete-
n es s of such introcep tion helps determine his religiousness. 
Since many aspects of thinking are a part 
of the religious experience, vm briefly sketch the personal-
istic interpretation of the psychology of thinking.l.9 Thought 
is purposive. It facilita tes adjus tment. It is an inner 
experience th .:~ t goes beyond itself and intends something tha t . 
is neither object, class, relations, meaning, or solution. 
Though t is similar to an act of will in tha t both are intet"-
nally structured, initiated, proceed tovmrd a goal and come 
to c.n end. The distinction is tha t an act of r:ill a ims a t 
an external change v,;·hile the goal of thought is an i n tellec-
tual change . 
Thought is a salient exp erience, i. e., it arises a s a 
res ult of tension. It is fus ed with images. Formal motives 
to thought grov..~ out of personal needs and desires. Contents 
of thought are motivated by lasting interests and ideals. 
Thus reli gious thinki ng may be motivated by desire for changes 
iYl the social order or a need to clarify and deve1op their 
position in regard to ultima te values. 
There are many forms in institutional religion tha t 
serve as a fr amework f or thought. Medita tion, prayer, and 
worshiu are some of them. The religion s t ha t glorify mysti-
cism and mystical experiences make a significant ~l ac e for 
lC9 Stern, General Psychology, p . 272f. 
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thought. Stern points out signific antly that motives for 
thought grow out of personal needs and desires and t hat the 
content is motivated by interests and ideals of a long-range 
na ture. · Religion c> lso provides ideals and interests. Wheth-
er these are true or false is not for the psychologist to s ay. 
All the psychologist can say is tha t in intending for such · 
goals, the person achieves a change. The interpretation of 
the goals must be left for philosophy. 20 
3. Motivation 
?ersonalistic psychology is a dynamic psychology. Nev-
ertheless, Stern never mechanized the spiritual life through 
a process of dissection. He views the person's activity as 
a purposive function directed toward self-preservation and 
self-development.21 Self-development involves the n ever-end-
i ng t ask of reali zing values V.'hich the environment suggests 
by the actualization of the inner go al structure df t he person. 
Unlike many psychologists, Stern does not attempt to represent 
the inner goc:d structure of the person by a simple scheme of 
instincts or drives, or needs. He resorts to all the avai~-
a ble concepts o£ motiva tion for the purpose of accounting for 
20 J. H. Leuba a ttempts a philosophical interpretation 
over and above psychologic al facts about mysticism. See his 
Psychology of Religioulii Mysticism (New York:Harcourt, Brace, 
1925), Chap ters 2 and 12. 
21 Stern, "William Stern", in Murchison ( ed.) Histor_y ..Q! 
Psychology in Autobiogra~hy, Vol. I, p. 356. 
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the higher needs such as the reli gious, ethical, etc. The 
doctrine of dispositions underlies the developmen t of the 
lower and the higher, f or the higher drives are al v.<ays present 
a s possibilities. 
i. Reflexes and prives. Reflexes are not meaningless 
or aimless. They serve a :n1rpose for the organism or the 
organ. The intensity and extensiveness of reflex '1lovementS 
depend to a grea t extent upon the personal significe.nce of 
the stimulus.22 As they are confined to instantaneous reac-
tions and instincts, t heir adaptiveness is solely conserva-
tional. They differ from instincts in that they lack antici-
pation and do not originc:,te new connections between means and 
ends. Reflexes are foremostly "implements that the individ-
ual t akes over from his forbears in order to adjust himself 
to conditions ••• universal to the racen.23 
Drives signify directedness toward go als. Unlike re-
flexes, they do not depend upon external s timuli but upon in-
ternal states of t he person. Thus they have rela tive free-
dom i n their adjustment to external conditions. A drive is 
defined as nan innc.te directional disposition ••• toward person-
al goals, it s tr2.nsformation ••• being conditioned primarily by 
the internal dynamics of the person". 24 There are drives of 
22 §tern, General psychology, p. 377. 
23 Ibid., p. 377. 
- . 
24 ~., p. 380. 
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self-!)reservation, self-development, and there are social 
drives. There are vital drives. There are also drives to-
ward intellectual, ideal, and cultural objectives. There 
ar e therefore meta~hysic al, r€ligious, and ethical drives. 
Such drives need neither occur at the outset of life nor oc-
cur in bare form. As a dispo sition, a drive may be asstmed 
even vihere its existence is merely in accordance '.'.i. th possi-
e>l; bili ty. t::- v It can be rejected only v~'hen its gr a tification 
can be ascribed to external conditions or other drive~. Since 
drives signify directedness toward personal goals, introcep-
tion indicates that religious drives may be those drives di-
rected toward the goals of one's religion, as cooperating with 
God. Since drives are dispositions, they are innate only as 
abilities vd th the goals being suggested by the environ1nent 
and selected by the person. 
Stern develops the concep t of such drives for the ~ur-
pose of ex~laining the tendencies such as the religious, ~hich 
cannot be explained as secondary products of other drives. 
G. Vi. Allport has pointed out that such a conception of drives 
mak es motives universal rather than personal, abstract r a ther 
than concrete.26 
25 Stern's theory of motivation is somewhat similar to 
that of McDougall's. Dispositions seem to corres~ond to Mc-
Dougall's "abilities". See McDougall, Energies Qf Men, p. 64f. 
2 6 G. v:r. Allport, Personality, note on pp. 556 c.nd 587. 
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ii. Needs and Instincts. As a further developmen t of 
the drive concep t Stern makes use of the concept of need. 
The activation of a drive alters the accompanying experience. 
The "urge away from" becomes an "urge towardtr something. A 
change of direction is desired. such a feeling from present 
l ack to future fulfillment is called a need. Needs arise 
v:hen an impul se is not able to be resolved directl .y through 
action because of external or i n ternal i nhibitions. 
Needs are grea tly affected by ext erna.l conditio ns. The 
obje~ of need may be of a general class. But one object of 
this class may become a specific need because by the t heory 
of convergence, the specific object converges with the inner 
impulse. A specific object als o becomes a need because it 
has valence, i. e., it acts as a stimulus t o which the person 
reacts, and also because objects possess ma teriality, i. e., 
it is t h e material upon vrhich the per son acts. 
As t he concepts drive and need express direction, 
Stern uses the concept i nstinct to i ndicate the mean s urgfng 
to t h e goals of the drives. 27 Drives are thus directional 
and ins tincts instrumental. Instincts like drives ar e innate, 
and this does not me an ready to function a t the outset. Th ey 
do not function mechanically. V.'ha t remains identical i s the 
basic drive and the final goa1. In man ins tinct opera tes 
partly a s a guide to certai n actions and partl y as a hidden 
2tf; Stern, General Psychology, p. 387. 
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source of energy, and again partl.y as a counterpar t of ~ill. 
Instincts are difficult to identify i n adults because they 
are affected by experience; but t hey cannot be replaced by 
experience. They impart t o experience the flavor of genuine-
ness or falseness. 
It can be seen that Stern forms a hierarchy of general-
ized mo tives instead of attempting to trace all hmnan motiva-
tion back to a few simple instincts or drives. Such a hier-
a rchy attempts to account for t he variety, uniqueness, and 
u..niversali ty of hume_n motives. It a~so attempts to explain 
the intellectual or "higher" actions of men vrithout resorting 
to a "nOthing but" theory of simple pushes or pulls. Thus 
there are psycholo gical needs as well a s physiological, and 
there are :?Sychophysical needs as well. 
A summary of Stern's theory of mot i vation proceeds ·il'.ri th 
dispositions acting as potentialities f or action. Drives 
(internal states) are directed toward goals. They are condi-
tioned and transformed by internal dynamics. Needs are acti-
vated drives affected by external conditions which have valence 
and rna teriali ty. Go als are attained by ins tincts vrhich fur-
nish the mea..'1.s tov.rar d the goals. 
Stern's theory has the advant age of accounting for the 
possibility of higher drives such as t h e religious by means 
of i n ternal trEmsforma tion of drives. But Stern fails to 
state precisely ·whether lower drives are transformed i n to hi gh-
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er or just what i s the nature of this "internal transforma-
tion". Thi s transforma tion is brought out more clearly by 
G. V! . Allport. It should be pointed out that pr actically 
2.11 psychologists who attempt to account for hi gher drives 
do so by pointing out the tr aYJ.sformation of other drives, 
such as curiosity, creativity, etc. Stern holds t ha t the 
h i gher drives, such as the religious, are as original as the 
lm•.'er drives. However, by holding that drives are conditioned 
and transformed by i n ternal dynamics (and the ~J roce s s of 
transformation i s not clear), the higher drives seem i n dan-
ger of a vagueness that makes them mysterious. Although 
such higher inna te drives account for r eligious drives, t he 
conditioning and transforma tion of these drives by internal 
dynamics indicate tha t a tran sformation of certain internal 
dynamics t akes place. These "internal dynamicstt and their 
transfor:ma tion are no t exlJl ai n ed on the drive level. 
Since human behavior is not exclusively a re sul t of un-
derly i ng motives, the fQnction of willing is considered. 
iii. ~ yrill ~ lJ& RP.lations. Stern, v.:hose a im is 
reconstructing general p sychology around the 9erson, does not 
overloo1r one of t he most char acteristic functions of t he 
person-- willing. Wi l l i s neither a sovereign power nor 
a subl ima ted i nstinct. It i s both at the same t i me and thus 
sometbi-lg ne·w and specifically human. \Hll occurs \':hen the 
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striving self is put into oppo sition to something else. It 
bridges the gap between the striving se~f and t he oppo s ing 
object. He therefore define s will as a form of s triving, 
motiva ted by needs, impelled and ordered by con scious ~ntici-
patioll of end and means, and v~hich is initia ted by a particu-
l a r personal act.28 
T'ne variety of acts of vdll r ange from a. simple act of 
sustaining an obstructed desire, act of choosing one of sev-
era.l. alterna tive s , t o acting on prin ciple r a ther than vrants. 
Es s ential to will is a conscious reference to the f uture. The 
distance of t hB future is determined by its personal signifi-
cance. The go al of will may or may not have its seat vd thin 
the person. It may be directed to a change v.'i thin the self. 
I t mak es possible relative freedom of s elf-determi na tion . 
The concept of ~ill indicates the co-activity of t h e 
uncon scious, the conditioning environment, and heredity, but 
in spite of these f actors doe s the will opera te. Although 
these f actors pl e.y a part, none of them individually account s 
fully for religiosity. The concept of -r'.'ill acco1.mts for the 
missing link v.herein th e person may a ssert hi.ms elf in s pite 
of the adversity of these f actors. This is another i ndica-
tion of the ecledtic character of personalistic p sychology for 
an adeoua te nnderstc:mding of religion. It considers no t only 
2'8 Ib'd 7 98 
__ l _.' p . LJ • 
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both the internal snd external fa.ctors 2.ffec t i ng behavior, but 
Rlso the mecms by ~' 'hich the planful. and future-oriented con-
sciousness may exert itself in spite of apparent adverse fac-
tors. 
Stern s ees the motiva tion of Till as being conscious 
and 1..mconscious. Using the terms phenomotive and genomotive, 
a phenomoti ve is defined as an anticipatory idea of a goa. l 
'"1 0 
c:mtecede.nt to a vol.untary action directed toward the goal. r~.., 
A phenomotive abvays i:~1volves emotion. Phenomotives derive 
their force from genomotives, which are needs. 
omotives continually arise from ·!Jhenomotives. 30 
Ho \','ever, g en-
This is 
another instance where Stern makes an observation of the func-
tional e.u tonomy of motives. It remains for Allport to devel-
on this idea further. 
As a further prerequi site to willing, Stern points out 
the importance of belief. Only tha t striving which is sup-
oorted by belief in one's ability can develop into ~illing. 
Belief i s thus psychologic c; l comuetence as clistin.guished from 
actual comp etence to perform an act. 
The acme of willing comes at a definite ins tance in the 
concentration of t he experience of being a ble to act, i n to a 
direct exnerience of acting . This onset is the core of every 
act of Y:ill. In no other activity, Stern holds, is t he a.c-
---~-g . ' 
- I b1a., p. 406. 
30 I b .d 
__ 1_ . • ' p. 41.0. 
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tive totality of t he personality con centra ted i n to such a 
cleer-cut experienc e of s elf as in the onset of ? ill. 
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However, there is another i mportant as~ ect of ~illing . 
Th2.t relatively more per manent sta t e of 2~ person v:hich dis-
po s es hi m t or .- ard acts of a definite k i nd is ca.lled the set-
ting-of-will. The more positive and definite a will-set , the 
less important are momentary motives. External i nfluence s , 
internal co ~ditions , and a decisive act of will influenc es 
one's vrill-set. I n the l a tter, convergence is transcended 
and the cause of acts of ~ill in such a case are caused by 
~elf-determination. 3l 
Especially important f or religion are the result s of 
vTill-sets t hat i s sue into convictions rather than acts of 
will. The person con sciously sets himself to believe cer-
t ain propositions of e general cla ss. Differenti a ted cui-
ture compels clarifica tion and justification of pr edomi nant 
t endencies toward certai n values. Hence, each person con-
sciously decides his own will-set concerning certai n sets of 
vc..lues. Such a conviction is a phenomotive beco me relative-
ly permanent. There are non-genuine conviction.s based upon 
self-deception and there a re h 1sii1cere con victions Bimed a t 
the deception of others. Finally, there are exagger a ted con-
victions in v'hich the expr essive attitude is viewed as a sub-
stitute for the real s e tting-of-will. From the latter, Stern 
31 Stern, General psychology, l) . 434-435. 
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draws the axiom that those who are .loudest in proclaiming 
their convictions often have the Y'eakest wills because they 
dissipate the energy that ought to be devoted to actions 
corresponding to the conviction. 
i v. Feelj.ngs. Stern rejects the older theories of 
feeling as inaclequa te for ex~)laining or describing the grea t 
varieties of feeling. Those be.sed upon physiolo gy alone are 
inadequate for explaining the higher feelings deali ng ~~ i th the 
realm of value, a.s religious fervor. McDougall's theory 
tha t every propensity has a connecting emotion holds promise 
but needs revision. 
Stern seek s the position that feelings occupy in the 
total pattern of the person. He contends tha t they consti-
tute the domain of embedded experience. It is upon this do-
main that cognition and acts of vdll take pl.ace. Besides 
their embeddedness, they have the attribute of formlessness. 
Feelings have significance for the person and by way of 
the person. 32 For the person they contribute ends a s controls, 
signals, preparations, and incentives. By way of the Lerson 
their significance lies in the fact that they partake of the 
person's nature and mirror it. In physical behavior it car-
ries over into actions. As it represents the person, it is 
reflected in expression. Feelings are bipolar: telic and 
32 Tb-!it':' ~32 ~., p. '-' • 
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dynamic. 33 The t elic concerns success or f' ailure in goal-
striving. The dynamic concerns the accumulation or expend-
iture of energy. 
Stern recognizes a ho st of feeling dimensions besides 
the pleasant-tm:pleasant, excitement-calm, and strain-relaxa-
tion dimensions. As examples of some of the dimension s Stern 
uses, we point out a few significant for understanding reli-
gion. There are genuine and non-genuine feelings. The non-
genuine feelings are mostly brought about by unconscious self-
deception. They are mo s tly socially conditioned beca.use so-
cial groups demand harmony of feeling above all else. It 
was Bo~me's contention that emotionalism in religion vFas of' 
the non-genuine type m2.ny times.34 There are higher and lower 
feelings. Higher feelings occur in the levels of the objec-
tive and introceptive spheres of the person. Highest are 
those that accompany the introception of values: the r eligious, 
ethical and aesthetic feelings. There are feeling s of ex-
pecta..ncy 2,n c1 retrospect, feelings of harmony with the worl.d 
and its opposite, positive and negative feelings toward the 
future, and feelings of expansion <=mel. negligibility of t-h.e 
self. These feeling s h ave been found mo st signific ant in 
conversion experiences.35 
33 Ibid., p. 533 . 
34 See p. 110 above. 
35 See Johnson's account of various i nvestigations in 
Psychol,g_gy of Religion, p. 97f'. 
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The realm of feeling is one of' the most productive .for 
personalistic psychology. Because feelings help regul a te 
action and tone experience, they are of utmost importance in 
the study of motivation. They represent e:mother level. of 
the motivational factors tha t must be reckoned with i n inter-
preting religious experience. 
v. Summar.z. The person is a. unique, purposive unity 
in multiplicity whose functions are directed toward self-de-
velopment and s elf-preservation. It is the generator and 
carrier of psychophysical events. Intelligence, temperament, 
reflexes, drives, needs, instincts, and will are given in the 
person. They vary according to external conditions and the 
amount of self-activity invol.ved. They occur in the form of 
dispositions. They are dynamic and by means of convergence 
and introception they change. 
Motives are arranged in a hierarchy of functions t o ac-
count for the vc.riety and change of motives. Thus lower mo-
tives are not immedi a tely trc:msformed into higher but go 
through intermediary stages. The higher motives are a.l v1ays 
present in the form of dispositions. 
The feeling s connect the s elf with experience and ex-
press the self by toning experience. The rearrangement of 
concepts generally used by psychologists a round the person in-
dic a tes tha t -personalistic psychology achieves a more empiri-
1.77 
cal character than most psychologies because the various fac-
tors involved are considered in their true context, rather 
than being artifici 2.lly isola ted and thus abstract. Stern 
introduces new concepts for understanding personal activities 
involved in religiosity. These dy:.r1.a.mic concepts give person-
alistic psychology an eclectic character because they include 
and supplement concepts of other psychologies. 
The patterning of t he tendencies of the person around 
self-regarding and other goals seems to need understanding 
as a supplement to an understanding of the person. This un-
derstanding is developed in the psychology of G. W. Allport, 
to ~hich we no~ proceed. 
CH.AP TER VI I 
GORDON WILLARD Jl...LI.PORT' S PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONJILITY 
Gordon VI . Allport's psychology of personality is the 
final representative of personalistic psychology considered 
in this thesis. Having traced the personalistic p sychology 
of Bowne, expositions of personalistic psychology from t wo in-
dependent personalists, Calkins and Stern, were presented 
sho Vi.' ing distinct similarities betvyeen them. From them the 
significance of the concepts for interpreting religious ex-
perience were shovvn. However, the adequacy of personalistic 
psychology lies not only in its concepts concerning the nature 
of persons, but also in the organization of those dispositions 
of the person into ;:m organic unity. Our knov;-ledge of reli-
gious behavior of indi vidua.ls is enhanced in proportion as we 
have knmr;rledge of the relative reliability and consistency of 
the organization of psychophysical tendencies of persons. It 
is only by such knowledge that we can understand the behavior 
of religious persons. 
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the con-
cepts developed by G. w. Allport for understanding personality 
and to seek the significance of these concepts for a. further 
understanding of religion. Noting the historical setting of 
Allport t s psychoJ_ogy, his aims and methods are stated. The 
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data proper are then co nsidered, the concepts of his psychol-
og;{ and their implications for understanding religion. A 
sQmmary concludes the chapter. 
1. Historical Setting of Allport's Psychology 
The historical setting of Allport's psychology is the 
cont emporary scene i n ~sychology. This includes approximate-
ly the ~Jeriod starting after World ·war I on to the present 
day. This period is especially marked by the i nfluence of 
behaviorism, depth psychology, hormic, and Gestalt psycholo-
gies. Allport's psychology has developed in the midst of these 
psycholo gical influences. 
Gestalt psychology has generally similar aims as that 
of personalistic psychology i n its emphasis on 1rholeness. It 
aro se partially, l .ike Allport's psychology, a s a protest 
against reduction ism and mechanism i n psychology. 
In this period, the desire of psychologists to become 
more scientific and less r a tionalistic has been one of their 
main motiva tions. Following more closely the lead of t he 
natural sciences, psychologists , on the one h~~d, have ~een 
more concerned vd th universels and uniformities in the gener-
al ized humc.n mind th ~~n in t he particular human mind ~':i th its 
unicue as well as common characteristics. They are con cerned 
'.'d th studying the structure of a postulated unconscious, for 
example, 2.nd attempting to account for all behavior i n terms 
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of its char acteris t ics. On the other hand, some psycholo-
gists have seen no need for studying mind at all. They 
have seen i n the physical stimulus and t he physical r e s ponse 
the all in all of human motivation and action. 
The hormic psychologists classified the goals of hnnan 
beings i n general and found that postula ting propensities to-
ward t hese goals, along ~ith abilities and s entiment f orma-
tion to V'.~ard ob jects of the goal s , accounted for t he lLvis of 
the mind. sentiments account for uniqueness. Difficulty 
arose, however, i n accounting for t he ki nd and qu an tity of 
go als in specific i ndi viduals. The foc alization of hormic 
energy from an adequate object of satisfac t ion to an i nade-
auate on e for the propensity, although the stimulus-object re-
mains present, poses the problem of explai ni ng exceptions 
where a certa in propensity f c-:ils to ma1-:: e an appearance, as 
well as expl ai ni ng the propensities that are felt vr.hen no ob-
ject is present and ·where the urge has never been f elt before. 
i. Allport's ~. It is against such a psychological 
setting that Allport has r eacted. He is concerned '.'.ri th ex-
plai ning i ndi Yidua.li t y 2.nd holds tha t i r:.di viduali ty c an be 
ex·ola.ined without resorting to generality. Believing that 
the true per son has been lost in the nook s and cr evices of gen-
eral psychology's concepts, he proposes to develop concep ts 
't'!hich v.'ill adequa tely pictur e the uni queness of t h e single in-
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dividual. He believes that the past d evelopm~nt is i~por-
t a.nt, but that t he present organi zation and dynamics of t h e 
person i s more importan t. Following t he lead of Stern, he 
a ttemp ts to expand t he boundaries of "f) sychology t o give a 
more a dequa te account of the total person vd th a.ll h i s unique-
ness, con tinuity , unity, and mul tiplicity. 
ii. Method of Apnroach. In a ttemp ting t o de1Jict per-
- ' · 
sonality adequa tely, Allpor t expands, refa shions , a.nd rearranges 
other t heories. He develops new theori es t o fill the gaps 
left by the concepts of other psychologies. His method is 
ess entiE•lly synthetic in tha t he a ttempts to assimila t e the 
appropria t ion s from other psycholo gies vri t h hi s O'.".n theories 
i n to a coherent t h eoretical account of persone.li ty. 
2. Ex-o erience 
i. Psychophysic al Paralleli~m. Unlike mos t personalists, 
.Allport acce-p ts t he pos tulate of psychophysic al. par allelism a s 
his f r cmework f or th eori zi ng.l ~~ereas Stern hel d to psycho-
physic al neutrali t y, Allport holds that v•:hile parallel ism has 
not been proven, !! probably no modern investi ga tor doubts t ha t 
through scientific discovery patterns of personalit y v:ill be 
"' found t o par allel pa tterns of somatic response" • .-... Thus both 
1 G. w. Allpor t , .Eerso.IJ.ality (New Yo rk:Hol.t Co., 1.937), 
p . 80 • 
.... 
t::. Al.l.por t , 0-o . Cit., p . 80. 
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Allport and Stern differ comcerning ·the relationship bet·ween 
mind and body from the other personalists studied. However, 
Allport realizes that it does not specifically advc:mce our 
kl'lowledge to hold tha t an individual's psychic s. ttributes are 
rooted some way in the physiological function of his body. 
But he gives no reasons for his a.ppa.rent preference other 
than citing some concepts desi gned to aid i n establishing this 
correlation. 
ii. The Self and .EgQ. Allport recognizes that conscious-
ness provides us with the one sure criterion of our personal 
existence and identity. It is consciousness that assures us 
tha t we somehow possess consistent personalities . He believes 
that unless we postulate permanence of personality there can 
be no account of t he many identical threads running through 
our conscious states. 3 
Allport equates self-consciousness with the ego. He 
criticizes Koffka for treating the ego both as the phenomenal 
object a.nd the phenomenal subject. 4 Allport holds that Koffka's 
division of the ego into layers of wh ich the core is the self 
is unnecessary. To Allport, the ego represents the interior-
r::; i za tion of cul tur2,l values .~ 
o Ibid., p. 1~59. 
He sees the ego or self-con-
4 K. Koffka, Princiules of Gestalt Psychology (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1935), p . 328. 
5 Allport, "The Ego in Contempor ary Psychology" in lli-
chological Review, 50 (Sept., 1943), p. 453. 
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sciousness as de~endent u9on memory, graded and differentiated 
emotional resuonses, l an guage, recognitio~ of recurring exuer-
iences, and symbolic anchorage ooints (such as one 's name). 
Allport seems to be C0!1fused as to the dis tinction be-
t ween consciousness and the ego. He overplays the i mportance 
of self-consciousness (the ego) at t h e expense of conscious-
ness (the self). Vlhereas self-consciousness occurs when one 
stops a.nd reflects on one's co!'l sCiousness, c.:::rnsciousness (or 
the self) is the agent 'l'i'hich makes the reflection. Most or 
the above outlined conditions or the ego are properties or 
·co,nsciousnes s. It is true th<:l t "the ego is a portion of the 
personality",6 but the developer of this portioa of t he 9er-
sonality i$ r a ther vague to Allport. 
Bertocci7 clarifies the confusion by pointing out thc.t 
1,;;hat develops, involves, pa.rticip a tes in and explain.s the con-
tinuity of the ego is t he p sychological self. He defines the 
self operationally. The s el"': is thus nthe complex, unitary 
activi ty of s ensing, rememb ering , imagining, -:Jerceiving, v:ant-
i ng, feeling". 8 Bertocci avo i ds Allport's mis take of thinking 
t hat the ego only develons; it is al so devel9~ by the self. 
Self r eflection develops nothing ; the r efl ection on t h e self 
0 Ibid., 9· 473f. 
7 Bertocci, "Psychological Self< Ego, and Personality", 
PsycholQ.gic al Revie"'[, 52 (March, 1945;, :9· 92f. Bertocci is 
prob2.bly Allpor t 's most stimulat i ng critic. 
8 I bid., p. 92. 
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enables the self to evaluate parti cular behavioral systems or 
patterns of cultural values. These sy stems and ) atterns con-
sti tute the egos. The selr interacts and cornmtL""lic a tes >.'i t h 
the ego system. The ego and the ego systems are developed by 
the self. The ego system represents a high level of i n tegra-
tion or introception of values i n to the total personality. 
Allport recognizes an ego-ideal vd thin the lJersonali ty. 
He sees the~o-ideal setting the goals that lead to a creative 
pattern of life. It is t he pl an that the developed personal-
i ty is able to evol.ve by tran scending unsocialized urges and 
thereby leading to a new level of personal freedom and matur-
. ty 3 l • Here it can be seen th2. t undervaluing the role of the 
conscious self leads to confusion in understanding the ego and 
the ego-ideal. The ego-ideal now becomes an autonomous en-
tity in that, although it is developed by the personality, it 
sets the goals for personality. This confusion can only be 
overcome by the acceptance of a psychologic al self. This 
self is the presupposition of egos and ego-ideals. As Bertocci 
has nointed out, nan ego presuppos es some form of knovdng and 
wanti ng in its development, al teration, and preservationn.lO 
The ego-ideal. is ordered under the concept of direction-
ality, a fundament al concept in Stern's psychology. It rep-
~Allport, Personality, p. 218 •. 
10 Bertqcci, n?sychological Self~ Ego, and Per sonality", 
J;syc""'hplogic al Review, 52 (March, 194,5}, p. 93. 
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resents the goel-strivi~g, the life-plan, and the i ntentions 
of the self for its narticula:r behavi or al sys terns or its ~')at­
terns of cultural values, its egos. The importance of this 
concept :for understanding reli gious experience is vital be-
cause Allport has found that iJersonal participation is em-
braced in proportion as the ego is involved in an activity. 
The degree of religious activity can be discerned by the de-
gree in which a particular behavioral system of the self is 
i nvolved. This does not necessarily mean tha t there must be 
social recognition although this factor seems to play a l arge 
part i n some person's reli giosity. It means more that the 
individual becomes religious to the degree that the values of 
religion converge vii th his inner ideals for himself. The 
self recogni zes the values i n religion for its particular be-
havioral systems (egos) and the self's ideal goal for each is 
seen as coinciding with teli gious ideals. Otherwise, on e 
develops a religious ego which may not effectively predominate 
or carry over into behavior where other ideals are held. 
iii. Constraint~ of the Self. The self is not absolute-
ly free and autonomous in .Allport's psychology. There are 
certain factors that restrain, drive, and i nfluence the s elf 
a.nd the subsecuent personc..li ty tha t it develops. The first 
of the constraints of the self is that of suggestion. By 
11 Allport, Personality, p. 219. 
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suggestion, Alll)ort means the adoption of a course of conduct 
or belief by a person ;;vho does not engag e L1 those processes 
of thought and judgments that wov.ld be pertinent to t h e ac-
cep t ance of such a cours e of conduct or belief. l 2 Suggestion 
occurs in the absence of complete self-deterE:tination. It 
opera tes vrhen resistance is weak. 
The formation of religious beliefs and a ttitudes a re in 
a l arge measure tracee.ble to suggestion in many people. 13 
The belief and conduct of others is raw materi al which the 
self introcepts, or rejects, and refines for its :particular 
needs and adjustments. They constitute a part of the envir-
OTh~ent upon which the self acts and is acted upon. 
Allport lists another constraint as being self-esteem. 
The self-esteem is not an entity, but is basically co-ex ten-
si ve vvi th life itself. This mean s that there is at the core 
of person ality a strong element of self-seeking ·which may be 
traced in many traits and sentiments. The ultima t e char acter 
of this principle is psychologically unknown. ~iha t is psy-
chol.ogic ally important is the innumerable c~nd variable con;.. 
texts in v·hich self-esteem occurs. 14 It is in the i n terest 
of self-esteem tha.t techni ques o:f se~f-deception a re :formed. 
1 2 Allport, personality, pp. 166 and 167. 
13 see Allport, Gillespie, and Young, 11 The Rel i gion of 
t he Po s t-War College Student", _Journal of Psychology 25 
(Jan., 1948), p. 12. 
14 Allport, Per sonality, p. 171. 
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Rationalization and projection are the main types. It is 
also in this same context that reason is so important for 
man. 
Self-esteem is enhanced by participation in activities. 15 
One's participation in an activity is almost directly propor-
tiona.l to the degree th2.t one's ego is involved in it. The 
self has various areas in v<hich it acts and seeks esteem. It 
develops egos in accordance therewith. Self-esteem appears 
differte.nt from ego-involvem:mt because the former is determined 
a grea t deal by social factors, vvhereas the latter is inter-
nally conditioned. Thus religiosity, because of self-esteem, 
may be t wisted and turned v.:ith change in social environr1 ents, 
whereas that of ego-involvement would tend to be more stable. 
This principle helps to account for the various degrees of re-
ligiosity of persons. Those persons who view themselves as 
being vi t al in cooperating vd th God or r .. i th other persons in 
carrying out His '.".'ill, will be more active in such an impor-
tant undertaking. Their ego is involved i n what they consider 
the most import2nt of activities. It does not matter ~hether 
t h ey are correct because rationalization may satisfy them tha t 
they are correct. They are deeply religious just the same. 
The.ir self-esteem vdll, however, depend a great deal upon their 
evaluation of their involvement in this activity. 
I5 Allport, "Psychology of Participation", Psychological 
Review, 52 (Feb., 1945), p. l73f. 
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Feelings of infe-riority and compensation are constraints 
of the self. An inferiority complex is defined as the strong 
and )ersi stent tension arising from a somewhat morbid emotion-
al attitude tmgards the failure to adjust satisfactorily to 
environment owing to some felt-deficiency in pe-rsonal equip-
ment. 16 Feelings of inferiority need not correspond to ac-
tual inferiority. The self overcomes feelings of inferiority 
by attacking the source of i:r.Seriori ty, substituting sa tisfac-
tion in a different direction, defense mechanisms, rationali-
zation, phanta.sy, and neuroticism. This is another instance 
where i)ersonalistic psychology makes use of concepts from 
denth psychology. As Adler points out, inferiority feelings 
may be a stimulus to religiosity.l.7 But it is not the only, 
neither necessarily the mc.in, source of reli gion. 
Allport places the emphasis on inferiority feelings in 
a more eclectic context than the originator of the concepts. 
Adler mal{es them the basis of a systematic psychology and sees 
motivation almost solely on this basis. Besides the psycho-
analytic mechanisms cited above, Allport also sees value in 
others :::>rovided they are seen in perspective. The pleasure 
principle, reality principle, the uncon scious, ambivalence, 
identification, and psychose:xuali ty are some of the psycho-
I6.Ibid., p. 174. 
17 A. Adler and E. Jahn, Individualpsycholo gie und .ftsl-
ligion (Beipzig:Rolf Pas ser, 1933}, p. 53f. 
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analytic mechanisms for understanding the constraints of the 
self. Allport stresses the fact that there can be no single 
f actor in the develoument of personality because biological 
motives never operate singly. Freud over-emphasizes sexual-
ity.;' Sexuality is never devoid of mental r amifications and 
it therefore becomes diffused into major systems of interests 
and traits which are themselves the fundamental functional 
sy~tems of personality. "~Nhat applies to sex applies, sta tes 
Allport, to every other so-called instinct. Thus religiosi-
ty is understood by functional systems and not by single fac-
tors of personality. 
3. Personality 
Allport defines personality as the dynamic organization 
within the individual of those ~Jsychophysiccd systems that 
determine his unique adjustment to his environment. 18 Ber-
t i 19h ·t· · d th' d f' ·t· b · ' t occ as cr1 1c1ze 1s e 1111 1on as e1ng somew11a vague, 
in that these systems seem to organize themselves by mere ac-
cident. The function of the individual is vague. He would 
correct such vagueness by inserting the sel.:f as the active or-
ganizer of those systems that then determine its unique ad-
justment to its environment. The persona.li ty, like the ego, 
18 Allport, Personality, p. 48·. 
19 Bertocci, Philoso-ohy of Personality (Unpub. Syllabus, 
Boston University, 1947), p. 5. 
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is a development of the self. Both represent the me2.ns the 
self ha s ta.ken in developing itself among the possibilities 
suggested by the environment. It must be noted that the or-
ganization does not r efer to just unique characteristics pe-
culiar to just one individual as E. B. Sk aggs seems to think . 20 
It r E'. ther refers to the unique organization of whatever char-
acteristic the person may possess, ·whe th r~r peculi ar to the 
individual or common t o all. 
Personality must not be confused with what is co:n.inonly 
call ed "char acter". Character is personality evalua ted by 
some mor al code; personality is char acter deve:llua.ted. 
actsr is strictly e.n ethical concept , Allport st2. tes, u.'Ylnec e s-
sary for psychological understanding. 
i. The Data of Personal;i......ll,. Allport sees the r aw ma t er-
i cT of per sonality as physique, intellig ::mce, and temper82!12nt, 
the ag encies of her edity. The ot'i gins of persc .-w.lity may be 
either a vitalistic urge or protopla smic irrit~bility. He 
leans tow·ard the latter. This is reflected in a strec;.m of 
activity differenti a ted at birth into gross pc:.tterns of •nove-
ment and specific reflexes. The stream of activity is set 
· into motion and sustained through simple sensitivity, segmen-
t al drives, and poss ibly through goal-seeking processes. In-
stincts are rejected by Allport, however, because he feels 
20 E. B. Skaggs, "Ten Basic Postulates of Personali stic 
Psychology" , Psychological Revie·w, 54 (Sept., 1947), p. 453. 
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that this concept does not obey the law of parsimony, it is 
difficult to explain exceptions where instincts do not occur, 
and the similarities thc..t do exist can be explained by the 
presence of common environment c:md common abili ti1:ls. 2~ Ber-
tocci, a hormic-personalist , holds that the fact people crave 
certain basic types of satisfaction irrespective of environ-
ment or ability justifies rejection of Allport's objections 
<:md sustains the McDougallian view. 
The stream of activity employs intelligence, temyera-
ment, c-~nd physique, as well as adaptive mechanisms. 
ii. Personali t.Y. Motivation. Having rejected instincts, 
Allport improves upon R. s. Woodworth's theory of drives as 
an alternative theory of motivation. He sees organic seg-
men tal tensions dri iring the infant in to his environment. Af-
ter the stage .of infancy is past, intellectual and volitional 
f actors affect the course of motives. The original tenden-
cies are then tran sformed so radically that the nev~·ly emerging 
motivational systems may be said to have supplanted the old. 22 
The tie of the nev..7 with the old i s historical, rather than 
functional. The new motivation systems are autonomous from 
the o1d. They possess their own driving power, rather than 
depending upon the driving power of the segmental tensions. 
2! Allport, ''Motivation in Personality", Psychological 
Review, 47 (Nov., 1940}, p . 543. 
22 Allport, '~Motivation i n Personality", Psychological 
Review, 47 (Nov., 1940), p. 547. 
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Thi s theory of functional autonomy of mo tive s dethrones 
t he stimulus for the purpose of genera ting emo tional activity 
and drive . It makes 9ersonal intentions and desires the basis 
for uniqueness rather than sentiment formation from general-
i zed drives exclusively. It explains personal values from 
the standpoint of t he i ndividual r a ther than from t he stand-
poin t of his drives or enviroTh~ent. Instincts themselves 
seem but personal categories of values of the psychologists 
1gho see them as the basis of motivation. In short, function-
al autonomy makes motivation a more specific responsibility 
of the person and i ndicates that his r ange of freedom of choice 
is wider than supposed . It indicates that the nerson is both 
morally and psychologically free. 
Religiosity might be explained by an instinctivist by 
pointing out tha t the 9erson gives vent to his submissive urge 
i n the presence of a religious object representing a better 
pers on than himself (God). He also gives vent to his urge 
to mas tery by attempting to cooper ate with Him. Difficulties 
encountered in the attempt give rise to pugn&city and crea tiv-
. .)... 
l vy. He might also be a little curious. He forms sentiments 
about religious objects and ideas. Vli th the devel opment o-r 
sentiments , a ttitudes, and traits of religiosity, one c an then 
expl ain religiosity by tracing the various formations to t heir 
origi n s i n propensities and the vitalistic urge. 
The point that Allport makes is t ha t regardless of whether 
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one holds i nsti ncts or segment al tens ions to be the origin of 
motivation, activity is best expl ained by its contemporary 
motive r a ther than its original one. A~ter all, propensi-
ties may set uo tensions V'i thin the p erson and urge h i m to-
'Nard a goal. When the tension is sa tisfied an d the person 
con tinues the activity f'or intellectual or voli tiona.l r easons, 
Allport contends that the motive has now become independen t 
of the ins t i nct or segmental t ension. 
The difficulty of motivation by organic needs or seg-
men t al tensions for religion is tha t it is difficult t o see 
how an organic· need can be so over-laid by intellectual and 
volitional f actors as to produce religiosity unless there a re 
intellectual needs or psychical tensions. Tr acing psychical 
tensions to organic tensions t akes us right back t o the vVa t-
sonian view of depending upon viscera}. contractions, etc. 
If they are developed by organic tensions, it is unclear a.bout 
the source of energy of the i n.tellectual f actors that can no ' 
affect their source, org&nic tensions. Instinctivis ts can 
r ely upon t he idea of mental as well as physic al. t ensions 
and the vitalistic urge. They can also account for the emo-
t ions, which .A~lport's theo-ry c annot do. However , Allport, 
if pushed, -v.·ould accept the ho rmic principle but hold s tha t 
it is a better met e:; physical principl e th <:- n psychological. L3 
Nevertheless, the theory of functi onal. autonomy i s val.-
23 Allport, £erson§li~y, p . £05. 
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uable for understanding religion. Religiosity can be better 
understood by present motives than by origins. The theory 
of functional autonomy is in harmony Vli th the axiom tha t ori-
gin does not determine value. Allport reg ards i n tentions, 
interests, 2.tti tudes, e:md traits as the ultimate and true dis-
positions of the mature personality. Functional autonomy ac-
counts for the various degrees and varieties of religious ex-
perience in terms of oresent needs rather than by original 
urges. It avoids explanation by geneticism. 
Allport points out that there is need for a concep t to 
characterize the activity of the religious person implying a 
high degree of conscious participation. He presents the con-
ce-p t of intention to account for the contemporary character 
of motives the t have a thrust toward the future vdth ple:n1.ful 
e:md conscious directedness and to account for this character-
istic of religiosity. Prayer, dogma, and ritual have been 
developed as means of focusing the religious intention at 
specific times. He sees belief as necessary to set in mo-
tion an intent. Belief is the person 's confidence or fc:dth 
in the object or act sought.24 By i ntention he means simply 
VThat the person is trying to do. It is synonymous vdth will. 
Allport 2.lso sees personal religion refracted by bodily 
needs, temperament, intelligence, psychogenic interest s and 
24 Allport, '!Intent c.nd Fe:d th", Lecture 6 of his Lowell 
Lectures given at King's Chapel, Boston (Feb. -March, 1947) . 
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values, pursuit of meani ng , and the effect of t he surrounding 
culture. Despite its derivative na ture, i ts pov,-er through 
func t ional autonomy, i s i ndependent of it s origins. It is 
as if 
the s elf hands over to it (the r eligious s entiment ) 
the t a sk of i nterpreti ng ••• and of providing motive 
-pov. er to lbre ••• v:ith an ad equa t e f r(Cllil e of value and 
Beani ng , and to enlarge and energize this fr ame by 
seeki ng cosmic support. 25 
iii. Asnects gf. Growth . Allport sees the basic aspects 
of growth as differenti ation, i n t egr a tion, ma turation, and 
1 . 
_ea.rnlng. The constrain t s of the self26 2re also asp ects of 
growth. One of the mo s t important is tha t of i ntegr a tion . 
Integr a tion produces a hierarchy of levels i n personality. 
I n tegrated systems of condi t i on ed r eflexes fo r m habits. The 
i ntegr ation of habit s helps to form, in part a t leas t, traits. 
Th e i n t egra tion of traits forms egos. 27 Finally, the i n te-
gr ation of ego systems forms personality, e..n ideal stag e of 
uni ty never reached. Thes e levels occur chronol ogically in 
response to the vari ety of events r equiring adjustment. 
Another i mportc:nt asp ect of grmr.;· th i s lea.r ning . Three 
import2.nt applicctions of learning to personE,li ty gr mvth are 
25 All port, "Religion of Ma turi tyn , Lecture 3 of series 
noted above. 
26 b See p . 172f. a ove. 
27 Allport, £ersonal j~, p . 139f. He r efers t o trait-sys-
tems a s nselvesT! &fter J ames . Ego seems bet t er as pointed ou t 
above (p . 170). 
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conditioning, insight, and imitc:. tion. These are especially 
importc:~.nt for understanding religious groV~,- th because condi-
tioning refers to the extension of the range of stimuli that 
vdll arouse a given response. This accounts for the widen-
ing, in part, of religious interests and desires as well as 
actions to religious objects. Insight accounts for the re-
ligious growth tha t occurs "~rhen the person is able to survey 
the field, organize, and fritelligently comprehend the poten-
tial relationship between various religious objects, symbols, 
&nd ideas , and himself to his God. Of the three, insight 
is most fundamental to religious growth . It presupposes con-
scious awareness , search, value-judgment, and choice. Grovrth 
by insi ght is mot'e r a tional, personal, and permanent than that 
of the other t wo. 28 However, Allport points out that imita-
tion may be a result of insight. Imitation is defined as 
consciously or unconsciously taking over a mode of adjustment 
from someone who serves the imi te_tor as a model for conduct. 
Imitation is more significant in the religious growth of 
children "trho imita te their parents' religious attitudes and 
behavior. 
In order to account for the 
uniqueness and stability of personality, Allport develops the 
theory of traits, ;,rhich also a ccount s for continuity c:md vari-
ety i n personality . The theory of trait s is a supplement to 
~8 C. R~gers, Counseling and Psychotheya~y (Boston:Hough-
ton-Mifflin, 1942), Ch. 7. 
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thB theory of functional autonomy. He defines a trait a s 
"a generalized and focalized neuro-psychic system (peculiar 
to the L1di vidual.) Yii th the cc:qJaci ty to render many s timuli 
functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide consistent 
( ) • •O _equivalent f ~rms of adaptive behavior".~~ 
Traits area necessary inference to give account of the 
unity c:md consistency of separate actions. They function 
as driving motives and/::>r as stylistic manners beca.use they 
are integrated systems of habits. Although traits focus and 
mobilize lesser habits and attitudes, they overl c. p, cluster, 
and interoenetrate vith other traits. A sufficiently i n.te-
grated personality may possess a cardinal trait or centrc;.l 
traits vvhich characterize the personality. There are traits 
common to many persons and there are traits that are the ex-
elusive characteristics of t heir possessor. 
Traits are similar to attitudes in that they are readi-
nesses for response, individualized, <:md distinctive of their 
possessor. Both may initiate and guide behavior. There 
are, hovvever, three distinctions between traits and attitudes. 
An attitude has a specific object of reference whereas traits 
have no definite reference. In other vmrds, an a ttitude rep-
resents a point of view whereas a trait refers to one's man-
ner of behaving. Attitudes may be specific and general where-
as traits are only general . The third distinction is that 
29 Allport, Personali~, p . 295 . 
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attitudes have, a clear-cut direction; tr aits are merely in-
ferred and are stylistic. 
The significance of the doctrine of traits for under-
standing religious persons may be seen more clearly by corn-
paring it I"Ti th the oft-quoted conclusions of Hartshorne e.nd 
Shuttleworth.30 After extensive inquiries into character 
education and conduct, they reach the conclusion that char-
acteristics such as honesty and self-contrl are specific hab-
its learned in relation to specific situations which have 
made the one or the other mode of re sponse successful. They 
are not actions guided by genere.l ideals and are, therefore, 
not trcd ts. Furthermore, Hartshorne and Shuttleworth hold 
that specific habits are the units of personality. Thus 
what c;m individual does in a given situation depends upon how 
his past experience has linked his movements to the stimulat-
ing situation. A person is therefore not, for example, hon-
est as a man, _ but honest in particular situations in an insul-
ated 'Nay. His honesty in a given situation depends upon the 
similarity to past situations in which the habit of honesty 
was formed. On this view one would find it difficult to un-
derstand how a thie£ who experienced a sudden conversion could 
suddenly become meticul.ousl.y honest in situations where he had 
previously been dishonest. This is an extreme exampl.e, but 
30 Hartshorne and Shuttleworth, Studies .in the Orgc>.niza-
tion of Character (Vol. 3 of Character Ed. Inouir~, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1930, p. 3'72.f. 
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the point is that interpersonal relations w-ould be in a ter-
rible state of affairs if human actions were bound by situa-
tional habits. For religious training, such a view almost 
amounts to conditioning, wherein a child would have to learn 
to respond to an ever i ncreasing range of stimuli. He may 
not ever become dependably honest because a. new situation may 
arise and his accumulation of experience will mean nothing. 
His habits of telling the truth, respecting the property of 
others, etc., v:hich may be ordered under a trait of honesty, 
would break do :m. Such a view seems to presuppose that chil-
dren are incapable of insight. 
Allport points out the fallacies of such argument as 
being grounded in Hartshorne fmd Shu ttl.eworth' s f ailure to 
see that the children investigated were not inconsistent with 
themselves, the investigators failed to consider the f act 
that children have traits other than honesty tha t may have 
been invoked, the method used proceeded from the point of 
view of child psychology, and the fact that their conclusions 
were dependent upon their interpretation of the data. 
From a positive point of view, the doctrine of traits 
is helpful f or understanding relapses from the religious code 
of conduct because one realizes that the individual has ideals 
other than religious ones which may conflict with the reli-
gious traits. The doctrine of traits indica tes that the in-
troception of religious ideals will mobilize and focalize 
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systems of habits for the a ttai nment of t he se ideals. Rather 
than the si tua.tion and habit being the guide of conduct, the 
religious ideals i ncorpora ted i n to the ego system f urnish the 
guilding lines of conduct. This accounts f or consistency 
in religious conduc t . 
The f act tha t person s have many tr aits c:; nd t h e f act that 
traits may be stylistic are h el pful i n understanding t he man-
ner and degree of religious participation. Traits of conser-
vatism, pro gressiveness, t olerance, i ntolerance, introver sio~ 
are some examples. Traits, however, are no t i ndices of r e-
ligious exp erience because the var i eties of religious experi-
ences are derived from the poin t of view and i n terpreta tion 
of the observer who abstracts some attributes of r eligious 
per son s and t hen proceeds to label personal r eligious experi-
ences by the names of traits he has observed i n t he person 
exp eriencing religi on. I ndi vidua1s do not f it r eligious ex-
periences; they have them. The type of religious exp erience 
tha t t he i ndi vi du a.l h as depends more u pon its meani n g for the 
i ndi vidual than the meaning of his actions t o the observer. 
It is a distinct con tribution of personalistic p sychol-
ogy, v:hich l eads to a .better unders tanding of r e~igion, t ha t 
emph asis is placed upon the system of habits, traits, attitudes, 
and egos of particular re*igious personalities, r a ther than 
r el y ing solely upon a particular cardinal trait tha t an indi-
vidual exhibits. From this poin t of view, religion is ano t her 
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part of the environment whose values and ideals the person 
may introcept into his personality for ini tia.ting and guiding 
his adjustments. The doctrine of traits goes beyond the r:1o-
mentary motivation stressed by Lewin. It dethrones the stim-
ulus emphasized by Tolman and the behaviorists. It gives 
content and meaning to the unconscious stressed by depth psy-
chologists. It shows that one individual belongs to a host 
of types , but that the most important thing in understanding 
him is the internal structure of his traits. 
v. The Mature Personality. Allport sees at least three 
distinguishing marks of the mature personality.31 The first 
i s that the mature personal i ty has not just one, but a variety 
of autonomous interes ts and goals which represent extensions 
of himself. He can lose himself , for example, i n v·ork, pol-
i tics, recreation, and religion with equal vigor and vi tc.li ty. 
Be can see the value of each for widening and extending his 
ra.nge of experience. Objectively, such a wide r ange of ex-
perience is a mar k of the mature personality. This implies 
tha t the mature person is an active participant, not merely 
passive , i n many affairs . He has an ego-ideal for each of 
his interests tha t helps guide him in creative living. As 
a.n ego-ideal involves intention and planning, it gives long-
r ange purpose to l ife. 32 
31 Allport, Personality, p . 213f. 
32 All·oort, "Scientific Models and Human Mor c'.ls" in 
"Psychological Review, 54 (July, 1947). 
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This is in contradistinction to the sign-Ge s talt expect-
ancy concept tha. t Tolman uses to i nterpr e t unrealized goals 
of bo th rats and men . 33 Such a concept depends upon past 
experience, learned cues, and mechB.nical reinforcements to 
i n terpret behavior. It is thus i ncapable of explaining the 
dissatisfaction of a present way of life and the setting up 
of new ideal.s and values with V;'hich to identify oneself. Ex-
t ension of the self i n to new fields of interest ·would come 
merely by accident and not as an expressed intention or uur-
nose of the i ndividual. 
The variety of interests of the ma ture person indica tes 
t hat one may be religious. without being mature . Ho v.: ever, 
such is not the case in the Christian sense because t h e i nter-
personal character of religion is clearest in s elf-giving, co-
operation, social partici pation, and its variety of interests 
i n the social order.c4 Reli gion provides a wide r ange of' 
interests 'i'.ri thin i ts framework f or the extension of self . 
To name a few of these, on e may cite the fields of social. \rei.-
f are , reform, recrea tion, missionary work , c:u1.d educa tion. A 
central teaching of Christi anity is tha t he who loses himself 
in services to others shall find h imself . Thus, is so f ar 
a s a variety of autonomous interests are con cerned, the reli-
33 See above , p. 66f. 
34 See P. E. Johnson, Psychology_ of Religion, Ch . 10. 
Also 'Fieman and li'~'ieman, Normative Psychology of Religioq 
(Nev,- York : Crowell, l935), p . 320f. 
7;5 gious personal ity is a mature personality. u 
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Allport sees the second mark of the mature ;J ersonality 
as the capacity for self-objectification or i nsi ght. Self-
insight is defined as the ability to survey and evalua te one's 
nretensions in relation to abilities, present objectives in 
relation to possible objectives, one's ovm equipmen t in rela-
tion to the equipment of others, and one's ovm opinion of 
ones elf in relation to the opinions of others about him. In 
short, it may be defined as self-J:r..nowledge. It is closely 
correlated with humor, another perspective in which one views 
himself as he pretends to be in comparison vri th what he actu-
ally is; he sees his absurdity and yet enjoys it. 
Insight is a prerequisite for change in personality. 
It mc:Jces past mistake s intelligible, shows the ground.lessness 
of needless worries, and enables the individual to gain c.. more 
accur2te perspective of himself. 
Allport points out that, i n. one respect, humor i s lik e 
r eli gion. A religious reference enables one to s ee oneself 
and hi s problems in relation to a divine scheme tha t gives 
t hem changed meaning.36 Humor enables one to see them a s 
trivi a l and or no consequence. Both are alik e in that they 
35 Se e P.' E. Johnson, "Religi ous Psychology and Health1:!, 
Mental HyRi ene, 31 (Oct., 1947), p. 562f. for a penetra ting 
analysis of i n terests and correctives that religi on offers for 
a healthy personality. 
36 Allport, Personality, p. 225. 
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are frs.mes of reference el1abling the individual. to vi e·w him-
self' and his problEms. in novel and sane 1a tterns. They 
sha tter the fixedness of literal -mindedness. Both bring per-
suective. 
By a questionaire given to 500 students, Allport et al 
found, among other facts, that seven out of every ten students 
answering felt tha t they needed some form of religious orien-
t a tion or belief in order to achieve a fully mature philoso-
phy of life. 37 A unifying philosophy of life is the third 
characteristic of the mature personality. A unifying phil-
osophy of life is a dynamic idea, a fundamental conception of 
value, embracing in scope, which serves as an autonomous sys-
tern v:herein one's life bec01~es unified. 38 Allport sees reli-
gion as one of the most comprehensive philosophies of life. 
Defining religion as 11 the search for a value underlying all 
thingsn, 39 he sees a deeply moving religious experience as 
one that remains a focus of thought and desire. Religion 
serves an integrative function in personality. 
Although a religious philosophy of life may be an in-
dication of the mature personal.ity, Allport recognizes tha t 
there are immature persons who have an immature religion and 
37 G. 1N. Allport, J. M. Gillespie, and J. Young, "The 
Religion of t he Post-War College Student", Journal of Ps:;:chol-
~' 25 (Jan., 1948), p. 30. 
38 G. w. Allport, PersonalitY, p. 226f. 
39 Ibid., p. 226. 
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vice versa • In his Lowell lecture on the religion of matur-
. . 40 lty, Allpor t i ndica tes the distinctions between the r eligion 
of the mature and the immature personality. The r eligion of 
immaturity is egocentric, magical, irresponsible, complete 
( s t a tic), intolerant, fana tical, and a servant, r a t her t h &n 
master of the i ndi vidual . On the other hand, t he religion 
of maturity gives coherence and purpose to life, :Nideni ng in-
terests, ent<dls me.ny a ttitudes, but yet a stable vmy of l i fe, 
is never complete or secure, is comprehensive and integr al to 
personality. It is self-giving and !Jroductive of a con sis-
tent morality. It possesses mo tivational po~er. It mar-
shalls motives toward a goal that is not necessarily one of 
self-interest. It ,:-ives steady influence and quiets moral 
storm. It is on guard for bigotry and im]Jeri c:,li sm and makes 
fo r tolerance. Finally, it is co-scientific, i. e ., i t 
t alces the t hreads of science and weaves them i'Yi th those of 
values and mor.als. The mature r eligious sentiment is nur-
tured i n doubt and engendered by faith. 
vi. Summary. Allport's psychol.ogy i ndeed expands the 
boundaries of psychology for a picture of the total personal-
ity. The psychology of personality is a n ecessar y su9plement 
of general :personalistic psychology f or adequately ULJ.derstand-
i ng religious experience and religious behavior. Bov.ne , Cal-
40 G. w. Allpo rt, "Religion of Maturityn, Lecture 3 of 
the Lowell Lectures (Feb. -March, 194'7). 
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k i ns , &nd Stern pres ent the necessary concepts for the com-
:;> rehension of experience, but it is Allport v.;ho follows Stern' s 
l ead in depicting the organi zation of those psychophysical 
tendencies which help to de termine our ad justment. 
For an understc:mding of religious persons, the t endency 
i s away from the structure of the unconscious, · environment, 
Etnd types toward a knowledge of the structure of the person-
ality as a r;hole as it is affected by unconscious mechanisms, 
stimuli of the environment , and the cardinal traits of person-
B.li ty • The latter co nstitute parts of the ) ersonality and 
·'' .r--
the raw material with vc-hich it has to work. Thus religion 
is not understood from the point of view of unconscious de-
sires, purposive behaviorisms, or the effect of t he environ-
ment as has been attempted by depth, behavioristic, and typo-
logical :psychologies. Person8listic psychology uses all 
these and more in a - uni:fi:ed ,: context for adequate understand-
ing. 
Allport takes an eclectic ap-proach to personality study. 
Many concepts of other p sychologies are retained, but are 
pl&ced within a personalistic fr ame of reference. The con-
cepts distinctive of Al~port's psychology are those of func-
tional '- ,, tonomy of motives, ego-ideal, ego-system, and trait. 
The con ~cepts of attitude, configuration, integration, interest, 
intention, congruence, and t he psychoanalytic mechanisms are 
used in a personal istic context. These are some of the con-
cepts vital for a psychological understanding of religion. 
£07 
Traits, attitudes, &nd egos represent significant structura~ 
levels of personality through v~rhich a psycho~ogical under-
standing of the religious behavior can be understood. The 
constraints of the self and the functional autonomy of motives 
give an account of the changes and the uniqueness of religious 
motivation which varies from _9 erson to person although the 
enviro~ment remains constant. The concept of intention also 
indicates the uniqueness of every personal religious experience. 
The conscious search which chara.cterizes religious experience 
indicates a personal intention. 
Allport's personalistic interpretation of personality 
supplements Bowne, Calkins, and Stern's personalistic inter-
ore tation of exDerience. ~ .L Religious behavior thus becomes 
com:n·ehensible by means of a. knowledge of the organization of 
. psychophysical tendencies ~hich help to determine our adjust-
ment to the religious ideals and objects in our environment. 
CHAP TER VIII 
SUMlviAHY LND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Summary 
We have examined concepts from representa tives of five 
current psychologies for their adequacy in understanding re-
~igious experience and behavior. 
Psychology throws light on the understanding of religion 
mostly i n the areas of the s elf, conscious experience, moti-
va tion, interpersonal relations, and personality. The basic 
perspective of a psychology is both a limitation and potenti-
ality for adequa te trea tmen- v r tl:.es e areas. 
The self is important -· i .n · a.ccounting for unity, identi-
ty, and change in experience. Reli giosity is understood by 
understanding the functions of the self in r eligious experi-
enc e and behavior. Although the unconscious is helpfu.l, the 
area of conscious experience is more so for m1derstanding re-
ligi on because it is in conscious exp erience and behavior that 
the unconscious has its effects. Moreover, consciousness 
provides the on e a.nd only true verification of religious ex-
perience. 
The problem of motivation in religion is concerned with 
helping us to m1derstand the dynamics of religiosity. It 
helps us to understand the p sychological causes of the unique, 
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personal, and dyn 2mic experience, and behavi or in religiosity. 
The area of i n ter personal relations helps us to comprehend 
the degree tovhich ·a:>Cial and other environmental relationships 
affect personal religion. The area of personality gi ves an 
understanding of the organization of tendencies to religious 
experience and behavior. These five area s serve as a frame 
of reference for examining psychologies f or the adequacy of 
t heir concepts helpful for a psychological understandil~ of 
religion. 
Personal religion is defined as experience and action 
upon personal values direc ted toward cooperation or communica-
tion with the Creator and Sustainer of values • 
.fJ..n examination of typologic al psychology as represented 
by Eduard Spr anger reveals a marked concern fo r understanding 
the r eligious man. However, religiosity is so broadly de-
fined as t o be almost meaningless i n the Chris t i an sense . 
Although Spranger uses a religious self in hi s psychology, the 
five other selves of the ideal types he postulates blur any 
understanding of the singl e, V(hole individual , y,ho is practi-
cally always a "mixed" type. Spranger emphasizes conative-
cognitive aspects of conscious experience . But his theo ry 
of mo tivation is based on a simple set of instincts ba sed on 
the a.tti tudes of his six types . This is far too simple to 
account for the great varieties of attitudes in r eligiosity. 
The personality structure of the religi ous per son in typol.ogi-
cal psycholGgy as represented by Spranger is abstract and 
ideal, rather than concrete and practical. 
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Gestalt psychology as represented by Kurt Lewin ha s 
much to commend it for a psychological. understanding of reli-
gion. The dynamic concepts set forth are very helpful. The 
concepts of ego and ego-systems , fields of force, valence, 
tension, inner personal region, and goal regions throw much 
light on religious behavior. How~ver, Le~in sees no need of 
a self and holds that the various egos are sufficient. This 
is confusing to o-o.e -.·ho ha s observed and experienced co ntinui-
ty in persons who ·s~ek~ to'~tn'lify · thei.r (behavlor. I.ev·.·in also 
confines himself to only momentary situations tha t the person 
finds himself in. This is enlightening as far as it goes, 
but it does not seem to go f ar enough. 
Behaviorism of the purposive type is represented by 
E. c. Tolman, As most of his conclusions about human bei:i1gs 
are the re sults of inferences from rat behavior, t here is 
very little ligh t to be thro~n on religiosity, a phenomenon 
with no parallel in the behavior of lo·wer animals. The ques-
tion of a unifying agent is dismissed as a metaphysical ques-
tion. The concep~ of sign-Gestalt expectancy and need-cath-
exis come nearest to any concepts for understanding religion. 
However,. the former is non-conscious and the latter is a re-
sult of conditioning instincts. They are stimulus-bound and 
his other concepts also lack explana tion of the deeper, future-
2ll 
oriented, and conscious aspects of behavior with 'iihich reli-
gion is concerned. 
Depth psychology has been both stimula ting c:.nd ·t} roduc-
tive for a psychologic al understanding of religion. Carl 
Jung, the representa tive examined, lecms toward an ideali s tic 
philosophical position. His concepts of the unconscious, 
psyche, collective unconscious, introversion, and ex troversion 
2.nd his other concep ts l ead to c;m understanding of some as-
pects of t he religious person. However, pr actically all of 
his concepts are concerned vvi th explaining the dynamics of 
the unconscious. The unconscious de s ires and impulses are 
the re sult of repression, on the one hand, and of instincts, 
on t he other. The collective unconscious expl e,i ns the in-
stincts. Jtmg underestimates the pov.rer c:.nd value of con-
sciousness. All aspects are subjuga ted to the unconscious. 
Although the unconscious is valuable for understanding reli-
gion, it is not t he Khol e story. Religious ideas, beliefs , 
and s~rmbols do not just demonstrate unconscious mo tivation. 
The other area.s of t h e person must be brought to bea-r for a 
full understanding of r eligion. Jung does not do thi~. 
The p sycho~o gists who represent the p ersona~istic v iev;-
do not exhibit the radical departures that are found among 
psychologi s ts in some schools of psychology. Although there 
are differences among the personalists, they are minor and 
are overshadowed by the wide areas of agreemen t. 
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Borden Parker Bovme, the first represent a. tive of the 
ner son.alistic view i n .Americ a has been largely overlook ed 
as fc:.r as his p sychology is concerned by historians. An ex-
amination of his ·writings reveals f acts tha t h av e been devel-
o·. ed by later personalistic p sychologists. Eov:ne emphe:.sized 
ei!1p iricism in p sy chology. Although he held to the supreme.cy 
of the intros·:)ective method, he emphasized the importance c:.nd 
legitimacy of other methods of studying the mind. This is 
a.n e arly i n dic a tion of t he eclecticism thc:~. t characteri z es 
per s onalistic p sychology . Bov,ne emphasizes the importe nce 
of action and conduct and c. consistent mor c.lity a s t he impor-
tc .nt c;_sp ects of r eli giosity. If mysticism leads to th~ t 
end, and does not become an end i n itself , he sav; it as worth-
V.'h il.e cmd import c>.nt for underst<:mc1 ing r eli giosity. He r e co g-
ni zed the dyn&mic char&.cter of emotions. He stressed the 
co~J.scious striving of t he individual as a.n important c-.s ·9ect 
of r eligio s ity. He notes the importance of hc:bit-for:na tion 
a.round ideals. He n o tes e.lso th2.t on ce they are formed, they 
becoMe e ither a help or a hindr a nce to con scious striving f or 
r E:ligiosi ty. 
_[ary V!hi t on Ca l Lins dev e lo:9ed her ) er s ono.l i s tic :;::·s y chol-
ogy from clues given by Josiab. Royce and V.rilliam J ames . The 
self or s oul had b een t c.I~en for grant ed until mechc.ni s tic em-
phases Ce.me into p sychology. The self vms th en throv'll out 
r i th t he soul. To clarify and reins t a t e t he self i n :?sychol-
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agy was Calk ins' greatest aim. 
Her writings reveal c-, penetrating c;malysis of the v ar-
ious schools of psychology and their abstractness V'i thout a 
11 .. nifying agent. She shov-:s how these schools could profit by 
c:,nd be recon ciled vd th self psychology. She defined :)s y chol-
ogy as the science of the self irt relation to, or conscious-
ness of, its environment . Religiosity is understood only 
2.s vv-e understand the self in its rela tion to other selves. 
The relationship between a human self a.nd a divine self comes 
under t his considerati on. As many of her other concep ts are 
nov; outmoded and there was not sufficient integration of the 
useful concep ts of other p sychologies, we examine Stern's p sy-
chology for a modern personalistic approach. 
William Stern develop s his p er s onalistic p sychology al-
!.'1ost unc:nra r e of Calkins c:.nd Bowne although he was -:,Jrobably 
av;--are of their philosophic&.l personalism. Except for the 
psychologic a.l neutrality of the p erson, il'.-hich he holds, he 
i s fundamentally in agreement with Bowne a.nd Calkins. How-
ever, Stern expands an d deepen.s the underste.nding by the 
wealth of concep ts adequc,te for 2. l':lsycb.o'ro g:Lcal understanding 
of' r e ligion. This is in relati onshi::_J to the . stage of ·p sy-
chology a t the present time. His concep ts of converg ence, 
introception, expansion of t he realm of feeling , c; nd h is con-
cern for u.n.derstanding such an experience as the religi ous, 
go f aT beyond the concepts of most psychologists to-day. As 
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v:i th Bovme and Calk ins, St er n is concerned v':i. th t h e con scious 
striving of t he self towa.rd higher go als thc:m mere biologi -
c al adjustment. 
So far, the personal .istic psychologists h ave not a de-
q_uately treated the field of interpersonal r elation s no r de-
veloped a theory of emotions, both of Fhich are important as-
pects of reli gi on . Calkin s made an c..ttemp t a. t interp erson al 
p sychology but vYas no t systematic in her treatme11t. The ad-
jus tment between t v;o individua ls is quite differ en t from t h e 
ad ju s tmen t of the individual t o the ma terial environmen t. 
These t wo area s are no t adequ a tely tre2.ted by yersonali s ts 
nor any of t h e other p sychologists who se Viorl-:s we h &.ve exa.mined. 
Gordon v.~illard Allport follows the suggestion of Stern 
t ha t the relatively persistent behavior t en dencies of t h e in-
dividual be .studied objectively. Allport points out tha t 
this i s the individual's p ersonality, which y:hen judged by 
some ethical code is c alled character. It is compo sed of a 
hierarchy of levels con sisting of habits, trait s , and egos. 
Al s o fundament<:>,! to the devero·pment of p er sonality a re mdny 
of the concep ts of the dep th psychologists , some of th e behav-
ioris t ic p sycholo g i s ts, and ma ny of the Gestalt p sych ologists. 
Th e typologic al appro a ch is helpful f or a s t art in understand-
ing th e v e.rious o er s ons a s i s the Gestalt appro a ch. In short, 
Allport exhibits the zenith of p ersonalism's eclecticism. The 
con cep ts of functi onal autonomy of motives, intention, and 
tr aits ana attitudes .:,re fundar.ten t al for UI'l;derstanding r elig-
iosity. 
2. Conclu~§_ 
(1) Personalistic psychology provides a wider r Gnge of con-
cepts covering a l arg er and longer (in time) area of the 
i ndividual t h an the other four psychologies exami ned. 
The areas of the self, conscious and the unconsciou s, 
motiva tion, and interpersonal rela t ion s h aving such a 
vi tal importance for understanding the religion of :_-. he 
individual, religiosity can best be understood by the con-
cepts presented from r epresenta tives of t his view. 
Th eir eclecticism does not pr eclude, but includes concepts 
from the other psychologies, yet in a broader pers·qective. 
(2) Personalistic psychology is not adverse to r eligion . 
The four mc.in represente_ tives give considerable treatment 
to religiosity, a f act tha t is not prevalent in con t empor-
ary psychology, exc~pt · in social psychology. Preoccupa-
tion Vii th phenomena peculiar to only biologica.l ad justmen t 
or the moment c:.ry environment are insuffici ent for 1..mder-
standing r eligion. By actively and purp o sely attempting 
to account for the higher needs, personalistic psychology 
has thereby developed concepts tha t vrill apply to r eligious 
exp erience and conduct. 
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(3) Mystical religious experiences are importc:mt for a psycho-
logical understanding of religiosity only c. s they result 
in a relatively consistent morality. .As some "9 Sychol.o-
gists, notably J. H. Leuba, have attempted to underst2nd 
and evaluate religiosity by the mystical experience, per-
sonalistic psychologists, notably Bo~1e, place the mysti-
c al ex9erience in its context, the living and acting per-
sonality. Not the origin of the mystical experience, 
but its effects on the ideals, intentions, anc1 behavior 
tendencies prove a better criterion for understanding 
and evaluating mystical experience. 
(4) Personalistic psychology leaves the problem of the truth, 
&nd validity of religious dogma to the philosoyhers. 
The depth psychologists, notably, occasionally forget the 
scientific method and intermingle psychological f acts with 
l)hilosophical speculations, thereby rendering confusion 
about religiosity. Although most of the personal i sts 
have specula ted on such problems, their speculation vvas 
confined to their philosophies. It did not occur as a 
psychological treatment of religion. 
(5) Religiosity, however it may be motivated, is a form of 
introception. It is the meaningful and conscious incor-
poration of values into the self. Introception of re-
ligious values may occur without a perceptual 
medium. 
?1.7 
It may occur by the personification c:~nd r ever-
ence of ideas. And it may occur in the comprehension 
of God in persons. Mysticism is another means of attempt-
ing to comprehend and coalesce v a.lues from the divine in-
to one's ovm selfhood. The divine reference makes values 
religious. 
(6) P~ though no one is in a position to state exactly the ul-
timate cause of human behavior in persons, personalistic 
:p sychology indica tes more clearly th<m any other psychol-
ogy the dynamics of change in religious behavior at the 
level of consciousness. Although religiosity may start 
from u:11conscious ·vdshes, propensities, or org.:mic tensions, 
the theory of functional autonomy of motives provides an 
understanding of the selectivity and relati ve freedom of 
the con scious self to regula te and guide religious behav-
ior. This theory is coextensive with the axiom tha t ori-
gin does not determine value. By the concept of intention, 
the initiative of the person himself gives a clue to the 
freedom and responsibility of the individual i n religios-
ity. 
(7) Religiosity is best understood as a set of personal ity 
traits. The religious person has other traits beside the 
religious. The degree and extent of his religious habits 
determine the strength of the religious traits. St rong 
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religious trait s ~ill affect non-religious behavior. 
Religious trait s initiate behavior guided by ideals rath-
er than particular situations or conventions. They there-
by affect the volitional activity of the person. A re-
ligious trait is an integrated system of habits of coop-
erating and commu_nica.ting v·i th God (peculiar to the in-
dividual) capable of initi a ting and guiding consistent 
and ~quivalent forms of adaptive and expressive religious 
behavior. It may and usually does include moral habits. 
(8) The organization of the dominant traits of the r eligious 
:r erson will reveal the position of his religious traits 
and attitudes . The apparent inconsistencies in his be-
havior vrill thereby be clarified by understanding ·wh a t 
other traits are stronger v.:i thin him <:md may be the guid-
ing factor in the situation. 
(9) Personalistic psychology indicates that the person, as 
responsible, in part a t least, for his attitudes and be-
havior, is best able to chang e them. He does so t o the 
extent tha t he himself i s free to recogni ze and introcept 
the values most important for him tha t a re suggested by 
the environment. 
(10)Personalistic psychology views human nature as n either 
good nor bad, but capable of becoming either. It indi-
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cates tha t good and bad persons depend upon ability, in-
telligence, temperament, the objective and conceptua~ 
environment , t h e type of values introcepted, and his con-
scious and unconscious drives. These factors affect 
the individual in the process of growth. 
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ABSTRACT 
There are conflicting interpretations of t he 
psychology of religion. Eecause this is so, there is apt 
to be confusion as to which of these psychologies is rele-
vant and adequate for int erpreting personal religion. The 
purpose of this dissertation is to examine the concepts of 
representatives of five current psychologies for their 
inplications, or their re1evancy and adequacy, in inter-
preting religion. By religion is meant personal cooperation 
or communication with a conceived CreatDr and Sustainer of 
values. 
:Psychology throws light on the understanding of 
religion mostly in the areas of the self, conscious ex-
perience, motivation, interpersonal relations and person-
ality. 
The self is important in a ccounting for unity, 
identity, and change in experience. The functions of the 
self provide . interest and integration in religious ex-
perience and behavior. Although the unconscious is 
contributary, the area of conscious experience is more so 
for understanding religion beca.use it is in conscious 
experience and behavior that the unconscious has its 
effects. Moreover, consciousness provides the one and only 
true verification of religious experience. 
Motivation has to do with the psychological causes 
of the unique, personal, and dynamic experience as ex-
pressed in religious behavior. The area of interpersonal 
relations helps us to comprehend the degree to which socia1 
interactions and relationships affect personal religion. 
The development of personality leads to the organization of 
religious tendencies into habitual attitudes and traits of 
character. These five areas serve as a frame of reference 
in examining psychologies as to the adequacy of their con-
cepts for a psychological understanding of religion. 
An examination of typological psychology as repre-
sented by Eduard Spranger reveals marked concern for 
understanding the religious man. However, religion is so 
broadly defined as to be almost meaningless. Although 
Spranger uses a religious self in his psychology, the five 
other ideal types he postulates blur any understanding of 
the single, whole individual, who is practically always a 
'~ixedM type. His theory of motivatio~ is limited to a 
simple set of instincts ba sed on the attitudes of his six 
types. This is far too simple to account for the great 
varieties of attitudes in religiousness. The personality 
structure of the religious person in typological psychology 
is abstract and ideal, rather tha n concrete and practica1. 
Gestalt psychology as represented by Kurt Lewin has 
much to commend it. The dynamic concepts of ego and ego-
systems, fields of force, valence,tension,inner personal 
region, and goal regions throw much light on religious 
behavior. However, Lewin sees no need of a self and holds 
that the various egos are sufficient. This is confusing to 
one who has observe= and experienced continuity in persons 
who seek to unify their behavior. Lewin is confined to 
momentary situations in which the person finds himself. 
The stability of the religious person himself is therefore 
overlooked. 
Behavioris.m of the purposive type is represented by 
E.G. Tolman. As most of his conclusions about human beings 
are the results of inferences from rat behavior, there is 
very little light to be thrown on religiousness, a phenomenon 
without parallel in the behavior of lower animals. The 
question of a unifying agent is dismissed as a metaphysical 
question. The concepts of sign-Gestalt expectancy and 
need .. cathexis come nearest to any concepts approaching 
religion. However, the former is non-conscious and the 
latter is a result of conditioning instincts. They are 
stimul.us-bound and his other concepts also la.ck explanation 
of the deeper, future-oriented, and conscious aspects of 
behavior with which religion is concerned. 
Depth psychology has been both stimulating and pro-
ductive of a psychological understanding in religion. Carl 
3ung, the representa tive examined, has concepts of the un-
conscious, psyche, collective unconscious, introversion, 
and extroversion and other oo~epts to lead to an understand-
ing of some aspects of the religious person. However, 
practically all of his concepts are concerned with explaining 
the dynamics of the unconscious. Although the unconscious 
is valuable for understanding religion, it is not the whole 
story. Religious interests, attitudes, beliefs, symbols, 
and activities are also consciously motivated. 
Borden Parker Bowne, the first representative of the 
personalistic view in America has been largely overlooked 
as far as his psychology is concerned. An examina tion of 
his writings reveals principles that have been d eveloped by 
later personalistic psychologists. Bowne emphasized empiric-
ism in psychology. There is an indication of eclecticism 
in his writings that characterizes personalistic psychology. 
Bovme emphasizes the i~portance of purpose and conduct and 
a consistent morality as the important aspects of religious-
ness. If mysticism leads to that end, and does not become 
an end in itself, he saw it as worthwhile and important. 
He stressed the conscious striving of the individual. He 
notes the importance of habit-formation around ideals. 
Mary Whiton Calkins developed her personalistic 
psychology from clues given by 3osiah Royce and William 
James. The self or soul had been taken for granted until 
mechanistic emphases came into psychology to challenge it. 
To clarify and reinstate the self in psychology was 
Calkins' aim. Her writings reveal a penetrating analysis 
of the various schools of psychology and their abstract-
ness without a unifying agent. She showed how these schools 
could profit by and be reconciled with self psychology. She 
recognized that religiousness arises in the inte r a ction of 
the self with other selves. As many of her other concepts 
are now outmoded and there was not sufficient i n tegration of 
the useful concepts of other psychologies, we examine Stern's 
psychology for a modern personalistic approach. 
William Stern is fundamentally in a greement wrth 
Bowne and Calkins except for his view of the psychophysical 
neutrality of the person. His concepts, resulting from 
attempts to reconstruct general psychology around the person, 
are empirical, holistic, and activistic. His principles 
of convergence, introception, expansion of the realm of 
feeling, and his concern for religious experience, go beyond . 
the concepts of most psychologists to-day. Stern, Calkins, 
and Bowne are concerned with the striving of the self toward 
higher goals than mere biol ogical adjustment. 
Gordon Willard Allport emphasizes the relatively 
persistent behavior tendencies of the individn.al when 
organized as personality. He points out that personality 
is composed of a hierarchy of·· levels consisti ng of habits. 
traits, and egos. He utilizes cnnc~pts from Gestalt. 
behavioristic, depth, and typological psychologi es for 
depicting the unique individual person and his behavior. 
His concepts of functional autonomy of motives, intention, 
attitudes, and traits are fundamental for understanding the 
unique and cornmo_n religious behavior of persons. 
The following conclusions are drawn from this study 
of the religious implications of :personalistic psychology. 
1. Personalistic psychology provides a wi.der range 
of concepts to understand reli gious persons tha n the other 
four psychologies examined. It includes concepts from other 
psychologies, yet in a 1arger and better integra t ed per-
spective. It is therefore more empirical for r eli gion. 
2. By actively and purposely attempting to account 
for the higher needs, personalistic psychology has thereby 
developed concepts that will apply to religious experience 
and conduct. Its relevancy is thus more distinct. 
3. :Personalistic psychologists place the mystical 
experience in its context, the living and acting personality. 
Not the origin of the mystica l experience, but its effects 
on the ideals, intentions, and behavior tendencies prove a 
better criterion for understanding a nd evaluating mystical 
experience. 
4. Personalistic psychology leaves the problem of 
reality and the truth, the validity of religious domna,to 
the philosophers and thus avoids confusion of a im and fields 
of investigation. 
5. Personalistic psychology indicates more clearly 
than any other psychology the dynamics of change in religious 
behavior at the level of consciousness. This is accomplished 
by the process of functional autonomy of motives. 
6. The theory of traits indicates that behavior may 
be initiated and guided by religious ideals despite particu-
lar situations or conventions. 
7. Religiousness develops by means of introception, 
the conscious and meaningful incorporation of values into 
selfhood by worship, mysticimn, and other religious experiences. 
It is aided by interest, intention, learning, and needs. 
8. Inconsistencies in religious behavior are understood 
by the position of religion in the dynamic organization of 
traits within the individual. The p·erson has many traits. 
9. The principles of ego-involvement a.nd intention 
point to the freedom of the person in recognizing and.in-
trocepting religious values considered most important for 
him. 
10. An understanding of the religious person ie more 
empirical, holistic, and adequate in terms of consciously 
integrated high-level concepts than in stimulus-bound, 
present-oriented, and reductionistic concepts. 
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